AD [illegible] 857

Frontiers of Leadership

AD



THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY PROGRAM ☆ 1970

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE

AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Air Force Systems Command ★ USAF

56

ABSTRACT

Seven papers and related discussion dealing with research and other developments in understanding changing concepts in leadership, presented during the 1969-70 Frontiers of Leadership program at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Qualified requestors may obtain copies from the Defense Documentation Center (DDC). All others may apply to the National Technical Information Service (NTIS).

DDC	NTIS
Cameron Station	U.S. Dept. of Commerce
Alexandria VA 22314	Springfield VA 22151

UNCLASSIFIED
Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED 2b. GROUP --

3. REPORT TITLE

FRONTIERS OF LEADERSHIP: THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY PROGRAM (1970)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Scientific Interim

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

Editors: Robert E. Stockhouse, Col, USAF; Victor F. Phillips, Jr., Lt Col, USAF; and Eugene Owens, Lt Col, USAF

6. REPORT DATE August 1971	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 152	7b. NO. OF REFS ---

8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. F44620-67-C-0093 b. PROJECT NO. 9777 c. 61102F d. 681313	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report) AFOSR-TR-71-1857

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES TECH, OTHER	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Air Force Office of Scientific Research (NL) 1400 Wilson Blvd. lington, Virginia 22209

13. ABSTRACT

Seven papers and related discussions dealing with research and other developments in understanding changing concepts in leadership, presented during the 1969-70 Frontiers of Leadership program at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 1473

UNCLASSIFIED
Security Classification

KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
Leadership						
management						
motivation studies						
organizational effectiveness						

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1971 O - 438-098

AFOSR-TR-71-1857

FRONTIERS OF LEADERSHIP:

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY PROGRAM (1970)

Editors

Col Robert E. Stockhouse, USAF
Lt Col Victor F. Phillips, Jr., USAF
Lt Col Eugene Owens, USAF

Partially sponsored by AFOSR
under contract F44620-67-C-0093

August 1971

AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Air Force Systems Command, USAF

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

FOREWORD

This volume contains papers and discussions presented during the Frontiers of Leadership program held at the United States Air Force Academy during academic year 1969-70. The impetus for the program largely grew out of the efforts of the editors of this volume, and Dr. Joseph M. Madden (Colonel, USAF, Ret.), Professor of Psychology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and formerly Professor and Head, Department of Psychology and Leadership, U.S. Air Force Academy.

Support and encouragement for the program, as well as for continuing efforts in studying the leadership function, have been provided by the Superintendents (Lt General T.S. Moorman and Lt General A.P. Clark), Dean (Brig General W.T. Woodyard), Commandants (Brig General Robin Olds and Brig General W.T. Galligan), faculty, staff, and cadets of the U.S. Air Force Academy.

Because of the widespread interest in this program, and its potential contributions to research in this area, AFOSR has undertaken publication of this volume as an activity partially supported by the Air Force Working Group on Management Studies, in which AFOSR has been a participant.

CHARLES E. HUTCHINSON
Deputy Director of Life Sciences

Air Force Office of Scientific Research
Arlington, Virginia

BLANK PAGE

The Frontiers of Leadership program was conceived and developed by the U.S. Air Force Academy's Department of Psychology and Leadership to foster an interchange between distinguished guest speakers and the faculty, staff, and cadets. We wanted to get the views, concepts, and philosophy of leadership research and practice from a wide variety of both academicians and practitioners.

Our final product, which has pleased us greatly, has included interchanges with a military leader, several academic researchers, a governor, and four corporation presidents. We sincerely trust that this innovative excursion will have thrust the "frontiers" forward significantly and will presage continued exploration in the future.

THOMAS S. MOORMAN
Lt General, USAF (Ret.)

Colonel Robert E. Stockhouse (EdD, Stanford University) is Professor and Head, Department of Psychology and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy.

Lt Colonel Victor F. Phillips, Jr. (DBA, Indiana University), is Associate Professor and Director of the Division of Organizational Behavior, Department of Psychology and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy.

Lt Colonel Eugene Owens (PhD, University of California, Los Angeles) is Associate Professor and Director of the Division of Experimental Psychology, Department of Psychology and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy.

CONTENTS

The Leadership Education Program at the USAF Academy, Dr. Joseph M. Madden 1

Organizational Leadership 13
Dr. Ralph M. Stogdill

Corporation Presidents' Perceptions of Leadership 35
Panel Discussion
Moderator: Dr. Arthur Mason, Jr.
Participants: Mr. Frederick Fielder
Mr. Robert Owen
Mr. John Bunker
Mr. Alvin Flanagan

Leadership Development 65
Dr. Robert Tannenbaum

The Challenge of Leadership 91
Brig General Robin Olds, USAF

Leader Experience, Leadership Training, and Other Blind Alleys, Dr. Fred Fiedler 109

Leadership in State Government 133
The Honorable John A. Love

Dr. Joseph M. Madden (PhD, University of Texas) is Professor of Psychology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. Dr. Madden retired from the United States Air Force in 1970 as a colonel. His last assignment prior to retirement was Professor and Head, Department of Psychology and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy. A Command Pilot with World War II and Korean combat tours, Dr. Madden's Air Force career was divided between operational flying assignments and duties related to psychology and personnel analysis functions. Dr. Madden was a founder and implementing force behind the Frontiers of Leadership program, which was instituted during his tenure at the Air Force Academy.

Abstract

A brief review is presented of the difficulty of teaching leadership given the inexactitude of the subject matter. A model for teaching leadership--Analysis, Judgment, Action--is presented and explained. Each stage in the model is further explicated and discussed. Integration of the total model into a teaching process is explained with examples from the Command Development course series.

THE LEADERSHIP EDUCATION PROGRAM AT THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

By

Joseph M. Madden

Professor of Psychology, USAF Academy

If you were to adopt a very scholarly approach to the study of leadership, you would spend a number of years reading in the literature of the world, in philosophical treatises, political writings, research reports and other sources. If you worked very hard and were very comprehensive in your coverage, at the end of your study you would reach a very simple conclusion: that we know practically nothing about leadership. There is some research evidence you might accept that the leader is slightly more intelligent than the group he leads. He is not much more intelligent. Other than that, there are really no research results, theories or principles to which one might attribute a high degree of generality.

During this long period of study, you would encounter a number of theories of leadership. There have been trait theories, situation theories, influence theories, great man-charismatic theories, and some that are not as well known; but the only thing one is led to by a study of these theories is that they have extremely limited generality. This is not to say that they have no value at all because they may be useful frameworks for thinking, and there may be good ideas in them. So at the end of this long period of study, and this is a process that a number of us in the Department of Psychology and Leadership have gone through, you would conclude that we know very little about leadership. There are no general guidelines, no principles, no laws.

Now this leaves you in a rather difficult situation if you are charged with teaching the subject. Another frustrating aspect of the field is that, in my opinion, there isn't even an adequate definition of leadership in existence. A year ago we assembled about 100 definitions from 100 authors from varying disciplines, and we were unable to find a definition that we were willing to accept. One of the main reasons is that the definitions tend to define leadership in terms of outcomes or results. It is somewhat like defining a hammer as something with which if you hit a nail, the nail will go in. It doesn't tell you anything whatever about the hammer. When you see definitions that deal with leadership in terms of influence, or some other outcome, they are not adequate for this reason. We had to devise our own operational definition which is essentially that leadership is a sequence of behavioral events. In other words, it is a behavioral process; and the process, in our way of thinking, consists of three major phases--analysis, judgment and action. These three nodes in the system are sequentially related to one another in a systematic way as shown in the diagram below. After the process is completed, it starts again, so that it is cyclic in nature.

This sort of definition, although it is also inadequate, serves at least as a working definition and tentatively solves the enigma of what leadership is. Of course, a leader would be defined as one who pursues this process in a certain context and when it involves a particular type of content. You can probably see that something should be said about the content of the process that differentiates it from repairing an automobile or selecting a wife. It will probably also be necessary to describe the context in which the process takes place that makes it uniquely the leadership process. We might therefore expand the definition as follows: leadership is accomplishment of group goals through behavior of others by application of the process of analysis, judgment and action.



Later we might get into a discussion of some leadership roles as they evolve from a definition of this kind, but I would like to point out that this is a logical derivation. We cannot prove it other than by logical procedures. It does fulfill several very useful purposes, however. First, and the one that we are most interested in, is that it is a framework for learning. One can devise the required learning experiences to teach his students to perform each of these three functions. So it lends order and structure to learning. Second, in terms of the cadets we are teaching, it provides an immediate method, an immediate technique which they can use to develop their skills in the Cadet Wing. It is simple enough that they can learn the basic model in less than an hour and begin immediately to apply it and continue to develop and refine it for the rest of their careers. Finally, it tends to help us emphasize the lack of preconceived solutions, the uniqueness of each situation, and the absence of theories or principles or laws or techniques which can be carried in a handbook with a ready reference index.

The Analysis-Judgment-Action model is also a useful conceptual basis for thinking about leadership, for studying it, and for identifying areas of weakness which require research and development. Now I'll go through each of the three functions and try to give you a more detailed idea of what we mean by each one.

ANALYSIS

- SIMPLIFICATION
- DATA GATHERING
- DATA TREATMENT
- CONTINGENCY PLANNING
- PROBLEM DEFINITION
- INFLUENCE STRUCTURE
- EXPECTATIONS
- STEREOTYPES
- ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
- OBJECTIVES, GOALS
- TASKS

Analysis is defined in the dictionary essentially as simplification. The analysis phase as we see it might require experimentation or the development of new knowledge or new data. It will always require data gathering, either quantitative or qualitative, and some systematic treatment of that data. The analysis phase would involve the problem definition; or in the many military situations where we don't want to wait until a problem is thrust upon us, we may seek to anticipate in order to prevent future problems. In this way, we maximize our posture of preparedness by thinking through the various alternatives for possible contingencies. One of the things that we find most difficult to teach cadets is that the definition of the problem is critical; and once this is accomplished, the remaining two functions may be simple.

We try to teach cadets that as they identify appropriate variables, either quantitative or qualitative, in the analysis phase, they must develop an appreciation for the way they interact with one another. That is why we have linked the variables together with arrows in the diagram above.

In the analysis phase, the individual exerting leadership behavior would want to look at the influence structure in the organization in which he is operating. He would want to know how much influence he has and how much he will permit from his followers. Many definitions of leadership include a phrase concerning the influence of the leader over his followers. We think it is much more complicated than that. The cadet studies the nature of influence, types of influence, sources of influence, and influence patterns among followers as well as the obvious dimension of leader influence on followers. We look at specific situations where the leader is more influenced than influencing and a variety of influence patterns in different organizations. I think consideration of this factor alone illuminates the inadequacy of the majority of definitions of leadership as well as their over-simplification.

The leader would want to know something about the expectations of the people in the organization, and he would want to be aware of his own expectations. Social psychologists can teach us a great deal about the direct and real effects on behavior that are exerted by expectation patterns. The leader would want to know something about the way in which people in the organization perceive others, their stereotypes, and their impressions, especially of him.

Another one of the things we try to develop in the cadet is an appreciation for the fact that we do not operate in a rational world, that things are not perceived according to their physical properties, but according to a combination of factors which lead to a perception which may not be accurate. We emphasize the role of emotion, personality and past experience on perception and the fact that rationality may sometimes play a minor role. But the perception is the reality of life with which we have to deal whether or not it is rational or accurate.

Organizational structure would be a factor to consider in the analysis, and actually it would be pervasive in the action and judgment phases also. Finally, the objectives and the mission, and the currently required task to move in the right direction, must be considered. The task is related to appropriate style of leadership, group properties such as cohesion, maturity of the group, and many other factors. These components of the analysis phase are not listed in order of importance, and the list is suggestive rather than comprehensive. There are many other items that could be added to the list, and some of these items that are listed could be broken out into several more specific ones. The point here is to give you some idea of what we conceive of as the analysis function, its complexity, and its essentiality as a first step in leadership behavior.

Now the analysis itself takes place within the context of another category or set of variables. Some of these variables are unknown at the time the leadership behavioral process occurs. We won't guess at what they might be. If we did, we would have more variables than we could depict because the number would be very large. Some of the more salient, contextual variables, shown in the diagram below, are the personal ones, those applying to the leader himself: his personality, his temperament, his ability, and his experience. And here it is suggested immediately, of course, that the leader has to know where he stands on these dimensions. He has to know a good deal about himself.



The resources available in terms of people, money, machinery, capital goods, etc., are always limiting factors that must be considered. The psychological climate of the group or the organization is an important background type of variable. As you know, organizations tend to have personalities of their own that affect much of the behavior in them. Obviously, the analysis must be performed within the time available--it may be completed in a fraction of a second or may continue for more than a year. Historical factors in terms of similar events in the past are important to know about, as well as the general history of the organization. Rules, regulations, and laws provide restraints and limitations that must be considered, limiting factors within which we must operate. The risk factor, the degree to which risks can be taken, is important in all organizations. A leader must have some well-conceived notions ahead of time about the kinds and amount of risk he is willing to take. Notice that all the contextual variables interact with each other as well as with the analysis itself.

The judgment function, depicted in the diagram below, follows the analysis and includes a large number of components. We can define it as integration of the data and information acquired in the analysis phase and then a subsequent differentiation into those specific relationships relevant at the moment. First, we must evaluate the data and information emanating from the analysis, have available or develop standards for judgment, and understand the bias and prejudice which every individual brings to every judgment that he makes. The cadet learns about personality factors that will affect judgment such as the flexibility-rigidity dimension, dogmatism, authoritarianism, and attitudes of the individual making the judgment. Testing in terms of predicting what would happen if a certain judgment were made fits very well here; and finally, an inference is made which essentially is the end product of this part of the process.

JUDGMENT

- INTEGRATION
- DIFFERENTIATION
- EVALUATION
- STANDARDS
- BIAS, PREJUDICE
- FLEXIBILITY-RIGIDITY
- WHAT-IF TESTING
- INFERENCE

Psychologists know a good deal about the dynamics of human judgment; and a young man who learns this material early in the game can reap rich benefits by understanding his own judgment dynamics, but perhaps more importantly in the early part of his career, by understanding the judgments of others including his superiors.

Again, notice that all these factors interact with one another and also that this is an incomplete list, merely intended to be suggestive. Judgment again takes place in the context of other determining variables, and here we've depicted them as essentially the same as those affecting the analysis. We are repeating ourselves



because now there is a different kind of an effect operating. For instance, the effect the resources might have made in the analysis phase might be quite different from that in the judgment phase. The nature of the effect might be more qualitative than quantitative in this case.

The final node in the system or process is action, the implementation of the judgment. Some of the components indicated here are timing, the implications in terms of the social structure with which we are working, the resistance to innovations or change that might be expected, the psychological makeup of the followers, testing the feasibility of an action on which we have decided, and methodology for implementing action. We spend a lot of time studying change: resistance to change, the leader as a change agent, delayed effects, and participation in change. Measurement of the effect is essential but often neglected and results in the beginning of the cycle all over again. Feedback which re-initiates the analysis phase receives a great deal of attention in the classroom.

ACTION

- TIMING
- SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
- RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
- FEASIBILITY TESTS
- IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY
- IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- FEEDBACK TO NEW ANALYSIS

Now again, the action phase is imbedded in the same contextual variables as the previous functions. Also again, the relationships among contextual variables and the action function are different from those in the two previous functions. The psychological makeup of the organization, for instance, may be a determining factor in the implementation methodology selected.



I think it has probably become apparent by now that the A-J-A Model is merely a simplified form of the scientific method. That's exactly what it is. We actually started with the scientific method a year and a half ago. What I have been describing has evolved over this period as a result of extensive developmental work in the Department of Psychology and Leadership and joint efforts with elements of the Commandant's organization. So, Analysis-Judgment-Action is the leadership model that forms the framework for all of our leadership teaching in the Psychology Department at this time. We have developed some teaching strategies which are also important to you in understanding what we do.

First, there is a great deal of emphasis on experiential learning, the feeling here being that leadership would be a sterile subject if it were learned only at the cognitive level without any opportunity to practice or experience the application of the things that are being learned. All of our courses have a modular construction, each consisting of the following three-step format: First, demonstrations and exercises are used to stimulate interest; then a cognitive period occurs in which a given coverage of the material is accomplished; and then there is a practice or experiential period, during which the material learned in the cognitive phase is put into practice in some way. This may occur in the classroom, either in problem-solving tasks or an exercise involving some sort of an interaction among cadets. The maximum payoff, however, occurs in the Cadet Wing itself, in the intimate, everyday life of the cadet.

Secondly, our orientation is that to the maximum degree possible, an illustrative material is derived from the Academy activities themselves, so as to strongly encourage immediate application in the Cadet Wing. In many cases, the cadets themselves develop specific ideas as to how and where and when to make this application. One of our most important criteria for our own success is the degree to which the material learned in the classroom is used in the Cadet Wing.

We spend a great deal of time devising exercises and other experiential learning techniques for use in the classroom, and some of these are extremely interesting in terms of the amount of learning that takes place.

The complete leadership program in the Department of Psychology and Leadership consists of four courses, and these four courses are the result of an analysis of the minimum needs of the average young officer. After this analysis, we then designed a learning system to correspond with the sequential experience of young officers during their first years on active duty. Thus, there is an iterative building through the four courses that prepares the cadet for his first years of service by giving him a basic coverage at the cognitive level, a framework for further learning and development, as well as practical skills and methodology for exercising leadership.

The first course is Command Development I: The Leadership Process. In this course the focus is on the individual and the process of analysis, judgment and action. The student learns such things about himself as the factors that influence his own judgment, analytical techniques, how to understand his own abilities--a general focus on the individual. This course is an expansion of the material I have just covered. The second course, Command Development II, Organizational Psychology, moves the individual into an organization where he studies the structural, psychological and sociological properties of organizations. He learns the way organizations affect him and the way he affects them. Command Development III, Command Leadership Problems, then takes the cadet into the command role where he studies management, command and administration. This course is, more than any other of the four, largely a practicum, where a maximum degree of experiential learning is provided. Here we utilize some exciting new teaching methods, including a new critical incident technique developed by Lt Colonel Victor Phillips (DBA) of our staff and a limited resource gaming technique developed by Major Bud Coyle (PhD), also a member of our department. The fourth course, Command Development IV, Seminar in Organizational Theory, is a capstone, wrap-up course, where students probe more deeply into areas that need to be filled out and are introduced to some of the more salient theoretical positions.

Dr. Ralph M. Stogdill (PhD, The Ohio State University) is Professor of Management Sciences and Director, Research in Leadership and Organizational Behavior, The Ohio State University. Previous positions include Research Associate in the Bureau of Business Research at Ohio State and Associate Director of the Ohio State Leadership Studies. Dr. Stogdill is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association and a member of the Institute for Management Sciences, Society for General Systems Research, and many others. Examples of his publications include Leadership and Structures of Personal Interaction, Individual Behavior and Group Achievement, and Managers, Employees, Organizations.

Abstract

The formal presentation deals with the function of expectations in the resolution of organizational roles and the role of the leader in initiating structure in the organization. The problems of the leader appointed to an existing group are dealt with in terms of this expectational structure. While trait studies are dismissed, the possibility of describing leader behavior in terms of the factors of Structure and Consideration is advanced. Pursuing this theory, the organizational outputs are identified as product, cohesiveness and drive; and the relationships between and among these outputs are discussed. In the informal discussion the theory advanced is illustrated and exemplified in terms of research data and military applications. New issues involving exchange theories, nonconformity, acceptance of privilege, and evaluation are raised and discussed.

Preceding page blank

BLANK PAGE

ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

By

Ralph M. Stogdill

The Ohio State University

Organizational leadership takes place among the interacting members of a group. A group is a social interaction system. An organization is a group that exhibits a differentiated role structure. In terms of these definitions, any group that has a leader is an organization no matter how small it may be and no matter what its purpose may be. In other words, groups with leaders exhibit characteristics of organization. These are not the commonly encountered definitions of group and organization, but I believe that they are logically sound (Stogdill, 1959).

The members of a newly formed experimental group, as a result of their individual performances, interactions with each other, and mutual reinforcement of each other's expectations, quickly develop a role structure. One member, who succeeds in emerging as a leader, thereby strengthens the expectation that he can help the group toward the accomplishment of its aims. Other members, in permitting him to lead, reinforce the expectation that he is to continue in his leadership role and that they are to play other roles in the group. It has been found that a group cannot engage in successful task performance until a role structure has evolved. The members continue to strive for position and to define and redefine their roles rather than working on the task until a structure has become differentiated and stabilized.

The above considerations pave the way for our definition of leadership. Leadership may be defined as the initiation and maintenance of structure in expectation and interaction. The leader performs a valued function, not only because he is able to initiate structure, but also because he stabilizes the role structure that has evolved for the purpose of task performance. It has been found that leaders who emerge in group interaction tend to be more strongly goal committed than other members of the group. Since the nature of the goal and task is a determining factor in the development of role structure, it is not surprising to find that the leader is expected to maintain goal direction and role structure for the group. If he wanders too far afield, the group members may remind him of the primary task or of his responsibility. Thus, the leader is not alone in commitment to the group goal and role structure. Both theory and research evidence suggest reciprocal and mutually supportive relationship between leader and followers with respect to the group goal. This is particularly true in the emergent situation where role differentiation takes place with respect to the achievement of a mutually perceived goal. It may or may not be true when the leader is appointed to the group by a higher level of authority and is responsible for a goal assigned by the organization.

Appointment may shortcut some of the striving for status that occurs in emergent groups. Nevertheless, the appointed leader may be challenged or tested by an emergent leader to determine who will have the most influence in the group. Also, in a long-standing group with a newly appointed leader, there may be considerable discrepancy between the leader and followers in their perceptions of, and commitment to, the group goal. It is for this reason that the appointed leader is at an advantage when he takes the trouble at an early date to determine how his followers perceive the task and their situation and uses this information to guide him in any restructuring that may need to be done. Attempts at restructuring should take into account the fact that long-standing groups develop very strong norms regarding member conduct, work performance, and the relative importance of various goals. Restructuring attempts will be evaluated in terms of these norms. The attempts will be accepted or opposed in accordance with the degree to which the attempts conform with the norms. This is a reality of organization that exists and endures independently of the decrees promulgated by higher levels of authority. It exists at all levels of the organization. The greater the extent to which the appointed leader can operate within the context of the norms of his unit of organization, the greater the acceptance of his influence attempts.

Groups may develop norms that need to be changed. But such change cannot be accomplished by fiat. Groups may comply with orders or directives that are in conflict with their norms. In doing so, however, they are likely to build up antagonisms and resentments that are directed against the leader or the organization, while their norms remain unchanged. In this eventuality, the norms will control attitude, behavior, and performance as authoritative pressure is reduced. An organization can be quite recalcitrant in its response to change attempts.

In view of these hard realities of organization, we might consider some of the variables associated with member acceptance of a leader's influence attempts. Results of research with experimental groups suggest that a leader's influence attempts tend to be better accepted when he is better informed than other members about the group task, when he brings with him a record of past success, and when he helps the membership group to succeed. There are other variables not associated with task success that increase acceptance. Among these are concern for the welfare and comfort of the group members, respect for their opinions and feelings, provision of an atmosphere of freedom for member participation and contributions, and enthusiasm that is contagious. These are behaviors, not personality traits.

Personnel psychologists since World War I have identified a long list of personality traits that differentiate leaders from followers. However, the trait approach has not proved to be useful for leader selection in the Armed Services or in industry. The traits do not operate singly, but in combination, to determine an individual's behavior. A given trait or combination of traits may be highly acceptable in one group but not in another. In addition, there are numerous situational variables that operate to determine leadership success independently of the personality of the leader. The same factors operate in relation to the behaviors that differentiate leaders from followers. The knowledge that has been gained regarding several differentiating patterns of behavior has not contributed much to leader selection and placement. However, the knowledge may have some value for the guidance of leadership practice.

Staff members of the Ohio State Leadership Studies have identified two dominant factors that describe the behavior of leaders (Hemphill, 1954). These are Initiation of Structure in Interaction and Consideration. Items in the scales for Structure describe behaviors that assign tasks and let members know what is expected of them as well as what to expect of the leader. Items in the Consideration scale describe behaviors that are concerned with follower comfort and welfare and that facilitate members' efforts to make their legitimate contributions to the group.

Referring back to our definition of leadership as the initiation and maintenance of structure in expectation and interaction, we see that the behaviors in the Initiation of Structure scale are directly concerned with behaviors that define leadership. It is not surprising to find in the factor analysis of items that describe leader behavior that items in the Structure scale are invariably loaded on the general factor. Items in the Consideration scale are loaded on a subgeneral factor.

We have identified patterns of leader behavior other than Structure and Consideration. However, these two seem to be general and pervasive. Somewhat similar behaviors, given different names, have been identified by researchers in several different research laboratories. The behaviors are important not only because they operate to determine how well a leader will be accepted by members of a group, but also because they are related to different aspects of member satisfaction and group performance.

Leadership is concerned with the accomplishment of goals. If goals could be accomplished solely through the use of machines, we would not need to worry about anything except productive effectiveness. When organizations composed of human beings are the instruments of goal accomplishment, we need to concern ourselves with outcomes other than productivity.

In several theoretical publications (Stogdill, 1959, 1965) I have suggested that organizations generate three critical and interrelated outputs. Those have been identified as product, cohesiveness, and drive. Cohesiveness and drive are usually regarded as mediating variables that condition productivity. I maintain that cohesiveness and drive are outputs along with productivity. Product varies with the mission of the organization and the nature of its operations. Cohesiveness is defined as the maintenance of the structural integrity of the group or organization. Drive is defined as the enthusiasm and motive power generated by the organization. A considerable body of research indicates that these three outputs are related as follows:

1. Productivity and drive are positively related.

2. Productivity and cohesiveness are negatively related.

3. Cohesiveness and drive may be either positively or negatively related.

These relationships tend to hold under routine operating conditions. Under emergency and short-run conditions, it is possible to have all the variables positively interrelated by intensifying the inputs. Football games are won by applying drive or pressure upon the opponent, by maintaining the cohesive integrity of one's own team while disrupting the structural integrity of the opponent, and by gaining yards consistently to the goal. Here productivity, drive, and cohesiveness are all positively intercorrelated. Football teams make tremendous investments of energy, skill, and determination over an hour of play. The members of an industrial plant or a home-based military organization cannot make such maximum investments of effort over an eight-hour day throughout the year. Organizations have to pace their work. Groups develop norms that define a reasonable and tolerable expenditure of effort for routine conditions. They may well exceed these norms under emerging conditions, and particularly in combat.

Whether the situation is routine or an emergency, the leader needs to be concerned not only with the productivity of his organization, but also with its drive and cohesiveness. Cohesiveness is important because it indicates, for one thing, the degree to which the members will support the organization when their support is needed. It is for this reason that groups and organizations tend to put strong pressure on the individual who deviates from the normative values of the group. A group can have no cohesive or structural integrity unless its members will support it. Drive is important for the provision of organizational power needed to accomplish difficult goals. However, drive can be as readily used to sabotage and destroy the organization as to accomplish its mission. The deliberate use of frustration and harshness to stimulate drive can easily lead to disastrous consequences for the organization. The degree of cohesiveness, member loyalty to the organization, and task dedication are factors that regulate the direction in which drive will be expended by the members. A leader will increase the drive level of his organization only when he is certain that it will be used in goal accomplishment or in strengthening the cohesiveness of the organization.

In a study of the production groups of 27 diverse organizations (Stogdill, 1965), I found that the supervisor who was described by his subordinates as high in Consideration tended to be in charge of a group that was high in drive and member satisfaction with freedom on the job. Supervisory Structuring of Expectations was related to group cohesiveness and member satisfaction with the company. Neither pattern of behavior was related to group productivity.

It was noted earlier in this discussion that a group needs to develop some degree of goal commitment, role structure, norm commitments, and cohesiveness before it can devote itself to effective task performance. Efforts spent on task performance are not invested in the maintenance of cohesiveness. Group drive can be devoted to maintenance of productivity or cohesiveness.

Two forms of leader behavior (Consideration and Structure) mentioned at the beginning of this discussion are found to be related to two important group outputs (drive and cohesiveness). Both drive and cohesiveness are necessary for organizational survival, especially in emergencies and when confronted by strong opposition from without. Both are necessary for productivity, although they are differentially related to effectiveness in goal attainment. It is for this reason that the leadership task is much more difficult and complex than some theories of leadership would lead us to believe.

Every experienced leader knows that things are continually happening in his organization that are difficult to understand. While he is straightening out one situation some other situation seems to deteriorate. This outcome is predictable in terms of the findings presented above. Some leaders are better able than others to keep things in balance. These leaders tend to be described high in both Initiating Structure and Consideration. The groups they lead tend to be described high in effectiveness. Theories which suggest that the leader should be high in Consideration and low in Structure are not presenting a recipe for leadership but for the surrender of leadership. Theories which suggest that group productivity should be emphasized at the expense of cohesiveness are paving the way for the eventual eruption of severe problems in personnel and morale.

It should be acknowledged that the magnitude of the correlations between productivity, cohesiveness, and drive are not high. For this reason, productivity can be increased slightly without reducing cohesiveness to a critical degree. Similarly, cohesiveness can be increased somewhat without an expensive decline in productivity; but extreme increases are accompanied by extreme counter actions. The leader who drives his organization ruthlessly toward a high productivity record is at the same time creating severe morale problems that his unfortunate successor will have to solve.

This paper has been limited to issues that are supported by strong research evidence. The findings have direct implications for the practice of leadership. They suggest some of the variables to be observed in the diagnosis of organizational problems. The effective leader, whether by intuition or by intentful diagnosis, sensitizes himself to the temper as well as to the accomplishments of his organization. He uses his knowledge to maintain a just balance between productivity and morale.

Discussion

Discussant: Would you comment on the level of structure which can be introduced in research organizations?

Dr. Stogdill: I more or less belong to that same class that you are talking about--cantankerous scientists who want to do things their own way and don't want anyone else telling them what to do. I am acquainted with engineering groups and scientists and scientific groups and so on where overstructuring is resented and tends to reduce initiative to some degree. I think that is a valid generalization for those particular groups; but the same people that tell me that it applies to these groups also tell me that the same theory applies to the workers on the production line, to people in machine shops and on the shop floor and all kinds of industrial situations. I have research evidence from my own and numerous other studies which indicates that it simply isn't true. I think we need to exercise a little discrimination and admit that the generalization is applicable to one place and see the extent to which it applies and does not apply to others.

Discussant: Then the leader would have to modify his behavior according to the situational variable that confronts him in terms of the maturity of the followers and the type of task involved. Would that be true?

Dr. Stogdill: Yes. I mentioned machine shops where things had to be done not to the thousandths but to the millionths of an inch. In the space industry and in making blades for the rotor blades for jet engines, for example, if measurements are off a little, the thing could fly apart. These parts have to be machined with a high degree of precision. If the leader, the foreman, wasn't described by his subordinates as high in structure, the people described their group as putting a lot of pressure on the person who engaged in horseplay and deviated from the group norms. If the leader himself wouldn't structure things, they put pressure on deviates themselves to keep them in order. The same thing happened in the clothing industry where women were operating very high-speed sewing machines. The company had hired a lot of young college graduates as supervisors, and they weren't doing much structuring--they didn't know enough to structure. The group itself was putting on pressure towards norm conformity. They cut down most of the talking and visiting back and forth between the machines which were disturbing to the women operating the machines. The leader himself doesn't always structure things. The group itself sometimes takes over in some form or other in these situations where precision and accuracy and safety are factors. I could elaborate on numerous situations where my own research has shown that the people themselves, if the leader doesn't structure them, will do it themselves one way or the other.

Discussant: Doctor, what is the basic motivating factor in that case? Safety? Survival or injury?

Dr. Stogdill: Well, no single one. Safety for one thing with the sewing machine example and then also money. If you slowed down, you lost money since these women are paid by the piece. I tried to find out why they acted as they did; and they said, "Well, the primary reason is money. I'm working here because I need money; and if there is a lot of visiting and gabbing going on around me, then how can I work?"

Discussant: I have a question concerning your comments on the inverse relationship between productivity and cohesiveness. You made this as a general comment. Have you had an opportunity to delve into the military area, and could you comment on that relationship in our environment?

Dr. Stogdill: Yes, I have. Let me expand that a minute because I might be able to answer both at the same time. It seems that the extreme of the negative relationship would be leaving the group. There must be a cutoff somewhere that would be of interest in that relationship because of retention. We spend a lot of time trying to achieve a level of cohesiveness that will keep the individual in the group. Let me say this: I have studied at least 27 organizations with respect to this relationship. The average of the correlations between productivity and cohesiveness was about minus .40. You see that is not a very high correlation. This relationship is not strong. If that correlation were .90 and you reduced either productivity or cohesiveness very much, the organization would fall apart, probably meaning a small change in one or the other of these would exert tremendous disruptive forces on the organization. With a correlation of only .40, you can stand a terrific amount of slippage in one or the other before the organization is seriously damaged. What I'm saying is that it really doesn't make any difference that productivity and cohesiveness are negatively related if the correlation is only minus .40. You could stand it. It is a cost that you could well afford to pay and not worry about it. If the correlation were .90, a decrease in one or the other would be very costly at the expense of the other. On the other hand, with a minus .40, if you increase cohesiveness as we strive to do in our military services and really push it hard, and if your thesis is correct, then it's quite likely that you are going to decrease your productivity. Yes, I will say so. Now whether it's decreased sufficiently that you need to worry about it is what I question.

Discussant: Where are your greatest losses? Reduced cohesiveness or reduced productivity?

Dr. Stogdill: Yes, well now that is what you have to figure out. I haven't known about this relationship long enough to make studies to determine where these costs actually occur. I think the locus of these costs should be determined, but I have no idea where they occur and the nature of these costs that have to be paid.

Discussant: Excuse me, Sir, is it possible that the type of productivity that we are talking about might cause a shift in this particular correlation factor? For example, talking about the product as the number of missions successfully flown in combat adds weight to cohesiveness in that context. Would we reach that stage where you were willing to suggest that maybe there was no longer a negative relationship?

Dr. Stogdill: Depending upon how much motivation is present for both factors, I would say, "How tense is this mission?" Let's say it's in wartime and it's very precarious whether or not the crew will come back. I'd say that productivity and cohesion would be positively related. For practice missions I would guess that a positive relationship is more likely under conditions where the trainee is very tense and highly motivated. Under routine training missions I would say that they would tend to be negatively correlated.

Discussant: This is my reason for questioning your finding, Doctor Stogdill. In any sustained combat period I know, you are prepared for emergency situations. I'm taking combat out of the emergency situation. When you are involved in it for a year, it becomes a way of life. I found in practice that productivity and cohesiveness seem to move hand in hand. Over a long period in combat everybody digs in and turns out a great deal of work for a short period of time, exhibiting nearly superhuman effort; but they do it over a year's period and don't seem to suffer physically or mentally from it.

Dr. Stogdill: Well, that's a superficial observation. I don't know it to be true or not. I would say that there is probably quite a bit that is accomplished at a very heavy investment. I would say that these men are investing heavily out of their personal resources in order to accomplish it. There is a good example of the reverse of what you are saying though. We use it in our Field II course to demonstrate that too much cohesiveness in a combat situation results in a decrease in the output of the product. In fact, isn't it in the movie called 12 O'Clock High that the cohesiveness gets so strong that the crews fail to perform adequately in a flying mission because they can't stand the loss of anybody from within the group?

Discussant: That was going to be my point. Sir, I'm talking about cohesiveness in opposition to friendliness. To me, the two aren't the same. The "buddy" relationship is not the same as cohesiveness. You can have cohesiveness and not even like a person.

Dr. Stogdill: Yes, that is right; but this kind of cohesiveness too, this mutual attraction and interdependency, is also a kind of cohesiveness. I will have to admit that there are several kinds of cohesiveness probably mixed up in this definition that I gave you. I'm not sure that all the people who define group cohesiveness are thinking of it in terms of the capacity of the group to maintain its integrity.

Discussant: Did you, in the organizations you studied, have a chance to look at a fire department or police department or any organization like that? I am also interested in hearing if anyone had made a concentrated effort on these organizations that you examined to increase identification of the group with the goals of the organization or of the leader. It seems another dimension of this problem is an identification with the task to be accomplished. It would seem that if we would work without the identification aspect, certainly we could have an apparent decisiveness that would be unfounded.

Dr. Stogdill: No, I haven't worked in organizations where what you might call a consciously planned effort was being made to help people identify with the organization. I studied organizations where there was a more or less frantic effort being made to salvage the pieces resulting from a long neglect of employee identification but not where it was intelligently and systematically gone about.

Discussant: Can you paraphrase what you are saying in terms of an exchange theory--one in which the effective leader has some kind of resource or resources valued by the group and in exchange for those resources the group allows itself to be influenced? We could build a model of effective leadership behavior in terms of this exchange theory type of concept.

Dr. Stogdill: Yes. In fact, I will carry it one step further if I may. I believe that one of the reasons why we don't find these patterns of leader behavior, that I studied, to be associated with great productivity is that the group members have not delegated to the leader the responsibility for his seeing that each member gets his job done. "I've taken that responsibility on for myself," says each member. "It is my responsibility to get my job done, and whatever the leader does doesn't make much difference since I'm going to do my job anyhow. Now, if he treats me in discourteous, rough, rude ways, it hurts my feelings; and I may wish I could get out of this group and join some other group where it looks like I might be a little happier." That attitude is going to reduce the cohesiveness of the group if a lot of people feel that way; but members still might go ahead and work hard, maintaining high productivity. Yes, I think there is an exchange. You can talk about this in terms of an exchange relationship in which members surrender a certain amount of status in the group to the leader from a feeling of being sufficiently committed to the goals and the task of the group. The member is willing for the leader to have some status and in turn expects him to provide group members some freedom for contributing, making contributions to the group with some enthusiasm, developing enthusiasm for it, maintaining a goal direction, etc. Yes, I think that you could well explain a lot of this in terms of exchange, cost, and rewards. A lot of our willingness to let someone else take leadership isn't just pure generosity. A lot of it is due to the fact that I don't want to pay the cost of assuming leadership that this other man is willing to pay.

Discussant: I have another question. I'm particularly interested in the relationship between conformity and leadership. Usually the leader is expected by the group to be more conforming to organizational norms, group norms, than the other group members. However, there is also that point where the group expects the leader to be nonconformist. Have you or do you know of anyone that has taken a look at that critical point at which the leader recognizes a need to be nonconforming?

Dr. Stogdill: No, I would say that it is an area of research that is very much needed--the critical point at which conformity or nonconformity is at stake. I don't know of a single research effort on that issue, and it is a very important issue. I've seen many young leaders spoil very nice situations by not knowing when that critical point had come. As a result, they violated the norm one way or the other, either failing to act or taking liberties to which they were not entitled. It would be very valuable to have such research. It hadn't occurred to me previously. I'll make a note of that to see if we can't get somebody to work on it.

Discussant: Is this the kind of thing you might consider in the context of the cadet or midshipman who looks upon his AOC as being reasonable, provided he has the proper balance and a judgment concerning when he must relinquish some of his conformity and behavior in view of the mitigating circumstances and so forth?

Dr. Stogdill: I think it goes beyond that, because you know there are those that conform very rigidly to regulations and those who will look at other circumstances surrounding it. There are a great many aspects of norm conformity. One of them is in regard to privilege--the privileges of rank and position. There are some people that think that all privilege is bad, especially if it's a privilege that he doesn't have. Now I think that one of the requirements of going up the ranks in any leadership structure is that a person does not feel guilt ridden by the enjoyment of having privilege or by utilizing privilege. I think that it will be very difficult for a person to rise to high rank if he feels guilt ridden by the privileges that

that come to him by virtue of his position. So a person has to have some freedom from guilt as a result of privilege. I'd say that is one of the hypotheses that I've arrived at, but I haven't published or done any research on it. I've been thinking about trying to get at this from some research point of view. I really feel that the hypothesis would probably be supported if we had some good research on it; but, of course, it is only a hypothesis at the present time.

Discussant: Dr. Fiedler was here last month, as you know; and we had a long discussion about personality. He is deeply committed to the notion of the necessity of matching personalities to task group factors.

Dr. Stogdill: Yes, I would go along with that. His point is that although you can act or play the role for a short while (and to some extent I guess everybody can), over the long run it either gets uncomfortable or it just breaks down; and it's better not to start it. One should either try to change the situation or requirements to the personality that is there, or take the personality out and put another one in. Well, I can't disagree with that. I don't think there is any question about it. I've been in situations where I don't think it's any exaggeration to say my very life depended upon the role I played, and the role required was not in conformity with my personality at all. I can't say that I've ever found these situations to be enjoyable. They are very costly in terms of what I want to pay. Of course, I am glad to be alive, but I wouldn't want to have to live very long under circumstances like that. I think that I would agree with Dr. Fiedler; but on the other hand, it's very difficult when you've got several thousand, or a hundred thousand, men to deal with to put everyone in the situation that's perfectly adapted to his requirements. So given that we could match man to situation, I think that's the ideal thing. All of us, I think, have to adapt ourselves to situations as best we can. My ideal would be not to make such extreme demands on each other or on ourselves to the point of breakdown, but we have to be able to adjust to situations that are uncomfortable at times.

Discussant: Another question that continually comes up, especially with the cadets, but also with officers, is the evaluation of leadership behavior, which is something we have to do whether we know how to do it or not. We have to go through some kind of an emotion which ends up with a number. However, the question most often focuses on how important the outcome or the result is to the evaluation of the behavior itself. You can develop a logical position that the outcome is irrelevant, that what is being evaluated is behavior, and the outcome depends on uncontrolled variables, lots of luck, and so on. If acceptance were obtained for that, it would change a lot of what we do in industry and government in personnel evaluation.

Dr. Stogdill: Well, to my knowledge, the evaluations that correlate most highly with criteria of performance several years later are general criteria such as nominations, superior's evaluations of aptitude for service and that sort of thing. When you put them down in detail and try to evaluate particular traits, the more detailed the analysis the less valid are the predictive measures. The more general and global you get, the more things are all averaged out and combined in this global evaluation, the more likely it is to be highly correlated with success several years later. I don't know many exceptions to that. So since I don't, I either leave it to the military services or to industry. I don't evaluate. I don't recommend spending thousands of man-hours and thus dollars on the development of highly refined evaluating scales. In view of this finding that I just mentioned, I think that the human mind tends to balance out various factors unconsciously and more justly in the predictive fashion than we can do it consciously by deliberate effort. I don't know why, but that seems to be the way things are operating at the present time. Maybe sometime we'll know enough, learn enough, that we can analyze the situation and do detailed ratings that will be more valid; but I don't think we could accomplish it yet.

Discussant: Is the term loyalty a specific or a general? Is the term loyalty, if you are evaluating individuals on loyalty, in your definition a general evaluation or a specific one?

Dr. Stogdill: You mean, suppose I'm evaluating one of my students for some university with the hiring as an assistant professor. Now I want to know to what extent does he develop loyalty to the organization. Maybe I had very little opportunity to observe whether he is going to be a loyal Ohio State supporter and rooter for the football team and so forth after he leaves. I can't say that it makes a whole lot of difference. I would be evaluating him in loyalty to the norms, to the profession, that he is in. Alternatively, I'd evaluate to what extent he would support colleagues who present reasonably sensible points of view and so on, and to what extent he would support the administration in its efforts to build up a sound university. I think I would be thinking of things like that rather than whether I could recall any specific instances where he has been loyal or disloyal. Now, if such instances have come to my attention, I'm sure they would enter into my evaluation. My evaluation would be a transformation of these things into a kind of different conception of loyalty and the projection of it into the future. This is all speculation and imagination because I don't know how it happens, but I'm trying to speculate to the best of my ability as to how this would occur.

Discussant: Well, that's a global perspective of loyalty. I find myself really excited about this notion, maybe because I agree with you so wholeheartedly that sometimes our general evaluations and aptitudes tend to be far more successful than any specific ones. But you posed for us some very peculiar problems given the kind of job we have to do. Suppose, for example, you were to sit on an aptitude advisory board and you were to say, "Let's evaluate whether this particular man has the appropriate aptitude for commissioned service"; and a man in whom you reside a great deal of trust says, "I've had a great deal of experience with this young man, and I just don't think in general he is going to survive in our system. He doesn't have the right aptitude, and we ought not to commission him." Well, in our society that doesn't get the job done. That is, someone will immediately say, "Give us some specific instances. What has he done that can demonstrate this?" You see the difficulty we face?

Dr. Stogdill: Yes. As I say, somehow we need help with these kinds of general cases. Perhaps the human mind is capable of integrating our value judgments about other individuals, and we are probably right.

Discussant: You look back when the individual gets in trouble a few years later; and you say to yourself, "Well, I tried to tell you that we shouldn't have commissioned that guy, but there was nothing specific to justify it." Now what kind of suggestion would you make to people in this kind of a position?

Dr. Stogdill: How do you approach this problem successfully? Well, I'm afraid I don't have the recipe for that. I will say this, you are all acquainted with the "forced-choice test." I think it started out showing reasonable promise of being a good predicting device but, as I understand it, was rejected because as the higher up you go in the military establishment, the more important political considerations become in appointing officers to various positions. If a certain man is required for a critical political position, and he has very poor ratings in his folder, it becomes difficult to justify his appointment. So I assume that the higher up you go in the military establishment, the less desirable it is for the military establishment to have an efficient evaluation system. They are just contradictions of terms. You can't appoint a man for a particular position if he has poor efficiency ratings; and if it is demanded that he be put there, then it is better that he doesn't have them. That's just one contradiction, and we might as well be frank about it and face it. To some extent we don't want predictive evaluations.

Discussant: Dr. Stogdill, I want to thank you very much for being here with us today. I am certain that your presentation and our exchange have provided stimulating and fruitful material for us to work on.

References

Hemphill, J. K. A proposed theory of leadership in small groups. Columbus: The Ohio State University, Personnel Research Board Technical Report, 1954 (unpublished).

Stogdill, R. M. Individual behavior and group achievement. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Stogdill, R. M. Managers, employees, organizations. Columbus: The Ohio State University, Bureau of Business Research Monograph No. 125, 1965.

Stogdill, R. M. Dimensions of organization theory. In Approaches to organizational design. Edited by J. D. Thompson. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965.

BLANK PAGE

CORPORATION PRESIDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP

(Editors' Note) In April 1970, the program consisted of a panel of Colorado corporation presidents with the dean of a leading business school as moderator. The purpose of the program was for these successful executives to present and discuss their personal philosophies and concepts of leadership in contemporary, major, corporate organizations. Each participant was asked to make an initial, individual presentation. Following these presentations there was a question-and-answer period.

Panel moderator: Dr. Arthur Mason, Dean of the College of Business Administration, University of Denver.

Panel members:

- Mr. Frederick Fielder, President of CF&I Steel Corporation
- Mr. Robert Owen, President of Great Western Sugar Company
- Mr. John Bunker, President of Holly Sugar Corporation
- Mr. Alvin Flanagan, President of Mullins Broadcasting Company

Preceding page blank

Dr. Arthur Mason, Jr. (PhD, University of Pennsylvania) is Dean of the College of Business Administration at the University of Denver. Before assuming his present duties, Dean Mason was director of doctoral studies at the Graduate School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis. His administrative, teaching, business, and research experience has covered a wide variety of assignments. He has published widely in journals for both professional and lay audiences, especially in the field of insurance. Dean Mason has served as director of several management development programs for a number of firms and institutions including Monsanto, Southwestern Bell Telephone, and the U.S. Federal Records Center.

Mr. Frederick A. Fielder (LLB, George Washington University) is President of CF&I Steel Corporation. He also has a degree in civil engineering, and his business career has been in engineering or engineering-oriented activities. Prior to joining CF&I Steel, Mr. Fielder was President of Poor and Company, a diversified manufacturing company. He served as a lieutenant in the Navy during World War II. His memberships include the American Iron and Steel Institute, the Association of Iron and Steel Engineers, the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, and the Society of Automotive Engineers.

Mr. Robert R. Owen (BS, University of California, Davis) is President of The Great Western Sugar Company. He came to GW Sugar from the Ford Motor Company where he was general manager of equipment operations. Earlier, Mr. Owen was manager of the engineering department of the Pineapple Research Institute in Hawaii and has been a technical representative for the DuPont Company. Mr. Owen holds the rank of Brigadier General in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Mr. John B. Bunker (AB, Yale University) is President, a director, and member of the Executive Committee of the Holly Sugar Corporation. Previously, he was Assistant-to the President, a Vice-President, and President of The Great Western Sugar Company. Before joining GW Sugar, Mr. Bunker worked in operating, sales and management positions for The National Sugar Refining Company. He was an infantry officer in both World War II and Korea and is the son of Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam.

Mr. Alvin G. Flanagan (BA, University of Florida) is President of Mullins Broadcasting Company, a Denver-based communications company. Prior to joining Mullins, Mr. Flanagan was broadcast division president of the NAFI Corporation with responsibility for TV stations in Los Angeles, Portland, Fort Worth, and a radio station in Houston. In all, he has had over 30 years' experience in the broadcasting media. Mr. Flanagan was an officer in the Marine Corps during World War II.

Abstract

Mr. Fielder: The leadership problem is discussed in terms of the variety of people with whom the leader must deal. Leadership is defined as the ability to induce different individuals to accomplish the leader's purpose. Various methods of persuasion, appropriate to various individuals, are discussed. In summary, the "led" determine the leadership required.

Mr. Owen: Leadership is conceded to depend upon the situation and followers; but added emphasis is given to the leader's style, which must fit the requirements. The need of the leader to be aware of his personal example and his role is discussed. The necessary practice of honesty and development of loyalty are advanced as significant factors. In summary, leadership must fit the situation, the leader and those led.

Mr. Bunker: Leadership is defined as the ability to generate a motivation to follow. Both money and fear are dismissed as poor approaches. Inducement of self-motivation is advanced as the most fruitful approach. Development of self-motivation is discussed in terms of the elements of goal communication, knowledge, imagination, application, judgment, initiative, and the presence of the leader in the situation.

Mr. Flanagan: Leadership is defined as the combination of people and ideas directed to a conclusion. The leader must see the problem and generate a method for involving the right people in its solution. The most severe challenge is represented in the problem of changing established structure. The role of the leader is summarized as a persuader, mediator and manager of tensions. The variations of the role are stipulated to be action or reaction with action recommended.

Discussion: The panel discussion includes molding intuitive leadership ability, leadership training within the companies, leadership versus task knowledge, utilization of MBA's (Dr. Mason), ability versus age and experience, authority limitations, and the changes in current new employees.

Dr. Mason: Mr. Fielder, our first speaker, is President of CF&I Steel Corporation. He is both an engineer and a lawyer, having an extensive background in both before coming to CF&I Steel Corporation. Prior to joining CF&I he was President of Poor & Co., a divisionalized, diversified manufacturing company. Prior to that time he had been with Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, makers of locomotive, water-wheel turbines, etc. He is very active in community affairs in this region and therefore, I feel, is highly qualified to start out this presentation on leadership.

Mr. Fielder: Thank you, Dr. Mason. Gentlemen, it is certainly flattering to be invited to participate on this panel and to be provided an opportunity to appear here at the Air Force Academy on the subject of leadership. The Air Force has had some magnificent achievements and is indeed an exponent of leadership to the highest degree. We, as business men, can enlarge on some aspects of leadership capability; however, it already seems well defined in the Air Force, so our task is a very difficult one. There may be some techniques that we use in business that could be useful and helpful. I have been told that it is all right to tell of my own personal experiences, so I should like to do just that if I may.

As I undertook to organize my thoughts and ideas on the expressions that I would present this morning, I asked myself, "How does one lead?" After reflecting on it, I discovered there really aren't any pat answers. Perhaps one leads in a multiplicity of ways, and this depends on whom you want to lead and for what purpose. It's a complex subject, and there are probably as many techniques as there are individuals. This gets back to the fact that every human being is different and responds in a different way. All of us who hope to be successful in leading others need to recognize the human qualities that exist in those with whom we are in contact. So, first I'd like to try to define leadership. Without going to the dictionary, I'd probably gather this definition for my own purposes, being essentially a lazy guy. I decided that what it really means in our context is that we want to induce others to accomplish a particular purpose or objective that we may have in mind. From there I then went to the subject of how we practice leadership in a corporation and how we as officials lead in business enterprises to try to bring about the accomplishment of objectives by others. So I tried to classify the various people that we deal with.

First, we have our fellow employees, our colleagues in business on the executive level, then others on levels that are subordinate to us. Third, we have to deal with our shareholders; and we have to induce a force of action among these shareholders that we hope will be beneficial to our business. Fourth, we also have to lead the investment fraternity. We want our shares to be well regarded in the market place. The financial analysts and others are constantly looking over our shoulders, so we have to induce them also toward a point of view we hope will be favorable to the enterprise that we serve. Then, finally, we have the general public to deal with. In this realm we have, particularly in the steel business, such things as contamination of air and water. We do what we can. We make conscientious efforts to get on top of this problem, and what we are doing and how we are going about doing it have to be understood by the general public if they are to adopt a favorable viewpoint.

I suppose in the final analysis that in the corporate hierarchy we deal with the Board of Directors; and, believe me, it is very important for the Board to follow the leadership of the management of the company. For example, if one is in the business of making things in factories and in steel mills, we need all the elements that go into these functions; and that requires, generally, a large infusion of money. We must persuade or induce or lead our Board of Directors in the direction that we think is most beneficial to our company.

In dealing with fellow employees alone, to further elaborate on the extent and complexity of the problem, we have professionals--accountants, engineers, lawyers, and many other gifted and talented people--who must follow the leadership of the management of a company. But as it goes further down the line, we have the laborers, salesmen, machinists, and toolmakers; and to all these people we must communicate. The techniques for leadership will vary depending on the element which we have to deal with at the moment.

I have tried to categorize how I would go about dealing with these people; and I suppose my first impression was, in reflecting on the subject, that these are things you do instinctively. Perhaps they do come as a matter of practice, but it is a little difficult to identify how we actually do deal with the various elements that we want to lead.

One of the most important techniques in leading is really by asking questions and soliciting answers. You have a group of people you want to move in one direction or another, and by constant questioning you can in time bring about a course of action or cause others to feel that the course of action may be beneficial and useful. Another technique is to consider what the alternative may be and to present to those with whom you are dealing a series of alternatives and invite their statements as to whether there are other alternatives. Once having an inventory of all the alternatives that are open, one can then adopt that one which appears to be most useful and most effective and cause the entire organization or group to move in that direction. Another technique is to set up a competitive situation so that you've sparked the competitive impulse that exists in almost all human beings, and you've turned this to your advantage in achieving a point of view or a change of direction that you think is worthwhile.

Still another method is to make a deliberate error about something. Let's assume, for example, you have half a dozen guys around the table; and you want to go in this direction. So you say, "Gee, I think it would be terrific to go over here, go in this direction." You then outline a course of action that's exactly the opposite direction of that which you want to go. There will be some guy, if he's sharp and on his toes, who will bounce back immediately because he wants to correct you. He will say, "Let's go over this way." That way you get them all ready to move in the way you wanted to move originally.

The final and least effective way, I think, is to issue a demand or a command. This may be anathema to the military approach to things; but in the business world if one issues a demand or a command, one has to see that it is carried out in precise and minute detail. If you follow any of the other techniques that I've outlined other than a command or demand, you get the guy motivated or the group motivated to do what you think should be done. You then can leave the details up to them because it is their own program, their own idea, their own scheme; and you can be sure it will be carried out well.

As I said earlier, I'm basically a lazy guy; and I don't like to go back and supervise every detail that is required. But this is what you are usually up against if you say, "Joe, I want this done by tomorrow morning." Then you have to go back and check every detail and see that Joe does it.

Well, these are my general concepts of how you lead, how you guide, how you direct. I'd like to draw on a personal experience that occurred some years ago and in which the Air Force was heavily involved. Just to illustrate how complex this subject is and how people respond to various methods that we use as human beings to get other people to do things, I submit the following.

In order to illustrate this point, I have to go back into history just a bit and mention that in the decade before World War II in Germany there was a technique developed for working metals which was unique and at that time existed in Germany only. It was the process of extruding and forging metals by the means of enormous presses. Early in World War II, planes that we shot down showed that the Germans had developed this capability; they had enormous spars and other elements of which planes were then constructed. These were of such size that they could not have been produced on machines which were then available or in use in the United States. At the conclusion of World War II, the officials of the Defense Department and members of industry were so concerned over this technique that they felt that it should be transplanted as quickly as possible to the United States so that it could be then employed for our benefit in the future. I imagine that at present there are probably only two or three of these monster machines in the world. They are equal in height to a ten-story building. The capacity of this machine is 50, 000 tons. The largest one that the Germans had built was 30, 000 tons, and at the close of the War it was in the Russian zone. The Russians dismantled it, quickly took it over to Russia and reassembled it, and presumably it's been running ever since. The Air Force was given the responsibility to transpose this technique to the United States, and I had a minor part in getting it done. Part of the transposition involved also the transposition of people. Under the auspices of the Air Force, a group of very gifted and talented engineers were imported to the United States and put to work on developing designs for such machines to be used here. These chaps were really a cosmopolitan group. Some of them had grown up and been educated in Germany, others in Italy, one or two in Russia; and there were one or two orientals. The makeup was such that we could not communicate very well. I had a little trouble with English; but a lot of those guys spoke three or four different languages, maybe not so fluently as English. When we were discussing how these machines should be designed and built, we might be talking to a chap whose native tongue was Russian and who had been educated in Russia. He would hear the words in English; they would somehow get translated into Russian; and then he would develop his own thought processes in Russian and then come back in English. This was a real problem in communicating. Now as we progressed with this project, it became evident that in order to get anything accomplished we would have to employ every means we could to get this group of people working effectively toward our objectives. I remember one highly gifted German engineer. He held the equivalent of a doctor's degree; he had served his apprenticeship in a machine shop in Germany. For twenty-five or thirty years he had done nothing except work on the development of these monster extrusion forging vessels. I am sure you fellows realize that the Air Force is very conscious of time, so we had certain target dates that were supposed to be achieved; and as time went on we began to be concerned that we wouldn't make the target dates or the completion dates. I went to this one engineer who was working on the drawing as large as this table, and I was new on how you deal with people like that. His name was Gearhart something or other. We called him Jerry. I said, "Jerry, come on, let's get going and get this design finished so we can build this thing." He just said, "Ya, ya," so I went on my way. A few minutes later, I saw him walking out the door. He had his hat and coat on, and he was on his way. We didn't see him for about three or four days, so I decided maybe you don't push Jerry like that. You fellows can say, "Why didn't you get him aside and discipline him some way or another?" But bear in mind, he was a guy who had a particular capability; and regardless of whether he was temperamental or difficult to deal with, we required the peculiar know-how and understanding that this fellow had. I pondered how I could get Jerry to stir his stumps and get on with the project. The next time I tried what I referred to as the development of the competitive situation. I presented to Jerry the fact that the Russians were probably still going on this thing; they themselves were carrying this development forward. I created a situation in which he as an individual was drawn into a competitive situation with a hypothetical competition elsewhere in the world. This worked. Jerry returned to work and came up with his designs, and we got the show on the road that way. So it just illustrates that you can't demand or push or shove sometimes, but you have to employ the subject of leadership in a more delicate and more subtle way.

We had another old German engineer called Heinrich working on this project with whom this idea of a competitive situation didn't work at all. He had the same temperamental characteristics as Jerry. To get results with this individual I had to bring into play his professional capabilities, something of which he was extremely proud, and get him to realize his professional stature was at stake in the accomplishment of the task that had been laid out for him. Then he did it. He got stirring; he got moving. So these are just two of the examples of the complexity of the problem. In retrospect, it was a very interesting experience for me; and I learned how to get the most out of talented and gifted people by employing various strategies to arouse or to induce them to accomplish the objectives that we had laid on. This concludes the thoughts that I have prepared to express here this morning.

Dr. Mason: Mr. Robert Owen, President of Great Western Sugar Company, also has a very strong engineering background. He first started with Del Monte Corporation as an agricultural engineer; he also worked in the engineering department of the Pineapple Research Institute in Hawaii. Prior to joining Great Western Sugar, he spent twelve years with Ford Motor Company. During that period he reached the position of General Manager of equipment operations, and part of his responsibility was the successful development of the tractor and implement manufacturing division for Ford Motor Company. He joined Great Western Sugar in February, 1968.

Mr. Owen: I feel a bit like the man who is carrying coal to Newcastle in that I think all of my leadership background really stems from military experience and military training. Leadership is an element of command responsibility. In the military I think that element is viewed with a great deal more weight, more importance, than in business. Perhaps it's the two ends of the old cliche that we used to use in NCO leadership schools, "You can't push spaghetti; you have to lead it." I am inclined to think that the military is much more aware of the need for leading the spaghetti, whereas business all too often tends to push the spaghetti.

The subject of leadership is one that doesn't fit very handily into a mold. As a matter of fact, I think the techniques and philosophies of leadership have to vary about as much as the recipients or beneficiaries of this leadership. As Mr. Fielder mentioned, you use different methodology, depending on the types of individuals that you have and their responsibilities. Similarly, I think the leadership characteristics have to fit the individual. You can't properly use bogus methods, those that don't fit his personality. Let me illustrate with a couple of diametrically opposed types of leaders, yet equally successful leaders.

Let's take the first, Mr. Henry Ford, and secondly Alfred Sloan. Certainly Mr. Ford was eccentric, was a genius; he didn't fit anybody's image of a man in a gray flannel suit. Yet he must have been a successful leader, a man who went from an alley shop to a multibillion dollar corporation. Mr. Sloan, on the other hand, more aptly fit the man in the gray flannel suit image. He was an organization theorist, a management theorist, and that type of leader, but equally successful. He built General Motors from a near bankrupt situation to the strong company that it is today.

Somewhat in the same kind of range or spectrum are two renowned military leaders of the past, General George Patton on the one end perhaps and General George Marshall on the other end. Certainly they were different types of men and used different methods in their leadership techniques, but both were very successful men in accomplishing their missions.

I'd like to give you my own personal philosophy which may not, and probably does not, fit anyone else. I think that one of the important elements in your own personal philosophy is an awareness of the importance of the personal example you set. Whether this be in the area of your standards relative to minor corruptions, we tend to become somewhat flexible as the years go by, as we go from the ancient Puritan ethic in our country to somewhat more flexibility. There are tremendous hazards here for the leader because he can unwittingly wind up with a tremendously corrupt organization.

The second element is an awareness of the fact that you are in the position of being something of an actor. Now the guy who "overhams it up" isn't going to be successful, but the successful leader is aware of this factor of being on stage. He is on stage all the time. When conditions are tough and the outlook is dismal, in order to maintain the morale, the enthusiasm, the drive, etc., though his ulcers may be chewing the hell out of him, he has to keep the optimistic outlook. He is the man who is setting the pace; he is the leader under these circumstances. He may not personally like the role of the anger and the chewing out, but there is a time and place for that. If he doesn't personally like the role, again he has to put on the act. I want to emphasize that overacting is a tremendous fault. It can't be overdone if it is to be done successfully. The leader can't be "on stage" all the time. He has to relax now and then, so the successful leader finds ways of relaxing that get him "off stage" and away from his employees and the public.

The third element in my personal outlook of leadership requirements is one of honesty in dealings. We have all known the guy who gives you a big line of bull, and you know it is. Either you knew it then or you found out later that it was. You get to the point that you don't really know whether what you are being told is true or not. No one for long can successfully maintain an untrue story. The successful leader is honest in his dealings with people. Now I didn't mean by that an absolute candidness. If you think a guy looks horrible and his features are all out of place, etc., you don't have to tell him that. There is a difference in honesty and being completely candid. Perhaps along this same line is a genuine feeling of concern for the welfare of the people that you are responsible for. This doesn't necessarily mean paternalism or anything that approaches that, but a genuine concern for the welfare of these people. It has been my experience that if you take care of your people, though this means sometimes giving them a boot where it belongs, if you take care of your people, they will take care of you Mr. Fielder commented very fully on the subject of the necessity of being sensitive to the individual needs of the people that you seek to lead. There is no pat approach to any broad group of people. Each one has to be handled, particularly those that are key people in responsible positions, according to their personalities and their needs. Some a curt word will destroy, while others get a flailing and it hardly gets their attention. Lastly, one that is no news to you of the Air Force, but sometimes is overlooked in business, is that of the importance of loyalty to your superiors. Your subordinates will be only about as loyal to you as you are to your superiors. This is true whether you talk about junior leadership positions or senior leadership positions.

These are the personal philosophies that I feel are important. As to specific methodology, that is something that you as an individual have to work out to suit you, your personality and your capabilities, etc., and to fit the type of people you are leading.

Dr. Mason: Next I'd like to introduce Mr. John Bunker, President of Holly Sugar Corporation. Mr. Bunker had a little trouble getting started into the sugar business, thanks to two wars. His education was interrupted after his freshman year by World War II. He returned to school and completed his education and was called back to duty for the Korean conflict. Finally, I guess you might say, in 1953 he was able to get started on his career, when he joined the National Sugar Refining Company in Philadelphia. He held various positions in operations and marketing and from there went to New Orleans where, as general manager, he headed up National Sugar Refining's sugar operations in that city. He then returned to New

York later as assistant vice president in charge of marketing. In 1962 we drew him out West, and he joined Great Western Sugar Company in Denver, Colorado. He had a very rapid rise in that corporation and became president in January, 1966. However, in February of 1967 he made a move at which time he became President of Holly Sugar Corporation.

Mr. Bunker: It is sort of a treat for a former "dogface" or "beetle-crusher" to be speaking to the "wild blue yonder boys," but Colonel Madden had written me and asked me to speak to this group about my personal philosophy and practice of leadership in business. I think that perhaps this is more philosophical than practical; my thoughts run that way. I think that as far as my prepared remarks are concerned, anyway, I'll be philosophizing principally. The motto of the Infantry School at Fort Benning is "Follow Me"; and I think that reveals, as Bob Owen put it, that perhaps my education in the military is an important part of my philosophy. I think that categorizes my philosophy. The leader is the guy who is out front, and he isn't a leader if nobody follows him. You have to be able to motivate others to follow your example and to follow your footsteps. You must induce people to want to do what you ask them to do. I suppose there are several ways in which you can motivate people to do this in business, particularly through rewards. That is, pay a man more money; this way you make him want to do a job. You can do it through fear, I suppose, by saying if you don't do what I ask you to do, you will get fired. You won't have a job; you won't have a pension. I think these are probably very poor ways to lead people. As Fred Fielder said, I think you have to induce a sort of self-motivation around the people that you are trying to lead; and to achieve this the person who is attempting to lead has to effectively communicate his goals. I think the problem is how the goal can be communicated. In the first place, the leader must have knowledge; he's got to know his business. He must organize the facts of his business, and he may need some help in doing so. In modern business today we can use techniques and tools that we have gathered, some from the military and some otherwise. Operations research can build computer models to assist the manager or the leader to turn raw information or raw facts into an understandable, organized pattern which then becomes the knowledge that the leader must use. I think leaders must have imagination. He must be able to develop new and better things, goods and services for people to use. He must be able to solve problems in new ways. You know Hannibal wanted to cross the Alps, and he figured out the best way to do it was to use elephants. Another example of an imaginative person is

Charles Kettering, the man who invented the self-starter. But being an innovator or an inventor alone is not enough. A leader must be able to put these new ideas to work in such a way that they accomplish something.

In this respect I suppose the next point I'd like to make is that a leader must have or must use judgment, that he must have sound thought processes. There are, I suppose, many people who have the surface qualities of leadership, because they have perhaps an extraordinary ability to communicate, but whose thought processes are not sound; they are warped. The kind of example of these warped thought processes would be Hitler. Because Hitler's major premises were wrong, obviously his conclusions were wrong. He did have the surface qualities that were necessary. He was able to communicate, he was able to use people, and he got people to follow him. Perhaps we could call this an ability to evaluate or make value judgments. I think a leader has to have initiative. In business there are a lot of people who can identify a problem, perhaps who can set a goal for themselves. But I think that perhaps in the military and in business that initiative is the ability to finally make the decision and to initiate action. All the knowledge and imagination and evaluation of the processes aren't any good if they aren't followed by specific action. For example, we may know about all of our environmental problems. We may have identified and evaluated them; but if we don't do anything about them, we haven't really accomplished the necessary leadership.

I think maybe the last thing I'd like to say is that basically I don't think a leader is lazy. A leader must work hard. I think that once the decision has been made in a business corporation or something like that, only the application of hard work will get the job done. Most of the job of the leader is doing this by taking the specific action of motivating others, communicating his goals properly, and in another way communicating the decision he has reached to do something. An old saying in farming is that "the best fertilizer is the footsteps of the owner." I think that whether you are a platoon leader and someone is following in your footsteps or whether you're a farmer and you're out looking at how the plowing and cultivating are going, a very important fact of leadership is to be present. Leadership, of course, in any field is difficult; and it does carry a great responsibility. I suppose on certain jobs, such as the Presidency, responsibilities become almost unbearable or intolerable. I am sure to many people who don't have the inner drive, it isn't worth it; it isn't worth the responsibility that goes with it. But to those people who are, for some reason or another, motivated by a sense of excellence or accomplishment, leadership is probably inescapable; and it is a fortunate thing that it is this way because without it we probably would still be back in the swamps.

Dr. Mason: Mr. Alvin Flanagan is president of Mullins Broadcasting Company. Mr. Flanagan started his career in communication while in college by working on the college radio stations at the University of Florida. Following his graduation, he spent ten years in radio and then joined the West Coast Don Lee Television network in 1948. He had a varied and successful career on the West Coast which culminated in his becoming Broadcast Division president of NAIF Corporation with responsibility for several television and radio stations in California, Oregon, and Texas. Mr. Mullins was able to attract him to Denver and Mullins Broadcasting Company in 1962 as vice president and general manager of KBTV, Channel 9. In 1965 he became executive vice president and general manager of Mullins Communications Company. In 1969 he was elected president of Mullins Broadcasting Company following the very untimely death of John C. Mullins.

Mr. Flanagan: I can't help but believe that it is a bit presumptive on my part to come to the U.S. Air Force Academy to speak and exchange ideas on the subject of leadership; but I must admit I am delighted to have been invited, even though the task is somewhat awesome. Certainly the Air Force Academy is one of the centers of learning on this subject in the country, if not in the whole world. Great names I associate with the Air Force and leadership are names like Generals Lemay, Twining, White, Kenny, and Vandenberg.

For you to be able to assess the importance and validity of my remarks, I think first of all you should know something more of my personal background, because my personal views were asked for. When I was just a kid, about fourteen years old, I left home and shipped out on a Norwegian freighter. I was a deck boy for a couple of years, and I got my ordinary seaman's papers as well as becoming a qualified quartermaster. I wound up on the streets of New York jobless, without a high school education, and without a trade when I was about seventeen years old. This was in the days of the WPA, the PWA, the CCC, and the NRA. I stood in line at some sort of a federal employment agency and was finally assigned as a messenger boy for a federal theater project. I joined the educational radio unit of the federal theater project with my chief job being mimeographing and delivering scripts from radio shows to stations and networks. One of the radio directors in the project took a liking to me and made me his first assistant. He was a recent graduate of Harvard; and after I worked under his direction for approximately a year, he got a Rockefeller scholarship to the BBC in London and named me as his replacement.

When I was about nineteen years old, through this peculiar set of circumstances, I became a full-fledged radio director for about six educational radio network shows a week on NBC and CBS. The office of education in Washington, for some reason or another, liked my work and asked me to join their staff. Well, after working for the U.S. Office of Education for approximately a year as an educational radio consultant, they found out that I didn't have a college degree, much less a high school education. They couldn't have that going on at the Office of Education. Commissioner Studebaker got me an interview with the president of the University of Florida, and I took the entrance exam and with some good fortune passed with sufficiently high marks to be admitted. The University of Florida had its own radio station so I was given a job as announcer in my freshman year, and I proceeded to announce my way through school. I finished as station manager in my senior year, and after school I went to WSB in Atlanta as production manager and later to KDKA in Pittsburgh as program manager.

Came the War and I joined the Marine Corps; and after the War I stayed in California, which is my home state, and got a job as dialogue director and worked in several motion picture studios. The studios went on strike for about a six-month period so I found myself directing television shows for several Los Angeles television stations. I was appointed program manager for ABC Television, Western Division, and later became manager of the Los Angeles television station. The station was purchased by Bing Crosby and several of his associates, and I was made president of the company with Bing Crosby as Chairman of the Board. We went on to purchase stations in Portland, Fort Worth, Dallas and Houston, Texas, and so on. They were later sold to a Wall Street firm, and I came to Denver about seven years ago as vice president of the Mullins Broadcasting Company. At that time, the only organization of the company was one television station; now it consists of eleven different companies including motion pictures, radio, television, outdoor advertising, and plastics. When John Mullins died last year, I became trustee of the estate and president of the company. Well, so much for my background.

I would like to state that I have never read a book on leadership nor have I given the subject of leadership any thought until invited to be a speaker this morning. In fact, the only time I was even a student of leadership was at Platoon Commander School in Quantico, Virginia, and there was a class I recall titled "Command Presence." Nevertheless, I have come up with my own homemade definition of leadership which is combining people and ideas and bringing the two elements to a successful conclusion. Let me give you some examples. In the leadership of the management of the Mullins Broadcasting Company I am confronted from time to time with people problems. One of my chief concerns after Mr. Mullins died last August was to make the several hundred people in the company believe that the organization was going to go forward and function as usual and continue to grow. If I was not able to sell this idea, then I would lose the best people in the company. I immediately set out to find a company to add to our organization. I was successful in being able to borrow a couple million dollars to buy a company in New Mexico. With the addition of this purchase, any problem or thoughts that our organization was at a standstill or on the point of dissolving immediately vanished; and this is a form of leadership.

I think that a leader must be able to see a problem, even though it isn't of his own making, and bring into play an idea involving people to solve that problem. When I hire a manager in one of our companies, I never have in mind when I am interviewing him, "Is this man a good leader?" For instance, I recently appointed a sales manager for KBTV in Denver. When I stop to analyze why I selected him, there were a number of reasons. First of all, he was an excellent salesman. His personal appearance was way above average. He was literate, being a graduate of Notre Dame, although that is no guarantee. He, more frequently than the other salesmen, had good sales ideas; and, not to be forgotten, he had just purchased a home reportedly valued at $65,000. So I knew he had to work to be successful to pay off the mortgage. During the six months he has been head of the sales department, sales have nearly doubled. None of the factors I considered are elements of leadership. I suppose it could be called putting the right man in the right place at the right time, and it was a good decision. After all, leadership to a large extent is making decisions or judgments too.

As president or leader of my company, there is another type of decision that has to be made. Not too long ago we purchased a radio and television station, and the purchase price ran into several millions of dollars. Well, as you all know, companies don't usually keep several millions of dollars in a savings account; and as a consequence, money had to be borrowed to acquire these stations. In order to pay off the principal and interest, it, of course, had to be a profit-making organization to a greater extent than it had been in the past. In any event, after the purchase was made, I became familiar with the manager of these two stations. I felt that a change in management had to be made, but the man in charge had been running this company for the past twenty years. It would have been a tactical error on my part if, after a short acquaintanceship with the people who made up this newly acquired company, I had gone in and arbitrarily fired their dearly beloved manager. On one of my visits to the station, I happened to have a conversation with a couple of the salesmen; and one of the salesmen said to me, "Well, I have my quota made for the year, and I'm not going to be pressured for more sales." I said to him, "What do you mean, your quota made? It is only October, and you have three more months to go." The salesman said, "Well, the policy here is that no one approaches in salary and commissions the amount of money the manager makes; and when you have made as much as you should in relation to the manager's salary, you don't try too hard." This gave me something to think about. I knew I had the wrong man running the place, but still I was new on the scene and still an outsider. You can be an outsider in Arkansas. Here then was the problem: how to move out the long-time manager and move in another who could get the job done. It didn't take long to come up with a plan. I met with the manager and increased the sales projection by 50% and tied his salary and management contract to the amount of gross sales. In less than 90 days I had a resignation. I appointed the sales manager as manager of the station, and now the interest and principal payments are being made with ease. Everyone in the station is satisfied with the new management.

Another subject I remember studying at Quantico was "Rifle Platoon in the Attack." One of the concepts I learned was that you never commit your complete forces at one time. You always hold back a one-third reserve to take care of any contingency that might arise. I don't believe that in leadership or management of a company, this would hold true. I think you have to go all out all the time; and there has to be 100% effort, nothing in reserve. I believe, also, that you must be straightforward with your key employees and hold as little, so-called, confidential information as possible. The more knowledge managers and department heads have of the overall situation within the organization, the better they are able to operate with the same objective as president of the corporation.

So, to sum it all up, I suppose you might say that leadership in a corporation calls for you to be a persuader, a mediator, and a manager of tensions. If one possesses these capabilities, then he is capable of being in a leadership spot in a corporation.

In closing, I would like to state that in my experience of giving orders and taking orders, I have found out there are two types of leaders which I have observed; and I suppose this is true in business as well as it is in the military. There is a leader or the manager who acts; there is the leader or the manager who reacts. There is the leader who acts or causes things to happen and then the leader who only sits back and only reacts to something that has already happened. I would like to think of myself as one who acts rather than one who reacts.

Discussion

Discussant: Some of our training officers have expressed concern that many of the kids that come in here are already intuitively good leaders. As you said, Mr. Fielder, they instinctively do well at leading. This leads to some concern that if we break away their intuitive ability by developing cognitive understanding of what they're doing, we'll ruin them rather than help them, that we may do as much harm as good for them. Of course, we don't believe this; but it is a subject that we attend very diligently.

Mr. Fielder: Well, I think that is a matter of degree; while you may have young men who seem to have capabilities that are instinctively sound, still they are by no means perfected. In gentlemen the age of your cadets, for example, their abilities can be improved with practice. While some might stand above others, I don't believe one should concur with unsafe opinions that these capabilities are at the highest degree of development. Maybe that is separating the wheat from the chaff as they grow older. As they grow more experienced, they have an opportunity to build on their instinctive capabilities. Maybe this is where the top-flight generals in the Air Force come from. Maybe it is those few who built on instinctive capability.

Mr. Flanagan: I don't doubt a bit that when some of the fellows come here to start school or when they are sophomores, juniors, or seniors they are very capable leaders within the group they have their experiences with. I think that on a golf course, in a foursome, there will always be one outstanding fellow. He would be leading the group. Then when you get inside on the 19th hole, there is another type of leader. I belong to an organization called "Round-up Riders of the Rockies" that has about 150 people in it. We go out and ride for about eight or ten days up in the mountains each year, and it is interesting to me to watch these people who come from all over the country. I know a good many of them who come from Denver, and they are in the business world as well as in the social world. When you get out on this ride of about 125 or 130 men and you have your horse, a tent, and bedroll, another type of leadership seems to develop among the riders when compared to that in the business world or on the golf course. So I suspect that the youth who is going to school here might show great potential; and if that courage or leadership ability is encouraged while he is going to school here, he can go on to almost anything. Eventually he will break off into one form or another because of the different types of leaders in the social and business world.

Mr. Bunker: A question arises whether there is such a thing as an instinctive-intuitive leader. I had to say that because they have these fellows back in Vermont that take birch sticks and find where the water is, a divining rod. The divining rod is to show where the water is; and actually, I think a hydrologist or someone like that could tell you what these guys are actually doing. It's something more than just letting the rod instinctively turn down to where the water is. They're looking at such things as land contour, terrain and soil. I wonder if he isn't using the sum total of knowledge that has been accumulated during the entire years of his life by the time he gets here.

I think my reference to instinctiveness may have missed the mark just a bit; and I meant to say that in examining my own experiences in this field, I couldn't find anything in the books that said to do this under such and such circumstances. Maybe it's the seat of the pants impulse that tells you to do this or say this or buy this technique of leadership. I didn't mean to imply that this is a capability that I have seen anyone born with. It is something that has to be developed.

Mr. Owen: In my experience, certainly I have known people who might be classed as extroverts and people who might be classed as introverts; and there are some very fine leaders who are in the classification of introverts. Really they were painfully self-conscious people and yet, primarily in scientific-type fields, technical-type fields, were nevertheless fine leaders. They lead by characteristics other than the Errol Flynn-type flamboyancy. I am not particularly keen about being personal, but in my own particular career I arrived in college a farm boy that had never led a Boy Scout troop. I was too far from town to even be in the Boy Scouts or anything else of that sort; and yet, somehow, either my imagination was fired or something happened. I remember a lieutenant colonel instructor in ROTC who was very instrumental in this firing process. I, in my personal account of my own career, place more weight on the training and example setting in the ROTC program than I do in the technical and formal education program that I had. I don't claim to be a very competent engineer. As a matter of fact, when I was chief equipment engineer at Ford tractor, I wasn't the best engineer in the shop by a long ways. I think it was this military-type leadership background which was instrumental in my career, both in military and in business life. The training experience in leadership is an important fundamental in the lifetime career of anyone.

Discussant: How do you in your own organizations develop leadership in your subordinates? Do you have any type of formal training programs, or is it informal--or just what is your procedure for developing future executives?

Mr. Owen: I think I'm a very short timer in my present company, and the company has been in existence for 70-odd years and pretty well ingrained in traditions. Changes have been a little tough to make. Some of the problems outlined by Mr. Flanagan exist there. We have, No. 1 in our recruiting programs, sought the highly promising young man to help do some leadership from the bottom so to speak in the organization. We have, for example, the Kepner and Tregoe problem-solving course. We have used that with quite a number of our people. We have rotated people into new, challenging assignments. It's historically a company where people have gone vertically through in one function and never been out of that function, and we have started making some cross-disciplinary assignments to place some new challenge. I think there is a great deal of difference between leadership in a functional organization where you have spent 25 years at becoming an expert in that function and of having new responsibilities for which you have no background. These are some of the kinds of things we are trying to develop in our senior people. We attempt to develop a true leadership capability through reassignments and also through formal training-type sessions or seminars. We are having a session this week with all the officers of the company, except myself. This group sits down and has a free-for-all on solving the problems of the company. Of course, I get a report afterwards; but I'm not going to sit there and restrain it. This is an effort in the direction of training broader leadership capabilities. Lastly, I personally think the exercise of personal example was so very important in my own leadership training program.

Mr. Fielder: I think you put your finger on the most serious problem that affects business today, and I'm not sure that we know how to do this thing. Because out of it comes management talent and skills, which are commodities that are so rare that we need to put an enormous effort on them. To give you a more specific answer to your question, in our company we don't have an organized plan; perhaps we should. We do take men that show promise and encourage them to take courses and go to seminars. We allow them to have time off; and we subsidize, to some extent, their further educational processes. It is, however, a kind of hit-and-miss thing the way we do it. I honestly wish we had a better way, a more reliable way to accomplish this purpose.

Mr. Owen: Some years ago, as I mentioned, when I first became engineering chief of Ford's equipment business, out of curiosity I checked the files on all the management people we had. I did this when I first came into that organization. My military orientation was well known, so I had no influence on selection up to that point. Of the forty men in management positions in that engineering organization, all but one had had a military leadership background. What's the chicken and what's the egg? Did they become military leaders because they had certain inherent leadership capabilities? Or did they become leaders in business because of their military experience and leadership background? I indicated in my prepared comments earlier that I don't think that business is very good at training leaders. We don't have a formal program for training leaders. Did their training program to become leaders in the military make them stand out against their colleagues with nonmilitary backgrounds, whereupon they became selected for advancement? I don't know the answer to that question.

Mr. Flanagan: Our company has no program for training future managers or future leaders unless it's from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M. Monday through Friday. We have a number of seminars or summer sessions that you can go to. We have sent several to Harvard, and I suspect that again this year we will have the opportunity to go to a session that I have seen advertised. On the other hand, I don't think that we have to apologize that we do have a problem in bringing up leaders. I just want to reverse it. If the company is a success due to leadership, then those who are working there with you are really going to school. They are developing in addition to their selling or whatever they are doing. I have no apology to make for the fact that we have no formal program. It may be that I am not familiar with it, and under the circumstances I have very little knowledge of what these formal programs have to offer. I may be wrong, but to this point I don't feel as though we have to have any. The company itself will develop it just by being there and open from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M. Monday through Friday.

Discussant: A question we often deal with here at the Academy is, What kind of balance should one seek between the technical aspects of knowing a job and what we like to call leadership abilities?

Mr. Bunker: I'm sure there is a balance. I think it is difficult to try to lead in perhaps the same degree of competence in some field in which you have less knowledge. I think knowledge is important. We have ways of accumulating broad material and facts and other things so that we can organize the knowledge, and it is an easier process than it used to be. I think accumulating knowledge is an absolute necessity, and I don't think there is such a thing as instinctive or intuitive leadership. A leader must first have a background, probably through education, or it can be arrived at informally, through experience; but it is still a sum total of knowledge.

Mr. Owen: Well, I guess I'm old-fashioned; but I feel that it is important for a man to be successful in his particular specialty as a foundation from which he grows. In my particular case, it is engineering. If you have a track record of only unsuccessful machines developed, you would probably never get off first base. You do have to have a successful base from which to grow and go on. For one thing, this creates confidence in the individual, the confidence of his former peers that this is, in fact, a leader. There seems to be a new school of thought on this subject that I haven't quite bought. I'm going to ask the Dean to comment on this. There seems to be a philosophy that a real bright MBA can come into a business organization and in pretty short order he is ready to be one of the top bosses. I haven't yet accepted that.

Dr. Mason: Before responding to the point you raised concerning MBA's, I would first like to add a thought with regard to your view and Mr. Bunker's view concerning the preparation of students for their careers. It seems to me the two points of view expressed are not incompatible. As a person moves through an organization and up the ladder of management, the kinds of knowledge he needs change. For example, in engineering initially he needs a high degree of technical knowledge of engineering since this is the position he is occupying in the firm. However, as one sees management potential in this person, one realizes that what is needed is the knowledge to be an effective manager. The manager assumes the role of a decision maker, a motivator and director of people's efforts in the best interests of everyone concerned. His body of knowledge to do these things effectively has either been previously acquired or now must be acquired and expanded upon.

I recall that about six years ago I had the pleasure of presenting an executive development program for a large chemical company. The purpose of this program was to take 27 research chemists, many of whom had their PhD's, all had done very fine research and a number had patents on their research, and add to their knowledge so as to prepare them to be managers. Thus, the firm saw in these men their potential as managers but at the same time recognized the need to send them back to school to expand their knowledge of the functions of management and to prepare them for their new assignments. Furthermore, the firm recognized that the men's knowledge of chemistry would probably become less and less as they assumed new roles in the firm and expanded their knowledge to become effective managers. Thus, to me, what we are really saying is that as a man moves up through the various levels of the organization, the kinds of knowledge he needs change. However, he must always be a very knowledgeable person.

Now in reference to your point, Mr. Owen, that you asked me to comment upon. I do realize that many of these young MBA's feel they are ready to be presidents, and most of them are not ready to be presidents as quickly as they think they should be. In many instances, I suspect strongly that these MBA's were convinced they were presidential material before they ever came into the MBA program. Because of my experience in working with them, I can say that most of them are very ambitious young men and women.

At the same time, I think there is one factor here that we must recognize. A firm needs to realize when interviewing MBA's that these people are a preselected group of students. Not every college graduate can enroll in a master's degree program. Most schools are interested in students who graduate in the upper fourth, upper third, or upper half of their college class. In addition, the academic backgrounds of these students are quite varied as far as their undergraduate work is concerned. Some are engineers, some are mathematicians, some are psychology majors, others are sociology majors, etc. Furthermore, they have now had five to six years of college education rather than four. Perhaps, then, the MBA is a little brighter and more knowledgeable than the typical college student you might hire. Perhaps he needs a different type of attention within the organization. Perhaps, therefore, he can move a little faster within the organization with proper direction. It has been my limited experience that many firms do not recognize that there has been this preselection process by the college or university before permitting a young man or young woman to enter an MBA program. At the same time, I must admit that I can give you examples of undergraduate students who would like to move even faster than the MBA's. So, much of it does still depend upon the individual.

Mr. Owen: I think we older fuds in business are inclined to forget that young people have demonstrated in the past their ability to build organizations and to do it with great speed and overall quite successfully. To go back to World War II, when we had a tremendous explosion of both our military and our industrial machines, it was young people who built machines. The old stories about "Bird Colonels" that hadn't started to shave had some foundation in fact. You found this in all branches of the military; but, equally so, you found it in industry. Young men did the job since there just weren't any other resources.

I remember in my own background in the military, as a first lieutenant I think I was the senior officer in the Corps of Engineers that knew anything about construction equipment. I was both a journeyman mechanic and a qualified construction machinery operator before I went into the military. The old military, and there weren't very many of them, had been trained in trenches, in barbed wire entanglements, in pill boxes, etc., but not construction equipment. So I found myself with some fairly heavy responsibilities at an early stage in the development of this new concept of how the Corps of Engineers would be employed. This story was repeated thousands and thousands of times; and one of the great problems that a corporation has today is how to use this young vigorous talent, probably better trained for problem solving than some of the older hands. We can't shoot them; we don't want to get shot. We can't affort to retire them at 50. Now what do you do? This is a real challenge. Some of the companies have been fairly successful in doing some of this, and it is a leaf that I have tried to use from time to time in our company. In one point of my checkerboard career I was with the Dupont Company and got acquainted with some of their approaches to this. They set up, under the business development department, new risk ventures; and one of these bright young men becomes a venture manager. He hardly has more than a table and a telephone initially; but here is a product that the research people have said, "This is going to displace silk stockings." Of course nobody believes it except a few key people, including our "Mr. Venture" manager. It is his job, then, to take this venture, find some place to get pilot quantities made within the company; he doesn't own or manage a factory. He goes and chisels some time out of a pilot plant to get some product made. He gets a few people to get out and do market development work; and if he is successful, this eventually grows into a business. Now he may become the division manager of a new division if it's really successful, and at a very ripe and tender age in the eyes of some of the older hands. The Dupont system also includes you when you become vice president of Dupont; you're not in charge of anything. The rank of "grand old men" that are in the vice presidency of the Dupont Company has only a secretary as a subordinate. They tend to specialize in knowledge of what's going on in various line divisions; and when there are Board of Directors meetings, they are in the position to give their sage judgment, etc. But the younger men are running the line divisions. This is an interesting challenge; and the military, I think, has done an admirable job of solving this. It's pretty tough on a guy to get retired fairly early and just at his prime; but it does create the opportunity for the younger and more vigorous hands to move up. The more able senior hands move into the senior grades, but you do tend to keep this upward movement. As a reserve division commander, I experienced this. Painful as it was to lose old Joe, he was a good man, it still kept this mobility within the organization and helped to motivate the young people.

Mr. Flanagan: I always feel safe in my position as president or leader of the organization because I have been in the business so long. I can talk to a writer or an announcer, or an engineer in their own language about my business. I can do this because I've been there, and I think this is a very important element as far as leadership is concerned. We have expanded into the plastics business. I don't know anything about it. We are making plastic tables, plastic chairs, plastic walls. It's just in its beginning phase, and I find I can go over there and watch what's going on. I ask questions, but it isn't related to my business, which is really selling "blue sky." In television and radio and outdoor signs you don't really sell a product that you can hold onto and feel. You just say, "If you buy X dollars in television time, business will break down your doors tomorrow morning." Sometimes they do and sometimes they don't, depending on how well they use the time. In any event, my relations to this plastic organization are entirely different than they are in the radio and television and the outdoor media because I don't really know the business; and I feel a lack in it--and I just hope I've chosen the right person that has the knowledge.

Mr. Fielder: I'd like to give a short answer to this question. I don't think there has to be much balance at all. Let me illustrate in this way: We tend to run businesses by exception, and all our businesses are so complex. If we undertook to guide every element problem, it would be an impossibility as individuals. We have our own limitations; the limitations are the numbers of hours and the amount of time you can put into it. In my estimation, your best course is to discover what's going wrong and to correct that.

If your business is manufacturing, you set up certain standards which are to be obtained by the various elements in the business and then you try to detect or discover at the earliest opportunity when one of them is drifting off course. If you can do that, that's all the technical capability you need. In my own experience, my class in engineering is 35 years out of school. Heavens, a whole new realm of knowledge and understanding has arisen! People talk about things that weren't heard of when I was undergoing my training. I would judge that my own capability as an engineer may have peaked out about five or six years after I got out of school. Since then, my capacity as a technician has gone steadily down hill; but I think maybe I have a capacity for discovering when engineering values are not on the course that they ought to be. Once we've done this, the next step is to get the technical capabilities together and to discover what change or what direction is required at that time. This doesn't imply a very heavy leaning in favor of technical or professional or specialized scales. How it comes or where it comes from perhaps only comes from experience or generalized knowledge of the subject. At one time the needs and requirements for leadership are thus and so; and as conditions change and as your own responsibilities change, these requirements may become different.

Discussant: Under what circumstances have you felt that you lack authority that you need in order to get a particular job done?

What has been your relationship with your Board under those circumstances?

Mr. Bunker: Well, I think that's a very complicated question to generalize upon. I think perhaps the structure of the corporate body and development of authority within corporations probably vary a great deal. In my present situation, I don't have any problem with authority as chief executive officer. My relationship with the Board of Directors is such that I have all the authority that I need to run the corporation. However, I do think that there may be cases of corporations where the authority doesn't really rest with the chief executive; it may rest with somebody else. It may rest with the principal shareholder who may for some reason or another deny the authority to you.

Mr. Owen: I think in any business where you feel there is an authority problem, it's more one of a relationship problem than an authority problem. Most well-regulated businesses have stipulated delegations of authority on those things on which you can put a number--salary levels at which you can hire an individual without further approval, or you can increase his pay without further approval--and as those go higher, the authority goes higher, for example, capital investments, purchase orders, or whatever it might be. These are generally fairly well spelled out.

The problem of not having enough authority is similar in frequency to the problem of managers being unsure of using the authority that they have. This is an awesome decision I'm having to make, and I'd like to have the boss as part of this thing in case it fouls up or some such thing as that. So there is some problem in getting people to use their authority. With this kind of an authority formalization, and where there isn't a specific authority statement, there develops a sort of judgment. Well, this doesn't have a number on it, and it's a policy thing. I feel free to go ahead; or I think I ought to discuss this with upstairs, whatever upstairs may be. If the relationships and the confidences, etc., are right, this is rarely a problem. It can be handled by telephone. It can be handled by a meeting, without a meeting of the Board, by letter, or whatever form you like. Very often it is done by telephone and then done on paper later to make it official for the records, if it is a major policy or something of that sort. Where the relationships and confidence situation are impaired, they had better get straightened out pretty fast or you had better get some new faces in the show. I have never, in going all the way from foot soldier to corporate president, felt that lack of authority was a problem in my own personal career.

Mr. Fielder: I don't think it's a problem under most circumstances. There are certain formal limitations that exist for any chief executive officer. They are established in the charter usually in the corporation and the bylaws: and the shares are traded and formalities imposed by the Security and Exchange Commission, and probably the stock exchanges on whose exchanges our shares are traded. These relate the matters such as Bob Owen referred to and the formalities of disclosures. Stock exchanges and the Security and Exchange Commission would tell us of making sure that you keep the public informed of what you are doing and what the condition of your business is. It's my feeling that one who runs a corporation where shares are traded ought to abide religiously by whatever these limitations are--not because they affect so much the operation of business, but because if you don't, you can be fairly sure that some sharp accountant or lawyer somewhere is going to find that you have deviated. The first thing you know, the process server is around and you have a law suit on your hands.

A more fundamental aspect of your question relates to the relationship of the chief executive and the Board of Directors. If you have a free and easy time of communication with your board, then there is no limit to what you can really do because there is an intimate understanding on the part of the Board as to what direction you are giving to the company, what your purposes are, what your objectives are, and how you propose to attain them. They will always support you.

This manner of communicating is something that one should be conscious of and develop so that there is an intimacy and understanding between the chief executive and the various members of the Board. This isn't always easy to obtain because more than likely you have on the Board people who have large responsibilities of their own. Maybe they run banks or they are lawyers practicing law, and they come to your meeting. Say you meet once a month, you are there for maybe 15 minutes to half an hour, and maybe this is the only opportunity there is to convey the purposes and the objectives of the business. Many boards meet at less frequent intervals, maybe every two months or quarterly or maybe even twice a year. The problem becomes even more difficult under those circumstances; but the formal requirements the Board must meet in operating a business are very simple. They're usually disposed of in one, two, or three board meetings. The other things, the general philosophy of where you are going with the business and how you propose to get there are really the heart of the matter; and this depends on the relationship between the chief executive and his Board of Directors.

Discussant: Do your companies notice any difference in the nature and preparation of employable young people today? If so, what are these changes and what accommodations are your companies making to take into consideration this change?

Mr. Fielder: Well, this has been alluded to in some ways in what we were talking about the MBA's a while ago. They were ready to be the presidents and the chairmen of the boards right off the bat. I would say, though, that perhaps the depth of their training is superior to what it used to be; and it seems to be improving as time goes on.

Mr. Owen: I think that with each new wave of college graduates you have new capabilities being brought into the organization; and as Mr. Fielder said, you are paying more for it. If you don't respond to utilize those capabilities, you're not getting your money's worth. Let me back up five, six, or seven years in engineering. When we began to form a new team of these bright young engineers who had done their homework on computers and so on, that would be a little difficult for us to do. We set up remote console arrangements in this new engineering activity that tied into the banks of computers we had in the central engineering center and used these young guys in development of some all-new concepts in automated hydraulics for some of our apparatus. Perhaps this is not very new in the aviation and space field, but it certainly is new in the farm machinery field. The older hands were skeptical, and there was some problem of translating some of this new knowledge from the newer hands to the older hands. We had one problem, a design problem in another department. Hydraulics is a pretty tough, technical field; it's still about 50% art and 50% science. The guys doing this job were largely artists. They cut and fit for a period of about six months before they finally solved this aberration problem. One of my subordinate managers was very skeptical of all of this new stuff, so I said, "Why don't you take the beginning criteria of this problem over here and give it to these guys and see what they can do?" They had no first-hand knowledge of all the cut and fit that had gone on in solving the problem. Twenty-four hours later they came back with the design solution to this problem which had taken the other team six months, and it was the same solution. There were some who didn't believe that this had been done by the machine, and there were some that did. Those that did believe started going into this new department and started to learn how to use the remote console and started to do some of their complex engineering mathematics with the computer, and this just spread like a disease. In time it was only a few of the oldest, oldest not necessarily in age but in attitude, who hadn't joined the parade.

Now similarly we are going through, at the present time, the transition from the green eyeshades to the computers, not just in keeping the payroll and the books, etc., but in what is broadly called operations research. Whole new methods, systems analysis and using the computer, are tools in those systems. It's sort of a "gut grinding" operation to get the green eyeshade and the young operations research people to work together. They both have something to contribute. The new operations research people don't know a lot about the business, but they know a lot about using modern tools. The green eyeshade boys know a lot about the business but nothing about new methods. So this is painful, but we are making progress. These are some of the kinds of ways that we are using the advanced level of preparation of today's college graduates.

Mr. Flanagan: Most of the kids who come in and ask for work at the station or the motion picture studio are in many ways exactly the same as when I was out knocking on doors, but they do have new ideas. As some of you may know, USC and UCLA have some of the best motion picture training schools in the country. In any event, they would come in, and in their briefcase they would have a roll of film that maybe they did during their senior year or from their master's or PhD. To me it's very interesting to look at these films because I have seen films come off the campuses of USC and UCLA and other schools back in New York that are just wild. At the same time, I don't understand what they are saying; but I suspect that maybe ten years ago we wouldn't have understood today's Pepsi Cola advertising spot. It's very fast cut, the music is way out, and the colors (a red car, then it's a green car, then it's a red car) are wild. The idea (there are 10,000 of them in 60 seconds) is that if you took this film and this youngster and said, "Will you give me a spot at First National Bank?", you wouldn't even get to first base with the spot that he would turn out for the First National Bank. If you showed it to the advertising manager, the vice president, or the president, they wouldn't understand what this kid was talking about as far as his film and sound are concerned. But with these new kids coming in, we now see on television some of the things that you are becoming used to. They don't do anything straightforward. They get you from

from the left field and from the right field, and I welcome their new ideas. I hope that more of them come in because I really get a bang out of looking at these new ideas. It's very easy to see a new idea, and it's very easy to hear a new idea on an audio tape.

They have changed the television industry. To a certain extent they changed our program. You saw on the 7-Up advertisement the Un-Cola drink. Now you know that some old man didn't create that. With these fellows now coming on the scene in radio and television, what we now see on the screen that we are used to we will see very little of in the future because of their new ideas, which as far as I'm concerned are most welcome.

Mr. Bunker: I think that I can only add one thing. I think most of the young people going to work today want more than just a job. They come with more than just new ideas; they come with a mission. They want to know what this corporation is going to accomplish; what is its social purpose? A very interesting thing is that many will choose not to work for a corporation that does not have a social goal or commitment. This may be one other fact that is new among the young people.

Dr. Mason: Gentlemen, our time is up and this ends our program.

BLANK PAGE

Dr. Robert Tannenbaum (PhD, University of Chicago) is Professor of Behavioral Sciences, Department of Business Administration, University of California, Los Angeles. He has been consultant to industry, government, education, community, health, and similar entities on organizational and management development. Dr. Tannenbaum has authored and coauthored numerous articles and the book Leadership and Organization: A Behavioral Science Approach. In addition to membership in many organizations such as the American Economic Association, American Sociological Association, and the Industrial Relations Research Association, Dr. Tannenbaum is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association and a licensed psychologist, State of California.

Abstract

The problem of developing effective leadership is approached from four aspects: goals, variables, characteristics of effective leadership, and leadership training. In the first area the qualities of leadership are discussed and differentiation is made between levels of attainment. The questions of values and long- versus short-run measurement are introduced. Leadership variables are typified as the leader, the led and the situation. Two major characteristics of effective leadership, sensitivity and action flexibility, are discussed and related to emotional maturity. Leadership training is proposed as a significant area for development in light of the apparent discrepancies between academic and practical success. In the discussion, these premises are applied to cadet leadership training.

Preceding page blank

DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP

By

Robert Tannenbaum

Professor of Behavioral Sciences

University of California at Los Angeles

I'm very pleased to be here with you today. As some of the officers already know, I'm in a sense returning home since I was born in Cripple Creek, not far from here. I spent the early years of my life there so I feel deep roots in Colorado.

As to my background, my academic degrees were from the University of Chicago in accounting, with a master's from there also in accounting, and a doctorate in economics and industrial relations. At that time industrial relations was heavily loaded with economics. My metamorphosis into the behavioral sciences occurred at the post-doctoral level, and I've been groping in this new field for approximately twenty years.

The early days in that twenty-year period began with my involvement with sensitivity training, which is one form of leadership training. It is a vehicle for helping individuals gain a better understanding of themselves and of others. As I have worked in sensitivity training, I've experimented with various aspects of it from the marathon, which involves getting a group of people together for a period as long as 52 hours, to the use of nonverbal methodologies. In the last few years I've worked in organizational development--or O. D. Here we study the individual in the organizational subsystem and develop techniques and methodologies for helping organizations develop more effective entities.

One of my central interests is the question of societal values. I'm concerned about what's happening in our society today. I'm concerned about the value issues and the policy issues related to those values. The value question is important for individuals being trained to play major leadership roles in our society, as you cadets are. It is also important for faculty members who are working in leadership training. The value question cannot be overlooked because it is a central part of what we do.

I've been attached to schools of business throughout my student and professional years. These schools are currently in a significant process of development. The names of some of them have already changed to such things as "school of management" or "school of administration." That may sound like a minor semantic change, but it represents much more. We have discovered in the field of organizational theory and practice that a large number of the theories, processes that we study, and skills relevant to functioning in organizations all have wider relevance. They don't apply just to business organizations alone. O. D. theories and practices have been found useful for other types of organizations too.

I have worked at times with school systems, with military organizations, with government organizations, with church organizations, with industrial organizations and with families. I'm sometimes asked, "Bob, don't you feel torn as you move from one setting to another, from working with the individual to the dyad or two-person relationship, from the small group as in sensitivity training to large social systems?" I'm not torn; I feel very whole because the model that I use is a model that's very deeply rooted in the field of social systems theory. I think it has wide applicability, ranging all the way from the individual to the inter-organization.

I don't have a kind of special position with which I am narrowly identified since I didn't come up through one of the particular behavioral sciences. I tend to range over psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, psychiatry and then ethics because they involve the value aspects of what we do, and so I'm fairly eclectic in my view.

In this connection, three years ago at UCLA we started an annual program for people from off campus from all over the world. It is known as the Learning Community in Organizational Development. Here we bring in approximately sixteen people who are interested in becoming professionals in organizational development work, and we work with them intensively on a residential basis for six weeks. We help develop them professionally in this field.

In each group of sixteen, we have had people from all the organizational fields. It's fascinating to watch them on the first day. They look at the roster, and they look at each other. The industrial man looks at someone from the national headquarters of a major Christian denomination, and he wonders why they are here together. Then as the program unfolds, it becomes quite clear they have very much in common.

The military, for example, has its uniquenesses--as does every organization--but the similarities among organizations are very relevant ones. I think there is as much difference organizationally between an organization in advanced space research such as TRW (Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge) Systems and one of our public utilities as there is between TRW Systems and the military. I think the classifications "military," "industrial" and so on don't mean very much in this context. My latest involvement is a four- or five-year project working with the kibbutzim in Israel. My involvement with the kibbutzim is with an organizational development or organizational renewal thrust. I'm involved in helping the kibbutzim to take a fresh look at their values, goals, modes of functioning, organization and leadership. My purpose is to help them to develop and grow into units that will be more relevant to today and tomorrow and thereby become more viable social entities.

Let me give a succinct overview of some key ideas in the leadership field that we will be discussing today:

First, leadership for what?

Second, I see leadership as a function of three broad variables: (a) the characteristics of the leader himself, (b) the characteristics of the followers with whom he is interacting, and (c) the characteristics of the situation in which the leaders and followers are involved.

Third, in studying these variables it is important to examine what characterizes effective leadership--the importance of sensitivity, empathy, and behavioral or action flexibility to the leadership process.

Finally, let's look at the leadership training process and the correlation between scores in the typical "leadership classroom" and success of the leader on the job or in the field.

Leadership for What?

As we turn to the area of leadership, the first question is, "Leadership for what?" This matter of "leadership for what" is very relevant. The two issues I'll be covering will be first the qualities of an individual that make for effective leadership, and second the factors that differentiate people who are high in these qualities from people who are low in these qualities. In suggesting answers to these two questions, we get into a third area, the question of what we can do to better train and develop effective leaders. These, then, are the issues for my presentation.

Do the values of a given organization really matter to us as leaders of that organization? To what extent do values really permeate our stance with respect to the unit that we lead? Are we primarily focused on a task or an operation without any concern about the broader values that are implemented by that activity? This basic question of "leadership for what" has to be tied to the question of values. Second, under the question of "leadership for what" it's very important to differentiate between a person's longer-run career in leadership and the immediate leadership situation. Evidence is becoming increasingly clear in most areas of society that over a man's career he is likely to find himself in a number of leadership situations. I suspect you cadets at some time will be leading combat groups, leading flight groups, leading administrative entities; and at still other times you may be involved in leading training organizations. There is a wide range of leadership roles opening before you. As we think about leadership, it's important to keep in focus a man's total career as well as his present specific assignment. When we are first choosing individuals as potential leaders and training them for what we hope will prepare them adequately for a lifetime of varied leadership demands, we have to keep in mind the whole spectrum of such demands that may be placed upon them. Keeping in mind both values and the long-run perspective, it's also important that we do not lose sight of short-run requirements. Each of you cadets, for example, is going to face over your next six to eight years some early leadership demands on you--and maybe some attention needs to be given to the first and second leadership requirements that you face.

Leadership Variables

Let me get even more specific about this difference in what I mean about the long-run demand and the short-run demand. A number of years ago, the rather superficial knowledge we had about leadership and what makes for effective leadership focused primarily on the leader himself. A lot of the research and a lot of the theorizing that went on were focused on the particular qualities of the leader that would make him effective. The early manuals on leadership that I've seen from West Point and Annapolis stress qualities of leadership. You know various successful generals and admirals who in years past wrote articles about what they saw as the key leadership qualities varied. Yet, as people began looking at these lists of qualities more closely, they found that among the various lists of qualities there was very little overlap; and they began to wonder what that meant. This led to a focus on another class of variables. These variables were situational in character. For example, maybe an individual leading a unit in combat, under high-stress conditions, has to have different qualities than the person leading a staff unit under fairly bureaucratic and predictable conditions through time. Maybe a dean in a school of business with faculty members as his subordinates needs to have different qualities than a person who is supervising a group of factory workers on a production line. So they began looking at situational variables. Now if we look at deans of schools, can we find qualities in common that make for effectiveness there? If we look at military combat leaders, can we find qualities that are in common there? Etc. ? Again, the answers were not neat and clear-cut; and it's rather amazing that only in the last fifteen or twenty years has a third class of variables come into the picture, the qualities of the follower.

This suggests that the effectiveness of a leader is not only a function of his characteristics and the characteristics of the situation in which he is involved; but it is also a function of the followers, those being led. For example, suppose I'm leading a group of human beings who psychologically are highly dependent and insecure persons. In order to help these people function effectively, I would need to have a lot of psychological strength, use a lot of directivity, use a lot of firmness, and apply a lot of clear structuring of organization, procedures, and methods. If I'm dealing with individuals who have very few internal controls, who have great difficulty in defining limits for themselves and their own functioning, I may have to be very firm in setting limits for them. At the other extreme, suppose I am supervising individuals who are emotionally mature and functioning as innovators in an advanced research and development setting. In this situation it would be wrong for me to highly structure, to be directive, etc. In fact, if I did these things, I would surely fail in my job. I should lead in quite a different way when dealing with the latter type of person. If I am dealing with people who are very much in touch with their feeling and are able to handle their feelings and be very spontaneous and open-ended, I need to function with considerable open-endedness and flexibility and adaptability. And so this third emphasis has really underscored the additional relevance of the characteristics of the followers in effective leadership.

This suggests, then, that leadership effectiveness is a function of these three broad variables: (1) the characteristics of the leader himself, (2) the characteristics of the followers with whom he is interacting, (3) the characteristics of the situation in which the leaders and followers are involved--that all of these are important. An effective leader must be sensitive to the followers and the situation as well as himself. I would like to emphasize that when we get into theorizing and talking about leadership, it's very easy to get locked into one part of this field and to lose sight of the broad import of what we are dealing with. For example, a leader may have a bias with respect to what he would like to see people experience in a leadership situation. He may be situationally focused, or very task focused. If a leader concentrates too much on the task, he may lose sight of some of the other factors. As we talk about leadership today, let's focus on leader, follower and situation.

Characteristics of Effective Leadership

If I were to be labeled in the field of psychology, I would be labeled as a humanistic psychologist. That's where my values lie so you will have to hear what I'll be saying next in this context.

With these principal variables established, let us turn now to some other aspects of leadership, some of the details. I would like to discuss two leadership qualities. The first of these is what we call social sensitivity or empathy. Social sensitivity is the accuracy of perception on the part of one individual viewing other individuals in social situations. I'm thinking here of a continuum. People follow along in a continuum ranging all the way from fairly low sensitivity to fairly high. The prevailing generality about social sensitivity needs to be broken down to a much finer degree. For example, some individuals are much more sensitive to individual human beings than they are to groups or to a community phenomenon. Some individuals are much more sensitive to some aspects of individuals than they are to other aspects. We need, through time, to get much more sophisticated in a breakdown of this notion of social sensitivity. I don't think that it necessarily is a single, generalized trait. I don't think it's possible to say that I'm high in social sensitivity and mean that I have high accuracy of perception all the way from individuals to large social systems and across all types of human beings and all types of social systems--so that degree of sophistication needs to be put in here.

In the earlier supervisory and human relations literature, it was fairly common to say that a good supervisor or leader was an individual who was able to put himself in the shoes of another person. In one sense that may be correct; but I think in the way that it is usually meant, it is absolutely incorrect. If I, for instance, want to reach you, George, for me to put myself in your shoes is quite irrelevant in the usual situation. It would be relevant only if you turned out to be a person who was quite similar to me, but the odds are quite great that we differ as human beings in many respects. We have different genetic roots. You may have been raised in a large family; and I, in a small family. You may have come from a rural area; and I, from the city. We studied different subjects; we were surrounded by different kinds of peers; we have gone in somewhat different career routes, etc. Social sensitivity or empathy in terms of the individual means being able to think as the other person thinks, to experience the world as the other person experiences the world, and to feel as the other person feels, to almost get inside that other person's skin.

The other quality here is what we call behavioral, or action, flexibility. I define action flexibility as the ability of an individual appropriately to behave with respect to other individuals or social units. By appropriately here I have in mind a response that is dictated by his social sensitivity, by what he perceives, what he tunes in on. Now these two characteristics somehow have to go together.

It's essential to be able to both tune in accurately on the social unit that one is dealing with and to be able to respond appropriately to what is tuned in on. We have encountered people who are behaviorally flexible, people who have a wide spectrum of behavioral modes; and yet as often as they vary their behavior, it's very inappropriate. It just isn't very much related to what's out there, and this doesn't make for very high effectiveness. At one time an individual may be able to get tough and firm, and yet what is called for is gentleness and support. At another time, an individual may reflect openly his lack of confidence, when what is really needed is something quite different. Either of these extremes does not help very much. Let me come back to the statement that I made earlier about two other variables, the follower and the situation. The leader's social sensitivity relates both to the followers and to the situation. We're concerned here about his perceptual accuracy in focusing on followers and on focusing on situations. As we look at his behavioral or action flexibility, we're focusing on his ability to relate himself to followers and the situations; so in both instances the relationship of the leader to follower and the situation are kept in mind.

When I started this talk, I indicated that I felt that the short-run leadership requirements should be seen in the context of the long-run leadership pattern of the person. I have seen many effective leaders who I did not feel were particularly high in sensitivity or flexibility, and I have understood their effectiveness in the short run. An individual can get into a situation which is just right for him. For instance, one individual I know, a retired colonel, has a certain set of personality dynamics. I can quite well see that in a staff situation, the structure, the rather high clarity and lack of frequent change, etc., of that situation, matched very well his personality dynamics. So I see a leader getting into a structured situation that just fits his rigidity, and likewise that his behavior mode, even though it is rigid and not flexible, may match quite appropriately the needs of the group that are his followers. So using my earlier illustration, if a fellow is primarily a directive, highly structured leader, he may typically have under him followers who are fairly dependent individuals. If that match occurs, there is really no need for him to be sensitive or flexible.

I suspect that in rapidly changing situations the matching does not occur very often. This has a lot of relevance to the military where people rotate a lot. For example, I may seek a leadership spot where I'm comfortable and where I kind of fit with respect to the situation. If I have great difficulty handling stress, I'm not very likely to get myself into a situation where stress is commonplace. I'm not going to select subordinates who just don't feel quite right with me. If I get some people who are uncomfortable with me, sooner or later they're going to move out; or other persons in the organization who are attracted to me may ask for a transfer and want to come in. Through time there's a kind of natural process that often tends to get leaders, followers, and situations into a pretty good match.

What are we beginning to learn about what makes for high sensitivity and flexibility? I'll first state my hypothesis. My basic hypothesis would be that there is a high correlation between individuals who are high in sensitivity and flexibility and individuals who are emotionally mature, have a high degree of mental health, and are well adjusted emotionally. Contrariwise, individuals who are relatively low in these characteristics are individuals who are emotionally immature individuals.

Focusing on empathy or social sensitivity, with our various sensory mechanisms we tune in on what is outside of ourselves. But the sensing must then be interpreted by us to provide meaning; and, of course, the meaning is attached to sensations through the perceptual process. We tend to see what we need to see and to hear what we need to hear. I suppose most of the faculty members are familiar with the earlier experiments of Allport on the rumor clinic.

The film strip we use most typically shows some people inside a streetcar or subway car. There are a number of individuals, variously dressed, of both sexes, doing different things. There are two central figures. One of the figures is a short, white man in workingman's clothes; the other man is a tall, well-dressed, black man. In the picture, the white man is holding a knife or razor. We have five subjects leave the room before we project the picture on the screen. Then we project it on the screen, and the group talks a little about what's there. We bring in the first subject who faces the picture. We ask him to tell us what he sees there. He talks, finally runs down, and we kind of pump him a little, "Is there anything else there?" He goes on as long as he can talk. Then we have him turn around with his back to the screen and bring in the second person who doesn't see the screen. He faces away from the screen. We have the first person tell the second person what's in the picture; then the second person tells the third; the third, the fourth; the fourth, the fifth; then the fifth retells it to the first. Allport used this technique to study the diffusion of rumors. What we've found in studying perception accuracy is that there are some individuals who will describe the picture in the minutest detail except that they will never mention the knife or razor. They just leave that out no matter how much we try to prime the pump--that isn't mentioned. It usually must be pointed out. Then in retelling the story, in over 50% of the cases, the razor or knife shifts hands from the white to the black. An interesting example occurred in our executive program last year. After the exercise was over, we were talking about what happened. The vice-president of an electronics firm was looking at the picture; and he said, "Bob, you know to really understand this, we have to look back in time from this picture. It's quite obvious to me that what happened was that the black man got onto the car carrying the instrument, that he probably walked down the aisles and began slitting the seats. The white man obviously is the motorman. He couldn't let this continue to happen so he took the instrument away from the black man, and now that's what we see."

In a sense, our own needs, and often our deep needs, determine the meanings that we attach to what we see or feel or experience outside ourselves. The more distorted, the more unworked through are those deeper needs, the more we are unaware of what those deeper needs within ourselves are, the more likely it is that what we perceive outside of ourselves will be distorted, will be twisted, or will be even blocked out, as in the case of the first person who deals with incongruity that he can handle by just ignoring it. This happens often in the perceptual field.

As you also may know, in the work of the California group of Adorno, Frankel Brunswick, and others who worked on the authoritarian personality and the F-Scale, there is a lot of evidence for the usual perceptual distortions of the authoritarian type. These kinds of distortions can occur in many different kinds of people in many different ways. Just using this one illustration and again coming back to my hypothesis, the more an individual has worked through his deeper biases, prejudices, blockages, fears, anxieties, etc., the more he is consciously aware of them and how they affect his perceptual interaction with the world about him, the more able he is to be socially sensitive.

Moving now to the second characteristic in the light of my hypothesis, again I feel that what differentiates low and high flexibility is a person's emotional maturity. Let me give one example here. You are all familiar with the recent focusing on effective listening that stems both from the early Hawthorne studies as well as from Carl Roger's work. In an executive group a number of years ago, we were talking about listening and what made for effective listening. One of the fellows in the group said to the others, "Between now and next week, let's each of us try in our relationship with someone in our organization, really try, to see how far we can go with effective listening and then compare notes next week." They agreed to do this. The next week when we came together again, this person was the first to speak up; and he said, "you know, I don't know about you fellows; but I found out a lot about myself as I tried the experiment I suggested." He said, "I sat down, tried to listen to an employee who came to me with a rather serious personal problem, and I remembered in effective listening we should really try to listen and not do much talking, except where it's highly functional to the process." He said, "I found myself intervening much more than I should have, and I thought about that. It underscored for me that I have a high need to control others; and when I'm talking, I'm able to define what we talk about and when, etc." But he said, "If all I'm doing is listening, I'm not in control of what's going on in the interaction. So, I realize that my high need for control was getting in the way of my ability to really listen effectively. I also found that when I got into a period of silence that I couldn't wait it out. After a few seconds I had a need to come in and fill the silence."

Now what I suspect he didn't realize about himself was that he probably had a relatively low tolerance for ambiguity, a quality that is very relevant to effective leadership, I think. When he is faced with unstructured situations, or ambiguity of stimuli, he gets high anxiety and he has to do something to deal with that. There are probably few things that are more ambiguous than a period of silence.

Often in the field of leadership, the term "skill" is used. My feeling is that in effective leadership, skill in the usual meaning of that term just doesn't play a very big part. Sure, to a minor extent there are some social skills that maybe we can develop that can be helpful; but I think a much stronger variable has to do not with the skill that a person develops as he learns to play the violin or how he handles a tool in connection with a lathe, etc., but rather with what he is as a human being. For example, my businessman listener was not ineffective because he hadn't developed certain skills. He might through practice be able to really control his need to go in with words, or he might be able to tolerate his anxiety when he is faced with a period of silence and therefore wait it out. However, my hunch would be if he withholds his words and controls his anxiety, he won't be a very effective listener because his handling of himself will be so demanding that it will get into the way of what's going on. It will be controlled and unnatural and therefore will get in the way. My basic hypothesis would be that the way to help an individual gain greater effectiveness in the action phase is to free him from the constraints that stand in his way of behaving in new and initially strange ways. If this individual could somehow work through his intolerance of ambiguity, or if an individual can somehow work through in part his high need for control, he will then be able to function more effectively; and that's not a matter of skill development. It's a matter of being freer and less tight in the behavioral phase.

Now since I've hypothesized that both of these factors (sensitivity and flexibility) may be related to emotional maturity, you might raise the question: If a person is emotionally mature, does that mean he will be high in both of these? In answer to that, I have to come back to the earlier statement I made, that I suspect really in both of these cases as we get to learn more, we will find there's a lot more differentiation and sophistication than suspected. For example, if I'm distorting because of some need within myself that leads me to distort certain kinds of social stimuli outside of myself, that may account for my low social sensitivity in that area. However, that particular hang-up within myself may not get in the way of my behaving flexibly in another situation. So that my hunch is that different hang-ups get in the way of our specific sensitivities, and different hang-ups get in the way of our being able to function flexibly as leaders.

Leadership Training

Maybe at times there is some overlap between something that gets in the way of sensitivity and something that gets in the way of flexibility, but we need to find out much more about this. If my hunches about these characteristics are relevant in relation to the question of what makes for effective leadership, if there is validity to my notions here, and if high performance in these characteristics is related to one's emotional maturity, then I think that what I've been saying relates directly to leadership training. It seems to me that we're led here to leadership training techniques that have high relevance to the personal growth and development of the individual as a human being, that we develop more effective leaders of the kind I'm thinking of in the long-career sense--individuals who through time will be able to be rather highly sensitive to a wide spectrum of people and social situations and be able to relate flexibly and appropriately to that wide spectrum of situations and individuals. That kind of an individual is one who is relatively emotionally mature.

In the early 1950's at UCLA I used to give human relations courses that had a lot of book stuff, a lot of concepts, and a few things in the area of role playing and cases and exercises; and I used to feel that this is what it took to help students become more effective managers or supervisors or leaders. What troubled me after two or three years was the clear evidence that there was little correlation between performance in the class and an individual's real effectiveness in leadership situations. It was quite possible for a person to be very analytically competent in handling a case, to respond to questions around theories and concepts, etc., and to be really very ineffective as a leader. Also, it was possible for a person to be pretty effective as a leader and not do very well in the things that were usually graded in such a course. This factor has really haunted me throughout the years, and I have to share some of this with you. This is the gap between intellectual competence in issues of leadership and human relations and effectiveness in actually being a leader.

Another area where this gap occurs is in various kinds of intern training programs. These programs develop trainers and train OD people as we do in the learning community and organizational development. One of the areas where we run into great difficulty is dealing with established social criteria for people to become professionals. For example, there is a requirement that they should have advanced degrees and hopefully PhD's in psychology and sociology or MD's with psychiatric emphasis. I can assure you that my greatest difficulty in developing effective trainers is working with people whose success has come in settings where it is measured by high intellectual performance.

Perhaps my greatest difficulty has been working with clinical psychologists and psychiatrists who turn out very often to be among the most inflexible individuals; often they have considerable sensitivity but are behaviorally inflexible. They are individuals whose conventional mode of operation really protects them as individuals. The typical psychiatric stance of the man behind the couch with his pad almost completely separates him from interpersonal relationship. He is not involved as a person except insofar as he's perceiving data and trying to understand it. Now these individuals have succeeded professionally in getting their degrees, but being the kind of person who can succeed this way almost gets in the way of their being effective practitioners.

Most recently, I have encountered a person who is only a high school graduate who, as a human being, had more of what it takes to be an effective practitioner in the field than most PhD's and MD's that I run in to. Yet, there are real problems in helping him as an intern in the field because a lot of people will be asking for his credentials. There is a real discrepancy between what it takes for effective practice and what it takes to get the professional kudos for society to let us carry on the practice.

Currently in California you might be interested that the State Psychological Association is now starting its own university and will set up its own curriculum with its own credentialing as one means of coping with this problem. It has become quite clear that the academic psychology departments are not typically turning out clinicians; rather they are turning out people who are rat psychologists or experimentalists or theorists. Certainly such people may be highly competent in making important contributions in those areas but are, nevertheless, not the kinds of practitioners that we need because generally they are interpersonally ineffective.

One other footnote here concerns the trends in the trainer role in sensitivity training or the therapist role in psychotherapy, or other roles in the other helping professions. One of the important trends in recent years is that the greatest effectiveness in the helping professions comes when the helper is able to involve himself deeply in the interpersonal process with the other individual--where he is not an entity protected in the relationship but where he is deeply involved in the relationship with the other person. Research studies are now beginning to emerge as well as an awful lot of theory which support this contention. The style in consulting with organizations in the OD field is typically not the outsider who holds himself aloof from the system that he is working with.

My style is to get deeply involved as a part of the system I'm working with. I think this is increasingly essential to do effective systems work, all the way from the individual to the much larger social system. My basic bias here is that in the development of effective interveners, whether they are managers, trainers, therapists, teachers, nurses, social workers, or parents, whatever the role may be, one way to help people become more effective is to help them become better human beings. In interpersonal and social relations, the only instrument we have to use is ourselves, and our deficiencies or our difficulties in being highly effective in the social role stem from our own hang-ups that get in the way of our sensitivity or our flexibility. I'm sorry to say, and you may want to push me on this since it is kind of antiacademic, but I don't think much book learning helps very much in developing effective leaders.

Before we move into our discussion period, perhaps I can briefly summarize for you the points which I have made as well as some of the issues which I have raised. First, I do not think we can simply discuss "leadership" out of context. If we wish to determine leadership qualities and to differentiate between levels of those qualities, we must do two things: we must relate them to societal values, and we must distinguish between a long-run and short-run frame of reference. Second, I think we must accept the evolution of the study of leadership as a three-variable problem consisting of the leader, the situation and the followers. Third, I hold quite strongly that effective leadership requires mastery of social sensitivity and action flexibility. The level of skill of application of these two qualities determines both short-run and long-run effectiveness. Fourth, and finally, I have raised the issue of leadership training without being able to adequately resolve it. Perhaps this is the real frontier of leadership.

Discussion

Discussant: We find that the cadet during four years becomes more open-minded, more flexible, more sensitive, perceptually more accurate, generally reaching the objectives of a liberal education. This surprises everybody that sees it. To a large degree, this is because when compared with civilian institutions the change we achieve is much greater. The only explanation we've been able to come up with is that a cadet either matures and grows or he doesn't make it through.

Dr. Tannenbaum: Do you have any data which indicates that the changes you are getting are changes that the individual learns to make to adapt to what he perceives as being the expectations of the systems on him?

Discussant: We have done a lot of work on socially acceptable answers. We are convinced that these are not socially acceptable answers.

Dr. Tannenbaum: I'm wondering does a guy go out internally tighter, which is not reflected on a pencil-and-paper instrument?

Discussant: Here is another piece of data that makes us believe that these are internalized changes; we've done a lot of work on stereotypes. If you ask the cadets about other cadets, they give you an answer that conforms very closely to a military mind stereotype; but if you ask him about himself, he's different. If you do work with the dogmatism scale, the cadets tend to score lower than civilian students. If you ask them to fill it out the way they think another cadet fills it out, the other cadet is very dogmatic. So the cadets are not dogmatic, but they perceive one another as dogmatic. I think that's some indication that they're leveling. We are also finding that as the cadets go through the Academy, the need for achievement and/or fear of failure changes in the positive direction; that is, they acquire a stronger need for achievement and reduce in fear of failure.

Dr. Tannenbaum: If I understood, you have a lot of evidence that suggests the cadets are responding very straightforwardly. They're leveling, but they have perception that they're the only one like this--most others do not feel this way or see things this way. I'm amazed that the learning situation or the social situation might be one which has individuals be with each other for four years and end up not knowing where their colleagues stand on certain pretty fundamental points of life values and stances; and, to me, this might have a lot to say about what they might learn or not learn about how to build effective social processes.

Discussant: There's an anomaly there which we can't explain; we don't understand.

Dr. Tannenbaum: I would gather that the flexibility, etc., that you are referring to is more perceptual flexibility rather than what I've called action flexibility. Is that correct? The test doesn't get at whether the individual at the end of his fourth year behaves more flexibly than he did at the first year.

Discussant: It's more an attitudinal-value-belief system kind of measurement.

Dr. Tannenbaum: I may be responding too superficially, but my first reaction is that this reflects widening his perceptual frame and making him more perceptually flexible but not helping him very much necessarily in what I've called action flexibility, that is, in translating his perceptual flexibility into greater action flexibility.

Discussant: The philosophy of the department is that all leadership training is extremely sterile unless it's converted into behavioral change. If what you suggest is happening, then we're getting cognitive changes that are not converted into activity.

Dr. Tannenbaum: I think we're hung up, all of us, on education and on knowledge. I suspect we've got to increasingly recognize that there are different kinds of knowledge.

We had trouble with our sensitivity training on campus when we started it in about 1953 or 1954. It was heavily process oriented; and to make it academically legitimate, we had to find ways to grade it. So we had all kinds of academic ruses such as a term paper. We have been able, somehow, within the system to continue this kind of training and meet the academic requirements--but it's game playing, and I don't like that.

Discussant: Did you ever use the system of grading by the students themselves?

Dr. Tannenbaum: This is a tough one. It has never worked well, at least not for me; and I don't think for many of my colleagues. I would guess that if the Academy, through time, moves toward more effective modes for developing action flexibility, one of the major problems you'll run into is the problem of whether the cadet experiences what you do as being relevant in the curriculum. I'm suggesting they'll find themselves in real role conflict to the extent that what they get with you points in different directions than what they get in other parts of the Academy. These are tough problems.

Discussant: From the point of view of education, we have assumed some kind of sequential nature to the learning process where you have a cognitive phase of knowledge accumulation and then you have a practice phase of applying what you've learned. What you suggest is that we really don't know whether that sequence is proper or not.

Dr. Tannenbaum: I'm fairly certain that in the areas where action must be taken, my bias would be in the direction of experiencing and then conceptualizing or at least an interrelated track of experiencing and conceptualizing, rather than conceptualizing and then action. I suspect they need to go on together but with the experiencing typically preceding the conceptualizing.

Discussant: Of course, the vehicle for education is a course.

Dr. Tannenbaum: Well, before I leave, let me challenge you on that. I think the traditional course unit, often unrelated to other course units, as well as the fragmenting of the learner and separating the total kind of growth process, growth both emotionally and intellectually, has a lot of dysfunctionality to it.

Discussant: We've been trying in an extremely naive and limited way to use data generated in class to guide the learning process. The trouble there becomes the need for a skilled teacher because you need an extremely clever teacher to be sensitive enough to know when data are generated and then to guide the student to the analysis of the data. Things can very easily degenerate into a kind of bull session, which may have value too; but within institutional constraints you can't permit yourself to do that--so it becomes a question of teacher competence.

Dr. Tannenbaum: But teaching is often an interpersonal process, and we too need to grow and develop as individuals. The really behaviorally flexible person is one who is able to function as a whole person, which to me includes being relevant to the total situation that he has to deal with; and the total situation may, and often does, at times include much more than the individual. Also, I would emphasize that rationality and knowledge should not be downgraded as a part of the total training of the leader. I suspect that the more one moves from the individual to dealing with the larger social system, the more knowledge in the usual sense of that term and rationality become important variables.

Discussant: The important fact, it would seem to me, is that you must recognize that you are being affected emotionally because, whether you are aware of it or not, decisions lose their rationality under emotional arousal.

Dr. Tannenbaum: I have deep ethical concerns about the entities that I work with, and I don't want to work with them as things. I suspect some of my colleagues are motivated more by arriving at a new scientific generalization than they are by the relevance of what they are doing. I regard myself for data collection, and a big part of data collection is experience. I'm really formulating hypotheses and testing them as I interact with the system. So increasingly, through that interaction, I get firmer feelings about various hypotheses that I think are relevant to my interaction with the system; and even more broadly as an academician I begin testing hypotheses. If you think it's hard to explain to some in your system what you are trying to do in leadership training, try to explain to some academic colleagues who are rooted in conventional ways of learning what this method means.

In fact, I suspect, and this is a hypothesis I've been developing for some time in a number of instances that at least give some face validity to it, that even intellectual systems (what we choose to specialize in, what we emphasize in our research and our research approaches, the character of our intellectual constructs) are determined an awful lot by what we're coping with inside ourselves as individuals at any point in time. It's fascinating to contemplate that one's whole intellectual system is so affected by his internal dynamics.

Discussant: I'd like to go back for a minute to social sensitivity, behavioral flexibility. It seems to me that over a period of years we have seen very conflicting evidence on the longitudinal value within organizations of sensitivity training. There have been certain studies that have said that it appears to be effective and others that tend to refute its effectiveness. It seems to me that if you were to have a good trainer and if you were to have a group that was largely concerned with the fostering of social sensitivity and interpersonal understanding, without the recognition and restraints of behavioral flexibility, perhaps this is what has led to the lack of its long-term effectiveness within organizations.

Discussant: The emphasis on the action side of it seems to be diminished in sensitivity training, if not completely lost.

Dr. Tannenbaum: Well, these are really two different questions. I'll try to deal with both of these. There is one kind of societal trend around in encounter groups which has used sensitivity training or T-groups for purposes other than organization improvement or development of leaders, and this is a legitimate use of sensitivity training. It can be used as psychotherapy for individual growth and development, and it has some relevance to that direction.

Discussant: Will you differentiate for me please the difference between sensitivity training and psychotherapy?

Dr. Tannenbaum: This is not easy to do because the lines are so blurred. What is usually labeled psychotherapy and psychoanalysis have tended, up until fairly recent years, primarily to deal with the deeper and earlier psychogenesis of the individual's present psychodynamics and tried to uncover these and then help the individual to get free from constraints that have been built up from very early childhood. Our sensitivity training has unfolded. The emphasis on the group variables has diminished; and the emphasis on the individual has increased in the typical group, although that varies among different trainers.

Now increasingly, also, as training has focused on the individual, it has quickly moved away from dealing with what Maslow would call the deficiency motivation side of the individual as a primary emphasis and increasingly is focusing on Maslow's be or being motivation side, that is the growthful side, the expanding side, the unfolding side of man. A lot of sensitivity training now is starting with competent people and carrying them into even greater competence.

Now on your other point, you mention that there are instances where sensitivity training has not proven useful in the organization situation. Some organizations will take an executive and send him through a university, or NTL sensitivity group, take him out of his social setting, take him over here where something happens to him, and bring him back. The setting remains the same, and he expects something different to happen--and the odds of that happening are very slight. I think in many ways, from an organization's point of view, it may be dysfunctional to send a guy to a sensitivity group in that way. Just as personal growth and development have to be ongoing processes to really make major headway, so organizational development has to be an ongoing process. It is fantastic what it takes to really make major developmental breakthroughs. The program of TRW Systems has involved some executives going outside. They have, almost from the beginning, run a few company groups. The boss decides what we now need to do is translate the learnings we have been getting as individuals to us as a team, so we begin to work with organizational teams on what is called team development or organization family group work.

After we have then built effective teams--and it's not either/or, it's always a process--we then move into the interface between groups such as where design and engineering interface with production. We then bring the two groups together and help them as separate entities deal with their relationships. We help build temporary systems, as, for example, a proposal team. Then we use these methodologies in mergers and in reorganizations; that is, as we get new configurations, we use these processes to facilitate the new social setups.

You see, a group just doesn't have a team-building meeting and then forget about it. They then begin to try to build what they have learned into their staff meetings so that then these processes become part of their staff meetings. So we try to facilitate an ongoing, unfolding, developing, total organizational growth process. This is closely related to some of Likert's current work in social accounting, human asset accounting, where he's discovering that often the real cost to an organization of actions taken or decisions made back here doesn't reflect itself for three, four, five years or more. We have to get a better sense of unfolding and interacting social processes through time.

Discussant: There was a challenge in the paper this morning by a member of the John Birch Society about the nudity groups and people who didn't want to swim but at least stood on the sidelines and rubbed each other with soap.

Dr. Tannenbaum: There is in this a kind of substantiating footnote to one of my key themes this morning. Authoritarians, individuals with high rigidity, low tolerance for ambiguity, etc., are individuals who have great anxiety about unpredictable events, about anything that falls outside of what for them is certainty and security and predictability.

It's quite clear that a lot of antisensitivity training sentiment is coming from the Birch Society. It is clearly true in Southern California, and it is predictably so. That kind of attack comes from individuals who are highly rigid, inflexible individuals with low tolerance for ambiguity and who express great concern about feelings and their spontaneous expression.

Discussant: I've observed personally and find it very interesting that a person's behavioral dynamics tend to isolate him in some fashion from his desires, but how would you respond to the challenge that your particular set in dealing with these problems also isolates you through your behavioral dynamics?

Dr. Tannenbaum: I think my system isolates me most poignantly in a way different from the implication, if I understand what you are saying. I am increasingly aware, have been for a number of years, that I'm often seen as an individual who is highly perceptive; and people who have feelings about themselves that they haven't really faced and are concerned about showing publicly often feel uncomfortable with me.

Resistance gets manifested in aggression, hostility, and rejection; and for people who grow up in our culture, almost everyone, these are behaviors that are damn difficult for us to handle. Furthermore, as we are working in change areas, we are dealing with ambiguity; and I'd argue that there are very few of us who possess a great facility to be open and to be spontaneous and to handle ambiguity. Yet as social practitioners we are constantly faced with the need to deal with ambiguity even if we are dealing with a single client as he walks into our office for consultation. Let me share with you a model that we often used in training. It will be useful a little later also in some of the things we might discuss. Just as a matter of interest, have any of you seen the Johari Window?

Discussant: Some of us use it in our courses.

Dr. Tannenbaum: This Johari Window is a model of each of us as individuals. Generally Quadrant 1 is referred to as the public cell, and that's the part of me that I'm aware of. I know about it, and other people know about it--so it's out in the open, both to me and to others. Quadrant 2 is the private cell. These are things I know about myself; but for a variety of reasons, I may choose to hide from most other people, maybe not everybody, but at least most other people. I call this horizontal dividing line here the line of maskmanship, and one of the things we teach people in our culture is to really manage that line of maskmanship. In Quadrant 3 we have things that are unknown to self--things that I haven't seen in myself but that at least some other people and sometimes many other people see in me. Then Quadrant 4 is the more deeply buried part of self, both to myself and to others. Now 1 and 2 are separated from 3 and 4 in what Freudians would roughly call the conscious or the unconscious self. One way in which we use this model that I want to point out quickly, is to highlight what psychotherapy in part and sensitivity training primarily relate to this model. They are involved, primarily, with areas 2 and 3.

Another kind of learning takes place here where the process of feedback occurs. As we interact, you have data about me that I don't have about myself and that need relevant feedback from you which tells me what you see in me and then helps in my personal growth.

Let me relate this to the main theme of this morning. From what you have said about developing your cadets as leaders, I infer that you don't do very much to really connect yourself at the deeper human level. My image of your cadet, placing myself in his position and going through four years of cadet life, is that I quickly learn that there is really a relatively small part of what is relevant to me as a human being in my own growth and development and unfolding that is legitimate for me to share with my colleagues within the system. So I quickly learn what is legitimate to share and what is not legitimate to share; and if I join your faculty, I might learn the same thing about the faculty relationships.

Bibliography

Robert Tannenbaum and Sheldon A. Davis. "Values, Man, and Organizations," Industrial Management Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, Winter 1969, pp. 67-86.

Robert Tannenbaum and Warren Schmidt. "Management of Differences," Harvard Business Review, 38, 6 (November-December) 1960, pp. 107-115.

Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt. "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern," Harvard Business Review, March-April 1958, pp. 95-101.

Robert Tannenbaum, Irving R. Weschler, and Fred Massarik. Leadership and Organization: A Behavioral Approach. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.

Irving Weschler, Fred Massarik, and Robert Tannenbaum. "The Self in Process: A Sensitivity Training Emphasis," in I. R. Weschler and E. Schein (Eds.), Issues in Training, Selected Reading Series No. 5, Washington, D. C., National Training Laboratories.

Film: Effective Leadership (1/2 hour), University of California Extension Media Center, Management Development Series, 1966.

BLANK PAGE

Brigadier General Robin Olds (BS, United States Military Academy) is Director of Aerospace Safety for the United States Air Force. From December 1967 to February 1971, he served as Commandant of Cadets at the United States Air Force Academy. Most of General Olds' career has been spent as a fighter pilot and operational commander, beginning with World War II where he was credited with shooting down 13 enemy aircraft and destroying 11 other planes on the ground. In Vietnam, he was credited with destroying four MIG aircraft in aerial combat. In his duty assignments in England, Germany, Libya, and Thailand, as well as the United States, General Olds has held positions as base commander, group commander, and top-level staff positions. He is a Command Pilot and a graduate of the National War College.

Abstract

Job accomplishment is stipulated as the criterion of effective leadership. Leadership in the Air Force is represented as having undergone a maturation from direct personal centered authority to a broader concept requiring more extensive leadership skills. The concepts of dichotomous leadership styles and selection of leadership situations are discounted. Air Force leadership needs are presented as responsible for a wide spectrum of roles and situations. It is suggested that this responsibility will act to develop leaders capable of meeting its challenge. Assumption of a leadership role is presented as the acquisition of knowledge rather than popularity. It is suggested that loyalty represents the most important quality to exercise and earn.

THE CHALLENGE OF LEADERSHIP

By

Brigadier General Robin Olds

Commandant of Cadets, United States Air Force Academy

Gentlemen, I am happy you asked me to participate in this "Frontiers of Leadership" program for a number of reasons. Although I do not possess advanced degrees, as many of you do, I feel that I have some relevant experience in this area. In our service they don't give you degrees for your ability to exercise the intangibles of leadership; they give you ribbons.

There are a wide variety of leadership positions in our Air Force--positions of command, positions of staff, as well as very responsible positions such as agency or staff head; I am referring to jobs that do not carry with them the authority to say, "So-and-so is appointed commander of X, Y, or Z outfit; so-and-so, relieved." And for as many different positions as there are in our Air Force that call for somebody to be the "honcho," there are as many different people who vary widely on an emotional, physical, educational, and experience basis who fill those jobs. So getting the right man-job match is extremely difficult, and I agree with Fiedler[1] that you can't really compare kumquats and oranges. The proof of the pudding is whether the man gets the job done, not really in how he does it. This is certainly true from the military point of view.

I think our Air Force has come a tremendously long way in the past 25 years. On the question of leadership and command, the officers left over from World War II either proved themselves or got out of the service. I think we have matured as a service. I think the people that we have following along today are better men than were their predecessors, en masse.

I've been privileged to go to the Air University, to talk to the Air War College, the Air Command and Staff School, and the Squadron

---

[1] "Style or Circumstance--The Leadership Enigma," Psychology Today, March 1969, Fred Fiedler.

Officers School. Naturally, in talking to these different schools within the Air University, you pitch your talk at a slightly different level to each student body. But the difference is slight as they are all interested in and engaged in the same leadership problems. They are all part of the same organization; and by and large, they have a pretty good feel for what is going on. I found the younger officers full of questions, and darn good ones. The older men were a little more set in their ways, not quite as curious, more resigned to what is happening to them, and more assured in the direction they want to go. I must say, many seemed pretty well aware of how far they can go, which in itself is a very interesting observation. I wondered why; but I am certainly not going to stand before this group and make an analysis because I haven't come up with a good answer, certainly not an answer that wouldn't be challenged immediately by you. So what I would like to do this morning is to talk a little about some of the theories of leadership as I see them as a practicing leader.

My qualifications for standing before you today are possibly the result of pure luck. Although I really don't believe that, it establishes a nice degree of humility. I became a leader the easy way. I was one of 40 young men that went over with a squadron in 1944 and joined the 8th Air Force in fighters. I was one of the original 40 that joined the squadron; and by the time we were completing our first tour, there were only eight of us left. That made it pretty easy for me because in those days the personnel people had the lovely habit of promoting you, if you were qualified, into any vacancy that might arise. I went from Assistant Flight Commander to Squadron Commander in something like eight months. That also meant that I went from 1st Lieutenant to Major too. Now you can call that luck if you like, but there was something that made me survive. There was also something that made me qualified to be chosen to command that squadron. That is the thing I can't put into words, although I shall try a little later on.

Frankly, I was very grateful that the war ended when it did, otherwise the orders that had already been cut promoting me to Lt Colonel might have been issued. Even at the tender age of 22, I had the good sense to realize that this was perfectly and absolutely ridiculous. So I went home knowing that I could do a job as a combat squadron commander; and believe me, it wasn't all just flying. I was responsible for a little more then than I am responsible for today, namely mess, discipline, transportation, maintenance, personnel, and so on. In those days the squadron commander had it all. He even had his own communications section.

That may give you pause for thought, gentlemen; but it is quite true. As a 22-year-old Major I had more authority than I do today as a 47-year-old BG--more direct authority. If a man goofed, zap! You took away a stripe or two. On the other hand, if he performed well and you had a vacancy, you promoted him. Fiedler covered this in different words in his article. He called it authoritarian--he didn't use the word dictatorship, but he almost said it--which, to him, typifies the military in a combat situation.

To get to the meat of the thing this morning, I want to say that I disagree partially with Fiedler. I think the words that he has used here are just jim-dandy, fine; however, he sets up the situation and then proves his theory--and it just ain't that way! You can't take a high LPC (score on the Least-Preferred Co-worker scale) and a low LPC and say this is it! The one score means the individual is an authoritarian; and the other means that he is a democratic sort of laissez-faire, free-rein type of leader. I would flunk the test. I feel that Fiedler has established a situation which is all black on the one hand and all white on the other. I would suggest that when he is here, you people challenge him to study the Air Force leader. He focusses on two clusters of behavior and attitudes. One is labelled autocratic, authoritarian, task-oriented; and the other is labelled democratic, permissive and group-oriented. He says the first type is frequently advocated in conventional supervisory and military systems. Of course, he qualifies it when he says "frequently." He doesn't say "always." I realize this, but I suggest to you that it just isn't that simple. For instance, he talks about leadership behavior and leadership style. The former is how the leader engages in directing others--or specific acts, i.e., how much consideration he gives his subordinates, what praise, what kicks. This is leadership behavior, and the style seems to be "Why he does what he does." In other words, what is his basic motivation--to step on others? Is he task-oriented or group-oriented? It is more complex than that. It just isn't that simple. In my estimation, gentlemen, a good leader combines all of these--and more!

Fiedler goes on to say that the high LPC is relationship-oriented, has close personal relationships with members of the group. A low LPC on this test is task-oriented. He will step on anybody, and he gets his kicks out of getting the job done successfully. I don't quarrel with the words, but it is shallow--because a good leader combines the two. You've got to relate to your people. You get your satisfaction from the knowledge of having successfully performed the task assigned to you with the resources given; but in order to do it successfully, you must relate to people.

Fiedler seems to say in no uncertain terms that experiments comparing the performance of both types of leader have shown that each is successful in some situations and not in others. I don't quarrel with that. No one has been able to show that one kind of leader is superior or more effective. But when he gets down to the point that leaders are not born and that anyone can become a leader--if he learns which types of situations are favorable to his personal leadership style and chooses to exert leadership in these situations--I can't buy that. Again, this is putting forth a situation and then working around it to prove that it is true. In the first instance, I don't quarrel that leaders are not born. I would like to say that perhaps they are lucky, that they've got something. They do have something; they've had the finger put on them. Because how many men have the opportunity to take advantage of situations favorable to their personal leadership style? Well, perhaps it's the guy whose daddy owns 52% of the stock in the company. He's got time to go to school and learn how to be a leader in that situation, but God help him if the company merges with another one. He's out.

Look at the people in the Air Force. Look at yourselves, gentlemen. What are you asked to do? You are asked to lead in peacetime, and you are asked to lead in wartime. You are asked to lead in the Pentagon; you are asked to lead on an airdrome; you are asked to lead on the mountain that has a radar station on it. In short, you are asked to lead in every conceivable type of situation except the one in which you have absolute authority, because you don't have it in the Air Force.

I have journeyed too far afield and into too many things that I know little about. I merely wanted to say these things to you to give you my reactions to a very well-written article and one that gave me pause for a lot of thought.

Another thing in your outline that caught my imagination was your attempt to teach the cadets an understanding of formal versus informal authority. I envy you every moment of the classroom time you spend with cadets discussing subjects like this because they are fascinating. Formal versus informal authority--that is really the greatest trick of the century nowadays--to fulfill a command position and to understand the limits of your formal authority and the horizons of your informal authority.

I mentioned a few moments ago that as a 22-year-old Major I had more direct authority than I have today as a Brigadier General, and that is true by any standard of measurement. Formal authority has been stripped from today's commanders. You must perform and command within the confines of a shelf full of regulations, a room full of manuals and a warehouse full of technical orders. And this is to say nothing of the ever-present and ever-watchful eye of the inspector general, staff judge advocate, and the local director of personnel. You just do not possess the degree of formal authority oftentimes essential to the performance of your mission.

For instance, what are the inherent responsibilities of command or leadership? It used to be that first you fed your horse, then you fed your men, and then you looked out for yourself. These are pretty good words really. Translated into today's vernacular it means that given a mission, given the resources, and the facilities, a leader must first concern himself with the training, the welfare, the care (blankets, beds, buildings, beans), and the morale and the discipline of his troops. If they lack in any of these aspects, you cannot perform the mission. You can continue to launch attacks on Hill 307 as long as you've got two men left. You can't launch the first attack with a full platoon if your men aren't properly trained, disciplined, and of good spirits, and properly led. So this is the first inherent responsibility of a leader.

Does this call for an authoritarian or a democratic, free-rein type? I'm not sure the question is even a relevant one because it doesn't matter who has the job or what his leadership style is, he still has these responsibilities. How does he react to them? How does he react when he finds that his lack of formal authority--which, believe me, is absolutely essential in securing the right reaction from his troops--works horribly against him? He relies heavily on informal authority.

For instance, how does he deal with discipline problems? You cannot properly, quickly, and with complete impartiality, discipline a recalcitrant. I've always tried to tell any subordinate commander I ever had working for me that you don't punish the culprit for his own good; you punish him for the good of the command. The men in your unit, collectively and individually, demand justice. Anyone who gets away with something, believe me, is a chink in your armor, is a chink in your authority, is a chink in your image.

It used to be that a commander could put a man in the pokey for a week, even the officer of the day could do that. He can't do that anymore. Now it takes the approval of a major force commander. In the meantime this guy and his acts have wrought a pernicious influence on the good of the command.

Now I didn't mean to rant and rave about our lack of formal authority, but I am saying that what it does is place supreme emphasis on informal authority. By informal authority, I don't mean circumventing regulations, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But you do have to play your game; you have to exercise your leadership; and you have to command in a very different way. I want to make it very clear right here and now that I am not saying this lack of formal authority is bad. As a matter of fact, I think it is rather good because it has, in our service, tended to eliminate the absolute autocrat, the guy who has no qualifications other than the insignia on his shoulders, the man who does not fit any definition of a leader. It has made people use their wits and their ingenuity, and I think it has brought to the surface (please, I am not speaking personally) the very best in our Air Force officers because it is a challenge to command with these difficulties placed in your way.

Now what is informal authority? Well, for one thing, informal authority is the word that goes around the base. Usually the commander is surprised at the authoritative value placed upon as simple a thing as his name spoken by someone else. Now that may not be his given name nor his surname. It could be the "old bastard," or the "old man," or the "chief," or the "boss," or whatever you choose to call him; but there is a very definite aura of authority associated with the commander's name.

You will find, for example, the technical sergeant who is the chief warehouseman will exhort his workers to greater efforts in stocking, binning and recording, and keeping the place policed-up by using your name. He'll say, "The old man is coming around tomorrow; now get with it." Boy, zap, zap, zap, everybody gets with it. The same thing with getting a mission off. The bird isn't ready; and according to normal procedures that are all laid down in stacks of books telling you how to do it, it would take two days to get that aircraft back in commission. So the supervisor says to the indians, "Men, we need this bird for tomorrow night's mission. The old man just told me so, and I think he is going to fly it himself." And zap, zap, zap, it's ready; and off it goes!

Now we could go on for a long time talking about this informal authority. Believe me, it is an all-pervasive force within a command. How many times here at the Academy have you heard "The Superintendent said . . . ."? How many times have you questioned that statement? Who said he said? Did you hear him? Nope. You may never find the source. It could be Dick Davis.[2] He knows what the Superintendent thinks. He doesn't say, "He said." He says, "The Superintendent sort of likes it this way." By the time it floats down here and over to your shop, "The Superintendent said." Right? It's true.

Now I don't want to preach at you; all I'm doing is recognizing the fact that informal authority does exist. And it is very, very important! But as a corollary, it is absolutely essential that the man who is in a position of command understand informal authority. It can be horribly abused by ambitious staff officers and subordinates. It can get you into trouble faster than anything I know. It also places the requirement upon you to recognize that this is happening and to be prepared to take advantage of it. Recall the warehousemen who really had the place in beautiful shape; they were proud of it. You know it's because of you they did it. They did not do it because they like to put little boxes on shelves and write a lot of numbers on a card that goes into a machine. They did it for you. So by golly, you had better make sure you go around there and look at it and find a little bit wrong with it if you possibly can and just praise the hell out of them. And do this as a regular practice everywhere in your command--everywhere.

Of course, you realize I am talking about something as simple as a military command. Last year I was asked to talk to a businessmen's executive club meeting at Scottsdale, Arizona. I was very flattered to address this group of gentlemen. The night before I read very carefully the brochures and the autobiographies of each of the men in attendance. They made no bones about it. There was a pecking order, and the worth of each of the industries or companies was right there in black and white. One man would have a company worth $25,000,000. There was another one there worth $500 million, which I thought was pretty interesting. So I sat down that evening and tried to figure out the worth, the intrinsic value, of a fighter wing. The more I pondered, the more things I thought of on that base for which I had really been responsible. When I stood up to give them my talk, I informed them of what the firm I had just run was worth; and

---

[2] Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, USAFA

I gave them the round figure number. They laughed when I reported my executive salary. That set the stage for my thirty-minute speech.

I would like to try to get down to the specifics of leadership instead of generalizing. I am just going to say what I feel, and you can tear it apart. Instead of talking to you about the principles of leadership or the techniques, or theory, I want to tell you a little about the practice. Even this is a very difficult subject.

Your effectiveness in a position of command is determined by you, plus your mission, your situation, where you are, the status of the unit that you take over, and the circumstances that prevail. Remember, it's you plus these factors. You must adapt yourself, even your personality, to suit what's needed from you or of you as a commander. Having assessed this hurdle, maybe intuitively, maybe objectively, the next thing you had better do is find out all you can about your people, individually and in work groups or task groups. How is their morale? How effective are they? Do they work well together? Have you got any problem areas? Remember that it is your personality and even your reputation that they are now going to look at very closely. In order to accomplish the mission, as a boss you've got to have a lot of guts, or courage, or faith, anything you want to call it; it all equates to the same thing.

You have to have the courage of your convictions. You have to have the courage, the faith, and the guts, to delegate authority. You have to have the courage and the fortitude to punish, when punishing is necessary--and you had better understand exactly when it is necessary and act swiftly. You have to have the good sense to praise when praise is due. You have to have the guts to exercise authority that frankly may not even exist; but if you act like it does, you exercise it. You have to have the courage to allow your subordinates a lot of swinging room because when you assign that responsibility, you have to delegate some authority. Unless you make that subordinate feel responsible for the job that he is doing and give him the authority to do it, the job may not get done. He is going to make mistakes; he might get your neck in a sling, so to speak. But you, in my estimation, are next to nothing as a leader if you don't give your people a job and say, "O. K., now go do it. Here is what you need to do it with--here are the people, the facilities, and the resources."

By the same token, you have to supervise, you have to manage, you have to watch. Don't stand on their toes. That's a terrible mistake, because you might just as well do it yourself. Believe me, if any one man thinks he is as smart as a whole collection of people, he is out of his mind.

I want to explain one of the techniques I have used in taking over a flying outfit because I could get away with it (I don't pretend that I measure up to what I am about to say, but some of you in the audience may not know the difference). In Thailand I had never been in combat in an F-4. So I just told the truth--gathered them all in and said, "O. K., I'm new. I haven't the vaguest idea what's going on here; and I expect you men to teach me, everyone of you. That goes for the supply officer, the electronics officer, the communications officer, the engineering officer, materiel guys, club officer, special services, everyone of you. You are going to teach me, and I'll fly 'green 16'[3] until I know as much about your job as you do. And when I know as much about your job as you do, look out because then I start getting nasty, terribly arrogant, and superior. I may even tell you how to do your job, so just stay ahead of me. Make sure you know more about it than I do."

Then you follow up. You had better, by golly, go around and have each guy tell you what he does and why and what his purpose is; and then ask him, "How do you fit into the whole?" The special services man probably never thought about it that way, or the club officer, or the motor pool maintenance officer, or the dispatcher in base operations. What you are doing is starting to mold them and weld them together. Each one feels that there is not a wheel that rolls down the runway that isn't his direct interest and something that he contributed to directly. Boy, if you can get those troops to feeling that way, you've got them. And it isn't difficult really, providing the circumstances are right.

What are some of the qualities that a leader should have? Mind you, I am speaking from a very limited background so my remarks are oriented a little bit more toward operations than they are toward other aspects of our services. By failing to cover the whole broad spectrum, I'm not ignoring anybody; I just plead ignorance.

What qualities must a leader have? I think he must have bearing (these are all written down; I didn't think of them), courage, decisiveness, dependability. You know all of these things: enthusiasm, initiative, judgment, integrity, a sense of justice, knowledge, loyalty, tact, unselfishness. You know them because they're right out of the dictionary, right out of the manual. You better have a whole lot of all of these and a tremendous amount of some of them. Any failings that you have as a personality, a human being, in any one of these qualities, you better cover up with a plethora of capability in the others.

---

[3] Last aircraft in the formation

Some men think that to be a good leader you have to be popular. This is so fallacious that it is absolutely unbelievable. Any man who thinks this way is doing the Air Force and himself a disservice. You are not running a popularity contest. You are there to command a unit, to perform a mission. It takes every man in the unit to perform that mission, including you as a catalytic agent. After you have taken care of your equipment and your facilities, then know your mission. Whatever the situation demands, you better make sure that you maintain good order and discipline through whatever talents you have. You train those men, equip them, house them, feed them, motivate and lead them. You must instill discipline, the right kind of discipline, and a high sense of duty and personal and individual responsibility. Willing obedience, not obedience through fear, stems from spirit, pride, and morale. If you do these things, I'll guarantee that you'll perform your mission well.

Each man in your unit, I said earlier, must feel that his job is necessary. I submit to you that a leader, whether he be in industry, in the Air Force, or in any other place, must make sure that everyone knows exactly where he fits and that he is necessary to the output of the whole. Sometimes your actions in this respect will be grossly misunderstood and misrepresented. Let me give you an example.

At my base in SEA I made it a rule that any man who was lucky and shot down a MIG would come back down that runway and do a roll on his return. This wasn't fighter pilot bravura as some people thought. I didn't make the rule for the benefit of the pilot. I didn't want to satisfy a childish inclination for showing off, a "Hey, look at me." I did it for every airman on that base, because I wanted to make sure each airman felt that that victory was his. It reached the point where, after a good mission, almost every airman on that base came down to greet the returning aircraft because he wanted to, because he was part and parcel of that mission and felt it in his heart.

I would like to talk a little bit about loyalty. This is a very difficult trait of leadership for some. When I speak of loyalty, I mean loyalty first to something that is almost passe in many circles today, loyalty to country, the symbolism of your flag, the meaning of your oath of commission to protect and defend the constitution, not the President, not the Secretary of Defense, nor even the Chief of Staff--the constitution. That's your oath. That's where your loyalty lies. It's loyalty to your country, to everything it stands for, everything it is today and everything it better be in the future. That is what you are fighting for--working for. You've got to believe in everything that is good and hate everything that is bad. Of course, you make that choice yourself. You can't go wrong, far wrong, by listening to the chaplain a little bit and the dictates of your own conscience, your own upbringing and your own heritage.

You must give loyalty to those above you--that means loyalty also to the men on the staff in the headquarters just above you. I don't mean a kind of deliberate, calculating, "What's in it for me" type of loyalty to those hard-working staff types. I mean full loyalty. Get to know them as people and work with them, not against them. If you don't, you have made one of the biggest mistakes you can make in your career. Sure they are all idiots, but so are you. They are hard-pressed, dedicated, wonderful guys, working under a situation of stress that you, the commander, sometimes can't even appreciate.

In one outfit over in SEA, loyalty was purely internal. This was fostered by the commander and his staff. The men of that wing were told they were the best, the bravest, and the smartest. Everyone else was wrong; they were always right. No one else could do the job as well as they. This was common knowledge in the whole unit. Didn't they tell themselves constantly that this was so? Therefore, it had to be right. They owed loyalty to no one but themselves. Such mass ego-pumping is not uncommon, but it is always dangerous in any organization and almost invariably leads to serious trouble. In this instance, the unit hushed up a monumental goof, to the ultimate embarrassment and international discredit of our government, and all because of a warped sense of loyalty.

One other subject I would like to discuss with you just briefly is the process of taking over another unit on any level. A few minutes ago I talked about the popularity business, and then I trailed off on another subject. I would like to return to it.

The first thing a new commander must do--the new office boss or whatever--is to get the attention of his people. He can do it in a lot of different ways. First, he must assure job output--mission accomplishment, mission capability, or whatever you want to call it.

If he is not sure that the unit he has taken over can handle this task and is fully capable, then he should shore it up. This is the attention-getting step. By doing this, he is going to earn respect or hatred, depending upon his personality and methods. He may be thoroughly hated, but he couldn't care less about that. As long as he is fair and has the other traits of judgment, unselfishness and so on that we discussed earlier, this will earn him respect; and out of respect, gentlemen, will come loyalty. He may still be disliked, but I doubt it. He's got that loyalty. Once he's got loyalty, it's a "piece of cake." He has obedience that is willing and spirited. He has to hold them down now, not kick them. He has built good morale and high spirit, and everybody absorbs that "can do" attitude.

Popularity is the last attribute a leader should ever seek. It is the least important; and if improperly placed on the priority list, it can certainly be the most damaging. All of you know that you have to be consistent. You have to praise when praise is needed and correct when corrections are called for.

A leader also has other responsibilities, and these are to his subordinate leaders. A good leader insures that the people to whom he passes authority and responsibility properly fulfill their roles in turn. He works with them to be sure they are properly oriented toward their mission and job, that they are fully aware of all the facilities and means available for accomplishing that mission, and that they receive the assistance they need to do the job.

You have to demand of your officers, for instance, adherence to standards. If you see an officer walking down the street and an airman does not salute that officer and the officer doesn't do anything about it, I suggest you walk up to that officer and say, "What the hell's the matter with you? Didn't you see that airman fail to salute you? Why didn't you do something about it?" If he answers, "Well, I don't know." Then you had better get rid of him, because he is not on your "ball team." He let that airman down, and he let him down badly in a military organization. I suggest the same thing is true in a corporate setup where men fail to say good morning or fail to follow the normal courtesies of human relationships.

What I'm saying here, gentlemen, is that you can't let your subordinates, the officers, and NCOs give up their own sense of responsibility in their positions of leadership. They can't pass the buck up to you. You've got to keep that "buck" well spread. In spite of the fact that there is a dearth of formal authority backing the movement of each of your subordinates in the chain of command, you've got plenty of informal authority.

I suggest also that a leader must be a leader whatever his job may be, and this is where I perhaps quarrel a little bit with Fiedler. He makes it too easy--it's too much this way or too much that way. Each of us knows in the military we have a wide variety of jobs, and any one of them may fall our lot. If we rip our knickers in any one of them, we are never going any further in the Air Force. So the great challenge to the military man is to be a "jack of all trades" and good in everything. Our system is designed to make allowances for the fact that we do have this variety of jobs. How, I don't know. I'm not sure it was even thought out, but it is built in. The system makes allowances. This can be illustrated in an assignment to the Pentagon.

When you report to the Pentagon, you are given time to learn your job. You go through the three stages. First, you are a "polyp," then you are a "raging bull," and finally you become an "elder statesman." Nobody expects anything out of you in the "polyp" stage--not even where the nearest men's room is located. Leaders in the Pentagon know that it takes time to learn the ropes; and when you get to the "raging bull" stage, they make allowances for that also, in most cases. I know this system motivated me. I moved from the basement to the joint staff. When you are an "elder statesman," you've really got it made; and you can count on having three or four tours there during your career.

What are the things that you the leader must try to be? I suggest that a good leader must be his own severest critic. You know it if you are leading well. You know it if you are doing a good job. But if you ever think that "you've got it made," if you ever think that everything you are doing is just absolutely apple pie and ice cream, then it's time for you to move on.

If you are doing the job well, don't be afraid of the ideas of your subordinates, or be afraid to admit it when it is perfectly obvious that you've made a mistake. Admit it any way you like. You don't have to admit it openly, but let them know that you know you goofed. With their help you can pull yourself out of it. I guess what I'm trying to say is that you've got to be authoritarian, and yet you've got to be democratic. You've got to use people, but you've got to be human. You've got to know your job, which means you've got to know your subordinates' jobs to the best of your ability. If you know their jobs, they'll be more interested in them.

Finally, I think you must be psychologically prepared to fail along the way and to get "hung," because in the final analysis that's what the leader is for. He's the scapegoat because he's responsible. When you take on that position of command and walk grandly onto the base and see your name and title plastered on a sign out in front of headquarters, get down on your knees and ask for a little guidance and a little help because you're going to need it. I guarantee those of you who take over that squadron, that air base group, or that wing--or any job where a piece of paper says you are the commander--I guarantee that within the first month your accident rate is going to go up. It never fails to happen. I guarantee that your incident rate and your disciplinary rate are going up too. I guarantee that some clod is going to run a truck over the commanding general's staff car, or some idiot is going to prang one of your airplanes. I guarantee it! So you better be prepared. You had better know these things are going to happen and be prepared the day you arrive. I know; I've had all of these experiences.

I pity the man who takes over a squadron or a wing that has an unblemished accident record stretching back for three and one-half years. I wouldn't want a job like that for anything in this world. In the first place, there is no such thing. There were some things going on in that wing that were wrong. There must have been some slightly shady reporting--some little cover-up. The systems that were in effect because of the forceful personality of the outgoing leader are going to fall apart when he leaves. So in you come, thinking how wonderful it is that you finally are going to command your own wing. The first thing you know you are going like this (down) because the airplanes are falling out of the sky, and all sorts of other things are happening.

I can't close without something being said about the rewards that come from being a commander. The greatest reward you can have is when you have severely disciplined a young fellow (you're a 29-year-old lieutenant colonel, commanding a little base), and this guy is a bad apple. Oh boy, is he a bad apple; and you very severely disciplined him. You are way out in the boonies, so your methods of discipline are a little bit different when the inspector general is not sitting there looking at you. When his enlistment is up and this young man is about to leave, he storms his way into your office and stands there with tears in his eyes and thanks you for what you did for him. He's going home now, and he's going to be a far better man for the four years he has just spent in the service. Gentlemen, that's when you get a lump in your throat and you realize what leadership is all about.

You taxi out on a mission for which you have been preparing for a couple of weeks, and you note the overtime work of the guys that have already been working ten hours a day for seven days a week. One bird is sick--but the airman is determined it's going to go. He doesn't know where or why or when, but it's going to go. He's out there for something like damn near forty hours without sleep working on that airplane of his. So when you taxi out, he's lying on the hot concrete under the blazing noonday sun with his head on a wooden wheel chock, out, dead to the world, absolute exhaustion; but his bird has gone. And his bird knocked down a MIG-21 that day too. That's a reward of leadership, gentlemen.

You see all the heartache, all the responsibility and all the frustrations have not been in vain. You see that everything falls right into place, and you are a very happy man. You have all the reward and all the success that you could possibly ask for as a leader.

The moment comes when you have to depart a job. The situation is charged with emotion because you are a pretty emotional type, as much as you didn't want the guys to know it. They give you a parade, and the airmen come running across the ramp just to shake your hand, to say goodbye. And, buddyboy, if you don't shed a small tear, you are not human. And if you don't have to go to the men's room at the club when the guys carry you in on their shoulders and hide from them for 15 minutes or so, you aren't human. Those are the rewards of leadership.

Thank you.

Discussion

Discussant: General Olds, you covered one interesting dichotomy very well, I thought, and that is the authoritarian versus the democratic approach to leadership. Probably most of us, from our own experiences, would agree that there is no one at either of these two extremes. Most successful leaders have used both types of behavior and numerous points in between. Another dichotomy I would like to get your comments on is the generalist versus the specialist. Also, would you comment on the intellectual abilities of leaders? You may recall that famous Prussian leader who said, at least with respect to military matters, "Genius is required of the military leader." And yet a few years later his general staff countered with, "Genius is superfluous. We can only succeed by average men being well trained."

General Olds: I'll comment on the second one first. I guess the Prussian leader felt himself to be a genius, but the general staff felt themselves to be average and dealing with average men. They rarely encountered a genius in the army, .and they established their whole military system based on what they could get out of the average troop. Their method of doing this was by regulation. Believe me, they had regulations regulating what you would wear when you went to bed. I don't think that type of approach got them very far. It sure caused some trouble, and it wasn't a winning system.

On the first question, I think you are giving these youngsters today the finest foundation that has yet been given. It is both general and somewhat specific, which is exactly the way it should be. You are giving our cadets a solid foundation on which to build just as our mission states. From there on out it is pretty much up to the graduate. He can take any one of a thousand different avenues in living his career. I would hate for us to get into the business of trying to job train. That's ridiculous. I think there is a certain orientation in the curriculum here that naturally leads toward the things that a man needs to know about in the military. That includes the humanities. The cadet takes that knowledge, and he builds upon that in the specifics. I can't help feeling that a commander today must both generalize and specialize. I don't care how sophisticated our equipment is becoming. It still applies. If an airman can fix it, then you should know what he must know in order to fix it to a reasonable degree so that at least you can talk to him, at least you then can show the interest that you feel in him and his job. At least you won't feel overwhelmed and shy when you walk into the radar shop. It's not hard to learn, to the extent that you have to learn it, if you are interested; and I submit that you should be interested. I don't know if I have answered your question or not. Let me repeat: I think what we are doing for the cadet here at the Academy is just great, and I have tremendous true admiration and respect for the faculty product. It is giving these men a far better education than I had and is certainly preparing them better to be Air Force officers and future leaders.

Discussant: In your opening remarks you talked about the fact that decentralized authority is not necessarily bad, even though you had more authority as a flight commander in World War II than you later had as a wing commander in SEA.

General Olds: Oh yes, I did, but in a vastly different way! For instance, let's take the motor pool on my base, if you will. There was one officer, maybe two officers, the chief, a maintenance guy, and a couple of NCOs and a lot of workers. All right. Now in 7th Air Force Headquarters there was a staff section devoted to motor transportation and all things pertaining thereto. In PACAF there was an even larger staff section. See? Their only concern was that little motor pool down there at my SEA base. Now you get up to the Pentagon having gone through AFSC and AFLC and a few other commands plus some DOD agencies. You get it all together; and what it boils down to is you have about 12,000 people in the chain of command, most of whom are in the Pentagon telling that one poor soul at my SEA base what to do. Now how much authority did I have? The same thing pertains to operations, to food service, to running a club, or to anything else today. The same thing pertains to personnel. Now I'm not saying it is wrong. I'm not howling about it. I'm just saying there is a difference, and the difference is this: As a squadron commander in the "old days" you had summary court authority. You could prefer charges. You could demote--even without preferring charges--and you could promote if you had a vacancy. You were the one that sat at the table and paid your troops. You were the one that was responsible for the quality of the food they ate. Yes, sir, you were the one that handled their airmen's records, that little old Form 20 or whatever it was. It was you! And when the quota came down to send the guys somewhere, you were the guy who picked them to go. I'm not saying this was all the way it should be or even could be, but I am saying that today it is vastly different. Vastly different! You don't have that authority today.

Discussant: In your presentation you equated leadership to getting the job done, that leadership was good when success was attained by definition. Would you say that Weaver of the Orioles was less of a leader than was his contemporary of the Mets?

General Olds: You know, I won't rationalize. I won't even explain, but I say yes. Although going backwards from saying yes, I would put in an awful lot of if's, and's, but's, maybe's and whereas's. Now directly--yes.

Dr. Fred E. Fiedler (PhD, University of Chicago) is Professor of Psychology and of Management and Organization and Director of the Organizational Research Group at the University of Washington. Previously he served as Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois and was a Fulbright Research Scholar and Visiting Professor at the University of Amsterdam. In addition, he was the recipient of a Ford Faculty Research Award and served as Guest Professor at the University of Louvain, Belgium. Dr. Fiedler's publications number over 100 in the areas of leadership, group processes, and organizational behavior. He is Consulting Editor of Administrative Science Quarterly and has served as consultant to numerous governmental and private agencies and business concerns.

Abstract

The Air Force is evaluated as having matured as a service with the result of producing better officer/leaders operating under a greatly changed leadership environment. The Fiedler Contingency Model is critiqued in terms of its applicability in this environment. The use, and reciprocal responsibility, of informal authority is discussed in terms of the practical functions of adaptation, inspection, and introspection. The qualities of leadership found to be personally useful are discussed and exemplified.

LEADER EXPERIENCE, LEADERSHIP TRAINING, AND OTHER BLIND ALLEYS[1]

By

Fred E. Fiedler

Professor of Psychology, University of Washington

The procurement and development of leadership occupy an important place in the thinking of the military services, government, business and industry. Few would argue that the success or failure of enterprises is not critically affected by the leadership the organization happens to have. Not surprisingly, therefore, a great deal of thought and effort has been devoted to learning more about this elusive phenomenon which shapes our lives to such a great extent.

In oversimplified terms, two major theoretical problems have dominated the leadership literature. The first of these is the question of who becomes a leader. The second question is how one becomes an effective leader. The first of these questions, which has been the subject of several hundred studies, has in a sense been answered: There are no known "leadership traits" which mark a man as a "born leader," and there are no personality traits or attributes which correlate very highly with the attainment of leadership positions. The man most likely to succeed in his quest for leadership is someone who is a little brighter than the average of his cohorts, somewhat more dominant, socially adept, etc.; but above all, he appears best able to satisfy the needs of his group members. In other words, the man who is a good basketball player is more likely to be chosen his team's leader than someone who is a poor basketball player; and someone expert on his job is more likely to be appointed as foreman than someone who is a poor workman. On the whole, it seems fair to say that attainment of leadership probably depends as much on education, politics, economics, and being in the right place at the right time as it does on having a particular personality pattern.

---

[1] Research reported in this paper was supported by Contract No. N00014-67-A-0103-0013 with the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Office of Naval Research and Contract N00014-67-A-0103-0012 with the Office of Naval Research.

The second question is more directly related to psychology, and I should like to focus here on the effects of leadership training and experience and suggest new methods for improving organizational leadership.

Definitions

By the term "leader" I will simply mean the person who is appointed or elected to direct, coordinate, supervise, and perform the many functions which the assigned tasks of his group or the organization require. Some writers have made a distinction between leadership and headship, that is, between those who lead by virtue of their personal influence and those who lead by virtue of the authority which they have been given. I do not consider this a critical distinction for the present discussion, and both of these will here be called leaders.

We will be concerned only with leaders of interacting task groups. Groups which primarily serve the social or personal well-being of their members are outside the scope of this paper, as are such co-acting groups as pieceworkers or students in a classroom, where one person's performance only minimally affects that of another.

Leadership effectiveness is here defined as the degree to which the group or organization performs its assigned major task efficiently and effectively as measured against other comparable groups. In other words, given 10, 20, or 100 similar groups, the leaders whose groups perform better in their major task will be considered more effective than those whose groups perform poorly. We measure the effectiveness of a basketball team captain by the number of games his team wins and not by the enjoyment the members get out of it, nor by the character the coaches are able to build. The latter may be quite legitimate goals, but they are not the major criterion by which team leaders are judged. In the same sense, we evaluate the performance of an orchestra leader by how well his orchestra plays. His ability as a musicologist, the happiness of his musicians, or the elegance with which he waves his baton may or may not contribute to the orchestra's performance; but the performance itself is the measure of effectiveness, not the musicianship of the conductor or the morale and happiness of the members.

One further point of definition. We need to distinguish between management or administration and leadership. We are here interested in military leadership. But let me emphasize that the ability to lead men is only one of many duties which the officer or noncommissioned officer must perform. He also must write reports, he must negotiate with others in his organization, he must interact with his superior, he must account for supplies, and he may have to function as a staff officer or a technical specialist. All of these are important. However, the leadership function per se, that is, the management and supervision of men, is the only function with which this paper will be concerned.

Leadership Training

Let us then consider the first question: How does a man become an effective leader? When we think of improving leadership, we almost automatically think of training the individual; and by training we generally mean that we wish to change the individual so that he will perform better. This is particularly evident in such training as is given at military academies where the program is designed to remake the whole man.

Yet, research on leadership training designed to make men into more effective leaders has produced very puzzling results. Gilmer's recent text in industrial psychology (1966, p. 245) states that "there is today not one sound study on leadership training." This is illustrated by Newport (1963) who surveyed 121 companies which provided middle-management training for their executives. While all of these companies expressed greater or lesser satisfaction with leadership training, Newport found that most companies evaluated the training programs by asking managers who had attended what they thought about it. Beyond this type of "evaluation" not one of the companies had any scientifically acceptable evidence that leadership training had improved the performance of the supervisor or his organization.

T-group and laboratory training, which have recently become fashionable in business and industry, have yielded similarly unsatisfactory results. Campbell and Dunnette (1968) and House (1967) recently reviewed the literature and found no evidence that this type of training had improved organizational performance; and Schein and Bennis (1965), two major theorists in the area of T-group training, found themselves compelled to say that the evidence showing that laboratory training benefits organizational performance is "meager."

Fleishman's (1961) well-known studies on the effects of supervisory training indicated that the effects of supervisory training in modifying behavior were very short-lived.

I would like to present the results of a number of studies which are of particular interest in the present context. The first of these (Fiedler, 1966) was conducted at a Belgian Naval Training Center.

We chose 244 Belgian recruits and 48 petty officers from a pool of 546 men. These men were assembled into 96 groups, each consisting of three men; 48 groups had petty officers as leaders and 48 groups had recruits as leaders. The recruits ranged in age from 17 to 24 with a mean of 20, and none had been in the service longer than six weeks. The petty officers ranged in age from 19 to 45 years, with an average age of 29 years. In addition, all petty officers had received training at petty officer candidate school. This is a two-year technical and leadership training course similar in scope and design to most military colleges. During these two years the candidate is expected to pay for his own room and board, and after graduation he is expected to enlist for a twenty-year hitch. Promotion from the ranks is rare. In other words, Belgian petty officers are truly motivated and committed career men. They are highly respected by the commissioned officer corps, and they function more like our chief petty officers and warrant officers than our first, second, or third class petty officers.

The petty officers were matched with the recruit leaders on intelligence and leader style scores. Each of the three-man groups worked on four tasks which were designed in cooperation with the camp's officers. One task consisted of writing a recruiting letter urging young men to join the Belgian Navy as a career; the second and third tasks required the groups to find the shortest route for a convoy, first through ten and then through twelve ports; and the fourth task required the leader to train his men in the disassembling and reassembling of a .45 caliber automatic pistol. These tasks are fairly similar to group tasks which petty officers might be called upon to perform in the course of their duty. The intercorrelation among the four tasks was quite low, namely .14; and we are, therefore, dealing with four independent measures of group performance. It is important to note, incidentally, that these correlations show that the best leaders on one task were not necessarily good on another task. Hence, the situation or the task determined at least in part how well a man performs as a leader.

Figure 1 shows the comparative performances of groups led by recruits who had had no leadership experience or training in the Belgian Navy and of groups led by petty officers who had had two years of leadership training as well as an average of ten years of leadership experience. Yet, in not one of the tasks did the groups led by petty officers perform significantly better than did groups led by recruit leaders.

We recently conducted a validation experiment at a leadership training workshop for 15 officers of Canadian military colleges (Fiedler & Chemers, 1968). This study compared the performance of two sets of groups, namely groups led by military academy officers with rank of captain or major, and groups led by enlisted men who had just finished their eight weeks of basic training. All of the officers had graduated from one of the military colleges. In addition, the officers had from 5 to 17 years of experience and training after graduation. The 32 enlisted men who participated in the study were brought in under the pretext that they would work with civilian instructors. None of the 32 men was over 22 years of age; and none, of course, had had more than basic training. Moreover, the officers were clearly superior to the enlisted men in intelligence. Only one enlisted man had a verbal intelligence score which was higher than the score of the lowest officer score, and this one officer was from the French-speaking part of the country. The test, therefore, did not adequately measure his intelligence. In effect, this was a grossly unfair comparison with all the seeming advantages on the side of the officers.

In one part of this experiment we assembled the officers and men into three-man groups and had them successively perform three tasks of varying structure. Two of the tasks were modeled after the tasks used in the Belgian Navy study. One task was to write a recruiting letter, one task involved routing a truck convoy, and one task required the groups to draw bar graphs from score distributions which had to be converted from one scale to another. All tasks were designed so that all three group members had to participate in the work. As in the Belgian Navy study, the intercorrelations among these three tasks were again essentially zero.

Despite the advantages in training and experience which the officers enjoyed over the enlisted men, none of the comparisons in group performance was significantly different. The groups led by officers performed somewhat better than the enlisted men's groups on two tasks while the enlisted men's groups performed somewhat



Figure 1.
Comparison of Belgian navy groups led by petty officers and recruits in four different tasks.

better than the officers' groups on one of the tasks (see Figure 2). This study, therefore, supports the results obtained in the Belgian Navy study on the effects of leadership training and experience.

To check whether amount of training influenced performance in real-life situations, we conducted a study on 171 managers and supervisors of post offices (Fiedler, Nealey, & Wood, 1969). The number of hours of supervisory training received by these managers was correlated with their performance as rated by two or more superiors. Amount of training ranged from zero hours to three years, with a median of 45 hours. Supervisory performance ratings, adjusted for mean differences of post officers, were highly reliable. Table 1 shows the correlations with performance ratings; Table 2 shows the correlations with such objective post office performance measures as target achievement in number of first-class pieces handled. Here again, we found not one of the correlations to be statistically significant in the expected direction. In fact, 12 of the 15 correlations were in the negative direction.

Neither the two controlled experiments nor the field study provides, then, any basis for assuming that leadership training of the type given in these institutions or in the executive training programs taken by postal managers contributed to organizational performance.

Leadership Experience

Let us now look at the effect of supervisory experience and the concomitant on-the-job training which this usually implies. The literature actually contains few, if any, studies which attempt to link leadership experience to performance. Yet, there seems to be a firmly held expectation that leadership experience contributes to leadership performance. We have more trust in experienced than inexperienced leaders. This can be inferred from the many regulations which require time in grade before promotion to the next higher level as well as the many advertisements for executives which specify previous managerial experience as a prerequisite.

We have already seen that the experienced petty officers and military academy officers did not perform more effectively than did the inexperienced enlisted men. A further analysis was, however, performed relating the years of experience of the petty officers and the years of experience on the part of the military academy officers



Figure 2.
Comparisons of groups led by officers and recruits on three different tasks. None of the differences in performance were statistically significant.

Table 1

Correlations of Hours of Training

with Individual Performance

(N = 171)

	Zero-Order Correlation	Partial Correlation
Post Office technical training	.040	.041
Outside technical training	-.001	-.004
Outside leadership training	-.128	-.119

to their groups' performance on the various tasks. Also, a second part of the military academy study utilized all 15 officers as leaders while 30 enlisted men served as group members. These two tasks involved solving cryptograms and drawing military barracks and a plan of a military camp according to scale. Neither in the Belgian Navy study nor in the military academy study did years of experience correlate significantly with leadership performance.

In addition, we also have findings from various other groups and organizations. These include (a) directors of research and development teams at a large physical research laboratory, (b) foremen of craftshops, (c) general foreman of a heavy machinery manufacturing company, (d) managers of meat and (e) of grocery markets in a large supermarket chain, as well as (f) post office supervisors and managers at various levels. As Table 3 shows, none of the correlations was significant in the expected direction. The median correlation for all groups and organizations is -.12. This is certainly not significant in the positive direction!

To summarize our findings, neither leadership training nor leadership experience appears to contribute to group or organizational effectiveness. These data, as well as the reviews of the

SUMMARY OF FIELD AND LABORATORY STUDIES TESTING THE CONTINGENCY MODEL

		Octants							
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
FIELD STUDIES	Hunt	-.67		-.80		.21		.30	
		-.51						-.30	
	Hill		-.10	-.29			-.24	.62	
	Fiedler, et al.		-.21		.00		.67*		-.51
	O'Brien, et al.		-.46		.47		-.45		-.14
LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS	Belgian Navy	-.72	.37	-.16	.08	.16	.07	.26	-.37
		-.77	.50	-.54	.13	.03	.14	-.27	.60
	Shima		-.26		.71*				
	Mitchell		.24		.43				
			.17		.38				
	Fiedler Exec.		.34		.51				
	Skrzypek	-.43	-.32	.10	.35	.28	.13	.08	-.33
	Median, all studies	-.69	.17	-.29	.38	.22	.10	.26	-.35
	Median, Field Studies	-.59	-.21	-.29	.23	.21	-.24	.30	-.33
	Median Laboratory Experiments	-.72	.24	-.16	.38	.16	.13	.08	-.33
	Medians in original studies	-.52	-.58	-.33	.47	.42	---	.05	-.43

Number of correlations in the expected direction . . . . 35[1]
Number of correlations opposite to expected direction 9
p by binomial test 01

[1] exclusive of Octant VI, for which no prediction had been made.
*p .05

Table 3

Correlations Between Years of Experience and Group Performance

	Correlation Coefficient	N
Belgian Navy Study (.08, .13, -.05, .12)	.10*	24
Military Academy Study (.03, -.32, -.30, -.21, .42)	-.21*	16
Assistant Postmasters	-.53*	19
Superintendents of Mail	-.13	20
Asst. Supts. of Mail	-.12	19
Second-Level Supervisors	.24	23
First-Level Supervisors	-.13	180
Research Chemists	.12	18
Craft Shop Foremen	-.28	11
Meat Department Managers	.09	21
Grocery Department Managers	.33	24
Production Department Foremen	-.18	10
Median Correlation	-.12	385

*Median correlations are listed since the correlations were not computed on completely independent cases.

literature (see Campbell and Dunnette, 1968; House, 1967) on other types of training, provide no evidence that current leadership training practices improve organizational performance. It is, therefore, obvious that we must consider alternative methods for improving leadership performance. I would like to discuss some probable causes for these discouraging findings and then suggest that a different type of training might yield a better payoff.

A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness

Terman wrote in 1904 that leadership performance depends on the situation as well as on the leader. We have repeated this and similar statements ever since without really taking them seriously in our training strategies. Practically all formal training programs attempt to change the individual; all assume that the training should enable the individual to become more flexible, or more sensitive to his environment so that he can adapt himself to it, or more typically, that he should adopt one versus another type of attitude, behavior, or style which supposedly is the most effective. Most training programs attempt to mold the individual into a supposedly ideal pattern. These programs, therefore, implicitly assume that there is one best way to lead, that there is one best type of leader personality. We generally think of organizations and leadership jobs as fixed and rigid, and we tend to think of the individual as infinitely malleable and plastic. You give the individual a course of ten lectures, or you put him into an intensive training workshop, and zap, you have a changed man. As we have seen from the various studies which I have mentioned, not even two or five years of intensive training in a military school appears to change individuals so that they perform more effectively in their leadership jobs. It is difficult to see how we can do much better with these same methods in a shorter period of time.

The problem may, however, lie not so much with our training programs as with our conception of the leadership process. I would like to review very briefly a program of research carried out under the sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research and the Advanced Research Projects Agency in order to suggest a new approach to the problem of improving leadership performance.

The theory developed under this program holds that the effectiveness of a group performance is contingent upon (a) the leader's style of interacting with his subordinates and (b) the degree to which the situation gives the leader power and influence. We have worked with a leadership style measure called the "Esteem for the Least

Preferred Co-worker," or LPC for short. The subject is first asked to think of all the people with whom he has ever worked and then to describe the one person in his life with whom he has been able to work least well. This "least preferred co-worker" (LPC) may be someone he knows at the time or it may be someone he has known in the past. It does not have to be a member of his present work group. In grossly oversimplified terms, the person who describes his least preferred co-worker in relatively favorable terms tends to seek need gratification from achieving on the task and from being recognized as having performed well on the task. The low LPC person thus uses the group to get the task done while the high LPC person uses the task to obtain a favorable position and good interpersonal relations.

The statement that some leaders perform better in one kind of a situation while some leaders perform better in different situations is begging a question. "What kinds of situations are best suited for which type of a leader?" In other words, how can we best classify groups if we wish to predict leadership performance.

One way of approaching this problem is by assuming that leadership is essentially a work relationship involving power and influence. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to look at situations in terms of how much power and influence they can give the leader. We can then classify groups according to a number of ways. One simple categorization classifies leadership situations on the basis of three major dimensions.

Leader-member relations. Leaders presumably have more power and influence if they have a good relationship with their members than if they have a poor relationship with them, if they are liked, respected, and trusted than if they are not. This is by far the most important single dimension as shown by Fishbein, et al. (1969) and Mitchell (1969).

Position power. Leaders have more power and influence if their position is vested with such prerogatives as being able to hire and fire, being able to discipline, to reprimand, etc. That is, a wing commander has more position power than one of his airmen; a manager of a store or a department has more position power than the chairman of a committee.

Task structure. Tasks or assignments which are highly structured, spelled out, or programmed give the leader more influence than tasks which are vague, nebulous and unstructured. It is easier to be a leader whose task it is to set up a sales display according to clearly spelled-out steps than it is to be a chairman of a committee preparing a new sales campaign.

As one rough classification method, we can now order groups as being high or low on each of these three dimensions. This gives us an eight-celled cube. This scheme postulates that it is easiest to be a leader in groups which fall into Cell 1 since you are liked, have position power, and have a structured task. It is somewhat more difficult in Cell 2 since you are liked, have a structured task, but little position power, and so on to groups in Cell 8 where the leader is not liked, has a vague, unstructured task and little position power. An example of Cell 8 would be a disliked chairman of a volunteer committee preparing a new curriculum (Figure 3).

The critical question is, What kind of a leadership style does each of these different group situations call for? Figure 4 shows the results obtained in 63 sets of groups (a total of 454 groups are represented in Figure 2). The horizontal axis indicates the situational difficulty, namely, where the leader's group fell in terms of the eightfold classification shown on the previous figure. The vertical axis shows the correlation coefficients between group performance and the leader's Least Preferred Co-worker score. Note that a point on the plot is a correlation coefficient which represents not one group but a set of groups for which a correlation was obtained between the leader's LPC score and his group's performance.

The important finding shown on this graph is, first, that both the relationship-oriented and the task-oriented leaders perform well under some situations but not others. Second, if our data reflect reality, it is not sensible to speak of a good leader or a poor leader--rather we must think of a leader who performs well in one situation but not in another. This is also borne out by the repeated finding, illustrated again in the Belgian and Canadian studies, that we cannot predict a leader's performance on one task by knowing how well he performed on a different kind of task. And finally, the plot shows that task-oriented leaders tend to perform better than relationship-oriented leaders in situations which are very favorable, and in those which are very unfavorable. Relationship-oriented leaders perform better than task-oriented leaders in situations which are intermediate in favorableness. This bow-shaped distribution is important, and I want to return to it again. Before I move on, one more comment seems appropriate. This plot shows that the performance of a leader


LEADER-MEMBER RELATIONS
TASK STRUCTURE
LEADER POSITION POWER
+
−
−
+
+
−
3
1
7
5
1
5
5
7
2
6
6
8

Figure 3.
Group situation model. Task-oriented groups are classified in a three-dimensional model (top) using the three major factors affecting group performance.*

*Fiedler, F. E. Style or Circumstance: The Leadership Enigma. Psychology Today, 1969, March, 38-43. Used with the permission of Psychology Today.



OCTANTS	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	V–A
Ldr. Memb. Relations	Good	Good	Good	Good	Mod. Poor	Mod. Poor	Mod. Poor	Mod. Poor	Very Poor
Task Structure	Str.	Str.	Unstr.	Unstr.	Str.	Str.	Unstr.	Unstr.	Str.
Ldr. Position Power	Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak	Strong

Figure 4.
Correlations of Leader LPC and Group performance Plotted Against Octants, i.e., Favorableness of Group Task Situation for Leader.

depends as much on the job and the organization as it does on the individual in the leadership position. Hence, the organization can change leadership performance by redefining the leader's job, or by making certain changes in the way his position or his task is designed.

Validation Evidence

The critical question is, of course, how well the model predicts in new situations. There have been at least 25 studies to date which have tested the model or certain aspects of it. Let me here briefly discuss only those studies which represent exact tests of the Contingency Model. These are studies which used the LPC score of the leader as the predictor variables and which classify group situations according to the three dimensions of leader-member relations, position power, and task structure.

The studies which meet these criteria have been divided into those which were conducted in natural settings on ongoing organizations, and those which were specifically designed as laboratory or field experiments. Table 4 gives the relevant results (a detailed description of all of these studies can be found in a recent review of the literature by Fiedler, 1970).

As can be seen, the field studies almost completely reproduce the findings obtained in the original studies (compare the row summarizing median correlations obtained in field studies with median correlations obtained in the original studies). A somewhat less satisfactory outcome was obtained for laboratory experiments; yet, even here the number of correctly predicted correlations far exceeds chance expectation. As for the entire set of correlations, 35 of the 44 were in the predicted direction, a finding which is well below the .001 level of confidence.

The only clear deviations from the predicted curve occurred in Octant II of the laboratory and field experiments. While it is too early to tell why this particular octant yielded results deviating from the prediction, it is not unlikely that certain leadership conditions are very difficult to reproduce in the laboratory or under experimental conditions.

Implications for Training

What does all this mean as far as leadership training is concerned? First of all, we can see from these data that the performance of an interacting group depends both upon leadership style and upon the organizational factors which determine the favorableness of the leader's job. We can, therefore, modify the leader's performance either by changing the leader or by changing certain aspects of his job.

The idea that we can change a leader's job in order to make him perform better is by no means new. We often hear a manager say that one of his subordinates needs to be given a free rein while another man has to be held in check, that one man can handle troublemakers while another cannot, that you have to give one man detailed direction on what to do and how to do it while you can give another man a problem without instructions and get it done better that way.

In sum, if we want to improve leadership performance, we can either change the leader by training or we can change his leadership situation. I would submit that it is much easier to change various aspects of a man's job than to change the man. When we talk about leadership, we are talking about fairly deep-ingrained personality factors and habits of interacting with others. These cannot be changed easily, either in a few hours or in a few days. In fact, as we have seen, not even five years of military academy and five to eighteen years of subsequent experience enable a man to perform significantly better than someone who has had neither training nor experience.

The data in this area generally do show that leadership training tends to bring about some improvements of employee job satisfaction and better interpersonal relations. Whether this alone is sufficient to warrant the high expense of current training programs is, of course, a question which must be left to administrative judgment and cost analysis. Nor do we question the value of technical training or training in administrative procedures which various programs offer. But, to repeat, there is no evidence that the aspects of these programs which aim to change the individual increase organizational effectiveness.

A proposed training program. The training program which our research suggests would consist in grossly oversimplified forms of the following steps:

First, we need to demonstrate to prospective leaders and their superiors that there are few, if any, all-around good leaders or poor leaders. A man who performs well as a leader in one situation may or may not perform well in another situation. The fact that a man fails in one situation does not, therefore, make him a poor leader--nor does a man's success in one particular task make him a good leader in others. If our data are to be believed, training must assist men in learning to recognize the types of situations in which they are likely to succeed and the situations in which they are likely to fail. Obviously, a man who avoids situations in which he is likely to fail is likely to be a success.

Second, leadership training should devote more effort to teaching leaders how to modify their environment and their own job so that it fits their style of leadership. We must get rid of the implicit assumption that the environment and the organization, or a particular leadership position, are constant and unchanging. Leaders constantly modify their leadership positions. They often speak of showing their men who is boss--presumably to assert their position power. They speak of getting to know their men--presumably to establish better relations with them. They talk of different approaches to their work; they look for certain types of assistants who complement their abilities; they demand more authority or they play down the authority they already have; they ask for certain types of assignments and try to get out of others. The theory which has here been described merely provides a basis for a more rational modification of a leadership job.

Third, it is important that we impress on managers and leaders at the second, third, or higher levels of the organization that they can directly affect the performance of their subordinate leaders by modifying various aspects of the leadership situation. A poor performance by a subordinate leader may, therefore, reflect the higher-level leader's failure to provide a leadership situation in which his subordinate can be successful.

Lastly, a word on how we can train leaders to determine the conditions under which they are most likely to succeed or fail and how they can modify their own leadership situation. The disappointing relations between leadership experience and leader performance undoubtedly stem in part from the difficulties in studying one's own leadership effectiveness. Unless the group fails utterly in its task, most people in our studies have been unable to say with any degree of accuracy how well their group had performed in comparison with other groups.

Leadership training, if our reasoning is correct, should provide the prospective leader with a wide range of leadership situations in which he can get immediate feedback on how well he has performed. On the basis of these experiences he must learn to recognize the situations which fit his particular style of leadership and how he can best modify situations so that they will enable him to perform effectively. This requires the development of six or eight short leadership tasks and situations in which each trainee is required to perform. He must then be given an objective appraisal of how his group's performance compared with the performance of others under the same conditions. Needless to say, leadership training of this type could easily be established in military institutions.

If there is such a thing as the all-around good leader, he is likely to be the individual who intuitively or through training knows how to manage his environment so that the leadership situation best matches his leadership style. It would seem that this type of training can be provided for the military leader and for the cadet in military academies.

References

Campbell, J. P., & Dunnette, M. D. Effectiveness of T-group experiences in managerial training and development. *Psychological Bulletin,* 1968, *70,* 73-104.

Fiedler, F. E. The effect of leadership and cultural heterogeneity on group performance: A test of the contingency model. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 1966, *2,* 237-264.

Fiedler, F. E. Validation and extension of the contingency model: A review of empirical findings. Technical Report 70-4, Organizational Research, University of Washington, 1970.

Fiedler, F. E., & Barron, N. The effect of leadership style and leader behavior on group creativity under stress. Urbana, Ill.: Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1967.

Fiedler, F. E., & Chemers, N. M. Group performance under experienced and inexperienced leaders: A validation experiment. Urbana, Ill.: Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1968.

Fiedler, F. E., Nealey, S. M., & Wood, M. T. The effects of training on performance of Post Office supervisors. Report to Postal Service Institute, Washington, D. C., 1969.

Fiedler, F. E., O'Brien, G. E., & Ilgen, D. The effect of leadership style upon performance and adjustment in volunteer teams operating in a stressful foreign environment. Urbana, Ill.: Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1967.

Fleishman, E. A. *Studies in industrial and personnel psychology.* Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1961.

Gilmer, B. von Haller. *Industrial psychology: Second edition.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

Hill, W. The validation and extension of Fiedler's theory of leadership effectiveness. *Academy of Management Journal,* 1969 (March), 33-47.

House, R. J. T-group education and leadership effectiveness: A review of the empiric literature and a critical evaluation. Personnel Psychology, 1967, 20, 1-32.

Hunt, J. G. Fiedler's leadership contingency model: An empirical test in three organizations. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1967, 2, 290-308.

Newport, M. G. Middle management development in industrial organizations. Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Illinois, 1963.

O'Brien, G. E. Group structure and the measurement of potential leader influence. Urbana, Ill.: Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1969.

Schein, E. H., & Bennis, W. G. Personal and organizational change through group methods: The laboratory approach. New York: Wiley, 1965.

Terman, L. M. A preliminary study of the psychology and pedagogy of leadership. Pedag. Sem., 1904, 11, 413-451.

BLANK PAGE

The Honorable John A. Love (LLB, University of Denver) is Governor of the State of Colorado. A Navy pilot during World War II, he served with the famous Black Cat Squadron in the Pacific and was highly decorated. Following the war, he practiced law in Colorado Springs and became active in local Republican politics. His first of three terms as Governor began in 1962. Governor Love is a Rotarian and member of the Colorado and American Bar Associations. In addition to his state executive duties, Governor Love is Chairman of the National Governors' Conference.

Abstract

Governor Love discusses leadership from the viewpoint of the chief executive of the state. He points out that political leadership requires that the leader move in directions indicated by the majority of the electorate. He discusses his analysis of his leadership role in terms of four functions: the executive, the political party leader, innovative program leadership, and the symbolic function of the governorship. In the question period Governor Love responds to questions on mass transportation, communication, the 18-year-old vote, background for public leadership roles, ecology, fiscal problems, regional problems and specific questions on the functions of leadership he cited.

LEADERSHIP IN STATE GOVERNMENT

By

The Honorable John A. Love

Governor of the State of Colorado

Thank you very much, General Moorman, for your warm welcome and that great introduction. I'm flattered to be considered an ally, and I hope I've been an effective one in some ways. I'm going to speak informally and briefly and then hope to stimulate what I'm sure can be a most meaningful discussion.

In thinking about political leadership, I thought I'd start with an old story that perhaps many of you have heard. It's been told about many political leaders, but I've used it in connection with Mahatma Ghandi. He allegedly was sitting in a hut talking with someone; and outside down the street there ran a great, howling mob. Mahatma Ghandi said to the person he was conversing with, "Excuse me, those are my people; I am their leader; I must run and catch them." This, of course, is untrue and perhaps unjust about most political leaders; but it does carry a grain of truth. In political and perhaps other kinds of leadership, you must be in some reasonable relationship with the true source of power--the people. People in a great majority tend to be effective. We believe that there is no guarantee that a majority is right; but, at least in my opinion, they often have a better chance of being right than any of the other possibilities. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, "Democracy is the worst form of government known to man, with the exception of all the other ones we've tried." So we come to the rule of the majority more or less by eliminating some of the other possibilities.

A political leader cannot simply follow, run a poll, and do what the poll says. He must lead, in my opinion; but unless he is going to be something else than a political leader, a martyr perhaps, he is not going to be too far out in front of the group of people he is leading. Let me discuss more specifically and in more detail my job here in the State of Colorado. It is, of course, broken down into various functions.

First and perhaps the simplest to discuss is the more or less routine job of being Chief Executive, of running the various institutions, the mental hospitals, the prisons and the highway department, and all the other things that a state does. This, I suppose, is more nearly comparable to the kind of job a corporate executive does. It is made very much more challenging by virtue of the fact that in Colorado the Chief Executive does not have the power to hire and fire. Many years ago there was great concern about the spoils system and what it was doing to our cities and states. The so-called "muck rakers" were writing many articles in magazines; and so the people of Colorado reacted and, in my opinion, perhaps overreacted. They provided for all practical purposes that all of our state employees, with the exception of the elected officials, were to be the subject of a Civil Service System. This means that a separate group decides who is going to fill the job. They then send the name over, and it does make the problem different from that of a corporate executive.

If I can lobby you for just a moment--those of you who are going to vote--there will be on the ballot this fall some amendments to the Constitution which would provide a little more flexibility as far as the Civil Service System is concerned. These amendments would allow more selectivity than the rule of one does now. So I've lobbied you.

So, you have the function I've described; and it is largely routine. You have the function of being the leader of a political party, and this is less than routine. It used to be fashionable to say about the Republican Party and it is now the thing to say about the Democratic Party, ". . . but I don't belong to any organized political party; I'm a democrat," which speaks for some of the problems that go on in political parties. A political party is a group of people who, however idealistic, want a part of the power, a piece of the action; and they want to participate. This is the way it should be. But from the standpoint of leadership, perhaps cynically, I have said that the politics in this area is basically the care and feeding of egos. You have to make sure that each and every one is consulted and informed if you want to keep a cohesive group, and a cohesive group is necessary in our two-party system. People interested and concerned at all levels of government in all areas of the state are necessary to provide the necessary backing.

Another function of the Governor as a leader, and it's much on my mind now since the legislature has just recessed, is the problem of providing leadership in the area of programs. You will note from time to time the newspapers or members of the other party will charge that I don't exert sufficient leadership on the legislature. Or, on the other hand, if someone does follow the administration line, they charge that they are rubber stamps. So it's a little hard to satisfy them all the time; but, nevertheless, this is a most interesting function of leadership.

For example, let me describe one program that I presented at this session of the legislature--a proposal that Colorado have a statewide system of land use, of statewide zoning. Now, this is quite far out in front--in the same context that I was talking about a little while ago--with respect to the relationship you have to the wishes of the underlying majority of the people. It is new and it trods on a good many toes. The basic thinking underlying it is that you can see areas across the nation, Los Angeles for one, that, when left to their own devices, have simply built great metropolitan sprawls and strip cities. With the forecast growth in population, it seems certain to me that unless we do it better, this is also what we are going to build along the east face of the Rockies. This is something we want to avoid.

Local zoning doesn't have the statewide perspective which can operate effectively, and it seems to be obvious that we must take some action in that regard. But you run into the parochial thought that many of our legislatures have in regard to power at the County Commissioner level. Or you run into different kinds of personal experience. One of the legislators, who is a very substantial rancher, firmly and philosophically believes that if he wants to sell a five-acre piece to somebody to build a mountain cabin, it is his business and nobody should be telling him what to do. Yet, if you fly over the front range and look at some of the unbelievable scars that poorly designed subdivisions created along the mountains, see building in flood plains, see casual destruction, you must be convinced that a better approach is needed.

As a matter of leadership, how do you accomplish this? There is no direct means by which I can order the legislature to take my advice and pass this bill. I think it becomes a process of education, not only of the specific legislators but of the people. I think that it becomes a matter of communication which is the most relevant power the Governor has. He commands the means of communication; that is, he can make himself heard. You can't always make yourself heard accurately through the communications media. I'm not, at the moment, being critical of the media. Even given the greatest understanding and sense of dedication, mission and fairness, the very real problem of getting time on the TV news for more than about sixty to ninety seconds makes it almost impossible to discuss any subject in depth or at any length. So, you almost have to think in shorthand.

As far as the press media are concerned, there are many problems there. I think of one example--this may not be a fair example, but it indicates what can happen. We had some serious floods in 1965; and I had been out across the state, had been without sleep. I came back to the office briefly and some reporter said some legislator had suggested that we double the income tax in order to take care of this damage. He asked, "What do you think about it?" I said, "That is very interesting," and went on out the door. The next headline in the Gazette Telegraph was, "Love Suggests Doubling Income Tax"; and they sent their inquiring reporter out to ask the question, "What do you think of Governor Love's suggestion to double the income tax?" So there is a bit of a problem in communicating through the media, even with the best of intent on everybody's part; but it is one of the basic tools you have to use.

Another and perhaps in some ways the most important aspect of the job of Governor is the symbolic, the ceremonial if you will. It's the cement that tends to bind our kind of organization together. The fact that the Governor shows up in Craig or in Cortez or one of the smaller outlying towns seems to be very meaningful to some citizens who live out there and say, "We don't feel like we are a part of the State of Colorado." The fact that the Governor visits these areas does tend to tie the state together. It does, I think, have many ramifications beyond that. Perhaps in the discussion we can get into it in more detail.

It seems to me our institutions, including government, are more under attack today than they have been for many generations. Whether it's the family, the church, schools, whatever, there is a minority, but a very vocal minority, that are actually attacking and actually endangering the system that we are talking about. When I say endanger, I have no great fear that the Weatherman or the SDS or the militants in other areas will actually succeed. The thing I find more worrisome is the possibility that the reaction to this kind of activity will be so overwhelming that we would all stand in some danger of losing the kind of system we have. Historically and traditionally, the reaction to unreasonable civil unrest has been in the authoritarian kind of government, a reaction in which we would all lose. So it seems to me that the function that you need to serve to the best of your ability in a position such as mine is to preserve and protect the symbol, a respected symbol, of the system which responds with fairness and responds effectively to the pressures.

One sometimes wonders whether this system is so designed that it can in the ultimate project itself--whether it does not, in the long run, rely upon the consent of a very substantial portion of its constituents, its electorate. We have had recent examples of the problems that cause great concern. The trial of the "Chicago Seven" has been a great dilemma. How can the system be made to work when the people will simply not subject themselves to it or give tacit consent? I think that the exercise of leadership in these various areas is different, and I would be more than interested to discuss it with you if you now have some questions or comments.

Discussion

Discussant: Sir, I have a question about mass transportation in the Denver-Boulder area and your role of leadership in that situation.

Governor Love: I'm sure that mass transit has to be a part of the solution of the transportation problems, not only in the metropolitan areas, but I would think in Colorado also along the east face of the range and perhaps into the ski areas. Historically, this kind of thing has been done by private enterprise; but it seemingly is not working effectively at the moment. The Department of Transportation has a fairly extensive program looking toward: (1) research in high-speed ground transportation and (2) in grants through the office or the Department of Transportation and also through HUD, to communities and to states in planning and attempting to implement mass transportation.

Discussant: What do you find to be your best sources of information to help you determine where the majority wants to go? You've mentioned the possible communication problem in getting your thoughts to the people. How do they, in turn, get their thoughts to you?

Governor Love: That is a problem. I think that we don't poll extensively enough, and I'm sure that is one possible tool. It seems to me, however, that it is not a completely accurate tool. I suppose this is a kind of horse-and-buggy answer, but it is a matter of "feel"--the people you talk to, the correspondence you receive, the comments. I am sure that I also rely on the press, the media, to a great extent. There isn't any definitive way in which I can report to you how I do, indeed, get the kind of information I need; but I can assure you I constantly work at it.

Discussant: Do you think that if and when Congress approves the lower voting age, this is going to prove a new and different means for you to reach the eighteen-year-olds? How are you going to reach them, and how are they going to reach you?

Governor Love: Well, first let me express a little cynicism. You know there was great thought that when women were given the vote, this was going to change everything. I don't think that it created a materially different political situation. I don't think that the eighteen-year-old vote will change things a great deal either. I know that on some of our campuses when issues requiring a vote arise, there is not a very big percentage who even show up to vote. So I'll wait and see. With cynicism aside, certainly I don't think it changes the problem too materially. I think that the methods of attempting to reach them will be roughly the same. That is, even if they don't have the vote, it seems to me that all elected officials still are most concerned about what they think whether they have the vote or not. I think they exercise just as much leverage on the individual's thinking now as they will when they have the vote.

Discussant: Sir, do you have anyone on your staff that specializes in helping you with the symbolic function?

Governor Love: I don't have a specialist in that. I guess the thing that would come closest to it is scheduling. One of the greatest difficulties of this job is just simply the organization of your time. The scheduling is at the heart and core of what you are going to do, and you don't do anything unless it is on the schedule. You have masses of invitations, and sometimes it seems to me that any time three people get together in the State of Colorado, they think the Governor should be there. Let me finish with a story that Bob Smiley, a former Governor of Idaho, told me. He said he went to his doctor; and his doctor said, "Now you must slow down." He said, "All right, doctor," and went home. The next day on his desk he received an invitation from the same doctor to speak to the Medical Society--so "turn down everything but come talk to me" is the thing. I think the closest thing to a specialist would be the scheduling of time--where you are going to go, who you are going to speak to, and so on.

Discussant: Does the Governor ever really become the leader of the bureaucracy? It is in existence before he comes in, and it will go on after he leaves. How do you make your leadership felt in this kind of situation?

Governor Love: This is very difficult, and I don't know--I think you can see it more clearly on the federal level, but it is also true at the state level. Somehow the bureaucracy flows on and on. Whoever is elected becomes a little irrelevant as far as they are concerned; and many, many policy decisions are made at that level. It is a little better at the state level. I'll use an example, if I can become personal for just a moment. Charlie Shumate is head of our Highway Department. I'm sure that our personal relationship is such that the effect radiated down through the highway employees is quite an effect, but what you say is true. It is awfully difficult to actually bring the kind of effectiveness you would like to in the bureaucracy, which will be there after you are gone. They also constitute a special interest group, which is not to be unduly critical, because almost everybody, it seems to me, is in one special interest group or another. The civil servants, however, through the Civil Service Employees Association, are organized and interested always in the rates of pay, the working conditions, the retirement benefits, and many other things. They tend to be an effective lobbying force.

Discussant: Sir, how much of your time do you spend on developing new programs for Colorado, and what kind of organization do you have in the Governor's office to provide you advice on this matter?

Governor Love: We have a planning department that is working on plans all the time, not simply physical plans but program plans. It is not all action--some of it is reaction. For example, the head of our Department of Social Services will be involved in the kind of planning that is a reaction sometimes to change at the federal level. We can see a change coming at the federal level that will affect our welfare system. We have to react. We also get a good deal of help out of the Governors' conferences and the secretariat that serves us. We look at similar programs in other states.

Discussant: Sir, you mentioned the possible state zoning of land; and I was wondering how fast this centralization of government is going to take place?

Governor Love: I don't know how quickly this will occur. I think it is one of those types of programs which are not going to move through our system the first time proposed. It may take two or three times to get it enacted. It ultimately will, of course, limit some local choice and provide that much more centralization if it, indeed, is implemented. The kind of severe problem it entails may be that inevitably you are going to have to say that Colorado Springs should not be any bigger than it is. We are going to provide another cluster city, maybe at Palmer Lake and Monument, to take care of another city of twenty or thirty thousand. If you, then, at a state level so zoned the land to prevent Colorado Springs from growing, or Denver or Greeley or whatever city it might be, I don't think you would find that you could do it at the local level. The whole theory of practically every city has been sort of a boomer philosophy that we must be bigger--not only to get bigger, but provide more tax base. This is nonsense in that it can be proven that beyond a certain point, as you get larger, the per capita cost of government is greater, until you finally come to what seems to me to be the "end of the line." An example is New York City, which I find to be just plain not viable.

Discussant: Governor Love, in the military subordinates to the commander are expected to support him 100% in any course that he elects to follow. How do you feel when a subordinate to you, say Mr. Hogan, publically differs from you on a program that you have decided upon?

Governor Love: Well, I don't know that that is really a good example. The present statutes provide that the Lieutenant Governor is to act as Governor when the Governor is incapacitated or unable to act; and he isn't in the chain of command, so to speak. The Lieutenant Governor as presently constituted under our statutes and Constitution is not necessarily a subordinate. Of course, it is made more difficult, as far as I am concerned, by virtue of the fact that we do have a two-party system; and Mr. Hogan is a member of the other party.

Discussant: Sir, along the same line, we asked some of the cadets here; and they seem to say, "I would like to be general some day." I'm curious as to the point in your lifetime when you made the decision that you would like to be Governor?

Governor Love: Strangely enough, I decided early that I wanted to become involved in public life. I probably decided it early enough that my desire was to be President of the United States, as a matter of fact; but early I thought that. As I went on, I came to the second conclusion that I didn't want to get involved in the political life if I had to rely on it for a living. So, I decided the first thing to do was to make some money. Well, I practiced some law here in Colorado Springs; and even though I hadn't acquired enough money, I looked at myself in the mirror one day and said, "John, if you are ever going to do it, you'd better start at it. Time is going by."

Discussant: Sir, one of the things that we are concerned with here is the development of leadership with our cadets. I am wondering in looking at the similarities and differences of the functions and what's involved in public life as opposed to a military organization or an industrial organization, what you see as the requirements in developing a leader for public life--aside from being a lawyer.

Governor Love: No, I don't think that any particular profession is necessary. We were talking earlier about law training, and I do think highly of it--not necessarily as a familiarity with the legal terms and statutes and so forth; but in my opinion, and it is something less than completely objective, I think it is great training as far as just organizing thought, a way of thinking. I believe it has been of great help to me. I suppose that some things are obvious--a person has to have interest in the kind of life that constitutes a campaign, the numbers of coffees and teas, church suppers, etc., the flood of people who must see you. I think you must truly have some call, some sense of mission, some sense of dedication to be able to do it. I suppose that relates to your relationship to people--I suppose you have to say you have to have at least some degree of personality, some degree of articulateness, because the first and foremost requirement for any public official is to get elected. You can't do very much until you do, so to be able to be elected is a big requirement. To do a good job, I suppose you need to have a pretty broad understanding of a great many things. Government, of course, is enough to cover a broad, broad range of activities, perhaps as broad as occupation. I hope that at least comes close to answering your question.

Discussant: Sir, as a leader of your party in the state, what type of difficulties and problems do you encounter in trying to instill a sense of mission or purpose in your organization or your party?

Governor Love: Well, one of the obvious problems that you encounter is that in neither party, at any time I know of, have you had unanimity of thinking philosophically. That is, you've got a group who are maybe just a little bit to the right of Ghengis Khan, or something like that; and then you've got a fairly liberal group of people. Nevertheless, you've got to fit them in one tent as a party. Then you have to, it seems to me, go back and keep going back and say several times what the goal is and what a great job the administration has done and what a great party it is. You need to provide them with some sense of mission and belonging. There isn't any pat answer. I think that the thing that is happening to the Democratic Party nationally now is a wonderful sort of case in point. There was, as you read and know, a very effective coalition put together at the time of the depression in the thirties when Franklin Delano Roosevelt came into power. The combination was the South, the big cities, and the minorities. It has run its course, in my opinion, not only in common interests; but somehow it has become (and I don't mean to sound partisan, but to be as objective as I can, which is not completely) philosophically bankrupt. The thought that fueled it for so many years was the theory that if there was a problem, number one, the government should handle it and, number two, it should be solved by a federal program. The thought that if you were, quote, liberal, unquote, the only thing you needed to solve the problems was to get sufficient funds and sufficient people in the federal program. We were going to cure housing or unemployment or whatever it may be. And it has simply proven to be not true. We've made some strides, but we've found that this doesn't always work. Also, it has created problems as it has gone along. The party is badly split, and I can't think any of them necessarily agree with this kind of philosophy that fueled them for so long.

Discussant: Sir, as long as you touched on this subject, I feel I can ask this question. Right now, and among our contemporaries, it's not really very fashionable to be in the military; and there are a lot of open revolts (well, protests if you want) against more or less federal government and control in campus life, in general, and everything. I was wondering specifically how you felt the unfashionableness, if I could say that, of being in the military reflects maybe mistrust, or at least disillusionment with the leadership at the national level, particularly between maybe 1963 and 1968?

Governor Love: Well, I'm sure it's been a tragedy. I won't attempt to certainly place any blame or to talk about the alternatives, but the Southeast Asia involvement has had a tremendous and difficult effect on so many things. Certainly it seems to me to be the major factor involved in this resistance to military service. I don't think I particularly support the all-volunteer concept. I think it has some implications that are bad; nevertheless, there was, without doubt, a real crisis of confidence in the leadership at the federal level at the time that President Johnson was there. It has been partially, but only partially, healed now in this particular area we are talking about. I think as an exercise in leadership it has been fascinating. With the country practically at each other's throats on this Vietnamese thing, the fact that President Nixon, who was not thought to be a great inspirational leader, has been able to calm it down is a real exercise in political leadership. The polls indicate that he shows 50% to 60% of the people who go along with him in this regard; and so to a certain extent, that leadership gap has been plugged. But certainly there was a real crisis in it for some time.

Discussant: Sir, let me ask, what one thought, one idea, what one goal keeps you going from day to day?

Governor Love: Oh, I think that perhaps the normal things that keep us all going, the sense of ego or whatever makes us all want to do the right kind of job. I suppose the nearest I could come to it beyond that would be I really do have a great pride in the State of Colorado. I have a great desire to preserve and protect and make it even better, if we can.

Discussant: Governor, how do you see the role of the governors throughout the country in the new and popular issue of ecology?

Governor Love: Well, I think they are going to have a part to play, a very major role. There are some areas that can't be handled locally. I don't know that at the state level we can solve this problem of the internal combustion engine. I think that it has to be solved through the leadership of the federal government, at least with some direction to the automobile and the petroleum companies. Something has to be done there nationally. On our water pollution, there are some areas that evidently are going to require federal funding and federal leadership because, like Lake Erie, it involves several states. Here in Colorado I think that we can and should do the job ourselves. We are the original source of four or five of the river systems in the United States (practically no water flows into the state). We should be able to do it, and we are well on the way to handling it. As far as the ecology of land use is concerned, I think it should be a state level function. There undoubtedly will be, as the

President has said, the need for some funding and concern at the national level to bring about some of the clean-up devices necessary; but it is high on the list of responsibilities of the states, I think.

Discussant: Sir, since you have been a highly effective leader yourself, I wonder if you have a little list, maybe, that you have entitled "Principles of Leadership" that you follow, or if you are ever even consciously aware of following certain principles of leadership?

Governor Love: I don't think I ever have formally put anything down in that regard. As a matter of fact, I was trying to think in terms of leadership itself, not necessarily in the context of political leadership; but I'm sure many people have talked about this. I think that a leader must be trusted. A leader must be believed and must be honest, which is not in sufficient depth to convey what I mean. I think of a remark Chase Stone used to make: "He's an all right guy. When he says it's raining outside, you don't have to get up and look out the window." It isn't only moral honesty in what you say as far as getting that kind of trust, but you have to have the intelligence to determine what the truth is. If you can ever achieve that kind of trust where "If John said it, it must be so," you have gone a long way toward achieving what you want. You have to be very careful in arriving at that point that you don't say things that don't follow and don't turn out and aren't true.

Discussant: Sir, what do you think is the biggest single leadership problem confronting city managers and mayors today?

Governor Love: Well, I suppose you would have to say across the nation, across the state for that matter, it is primarily financial. Here in Colorado we have had a great deal of growth, true growth. We have also had a good deal of inflation. We have a progressive tax structure at the state level. The revenues have increased, and we have been able to go on with very much expanded programs at the state level well within the revenues that were flowing in. Look at our state supported institutions of higher education--when I took office, there were about 34,000 students enrolled. We are budgeting this year for some 90,000. This kind of increase is very major and almost unbelievable. A good many of the burdens of increased population and growth fall not at the state level but at the city, the county, and the school district level; and they don't have progressive tax structures. They rely primarily on the property tax, the ad valorem tax, which does not grow as fast as the income tax or even the sales tax. As a consequence, they have, to varying degrees, financial crises. I think of this when you ask what are the greatest problems. I'm sure there are also great problems in simply the maintenance of law and order, because the primary responsibility for that does fall at the local level. There are others in the ecology field and other fields.

I think one of the crises that is occurring is a fiscal crisis present across the United States at all levels of government, and it is perhaps going to worsen. At the federal level, state and local levels, we are taking something that approaches 35% of our gross income in taxation. There is some point beyond which you can't go, whether it is 36 or 40 or 45% I don't know. I don't think it can go much higher and still maintain our kind of system. I don't know what the complete solution will be. I think it does involve some shifting of the tax revenues downward from federal to state, from state to local; but also to sound like a black Republican and conservative, I think that we are going to have to come to an adjustment in our thinking that government, indeed, can't be all things to all people. Government itself cannot cure all problems.

Discussant: In your job you obviously have to deal with a lot of militant-type extremist groups, and I wonder if you could give us some kind of insight into exactly how you go about trying to reach these people who seem so God-awful sure that what they are proposing is right?

Governor Love: It has been amazing to me, the change in the climate or the mood of the people just in the period of time that I have served in this office. Eight to ten years ago, it would have been almost unthinkable that a nice school teacher like Mrs. Brown would be out walking around with a sign. Now it is seemingly accepted. I remember shortly after I took office some of the first mild demonstrations--people walking around the Capitol with signs. I was tempted at that time to get my staff to make our own signs and answer them. If they wanted to communicate that way, we would so communicate. I still think it is funny, but it has become serious enough that this wouldn't do at all as far as a response. There are some of them that I simply can't communicate with. I'm sure this is a part of their technique. I remember, but I've forgotten even what the issue was, that there was a group, some of them Black Panthers, some of them Hispanos and so on, that were up in the legislative chamber and insisted that I come up and speak to the issue, whatever it was. And you simply get hooted down. You can't communicate with some of them. I think this is one of our problems. When they leave what to us is the rational way of exchange of ideas and working within the system, there is no persuasion. Ultimately, I suppose, it is going to have to be force; but that is something, as I say, in which we would all lose.

Discussant: Do you find you have many opportunities or occasions to become involved in leadership development of younger people or younger executives in the state government and the Republican Party on a person-to-person basis?

Governor Love: I think that is a weakness of our situation. We don't have, at the state level, the kind of trainee programs or formal programs that should be developing this sort of person. At the party level, we are a little more aware of it now, but it is again not effectively done. I think it should be done much better than it is.

Discussant: You know we in the Air Force have a dilemma of sorts. Should the individual be a specialist or a generalist? You said that in preparation to become Governor, it would be appropriate if a person was broadly prepared. What sort of a program would you line up for a junior individual who is coming up in public service as to how to accomplish this change from a highly qualified specialist to a highly qualified generalist?

Governor Love: Well, at first, this is something less than humble--I have to relate it to my own experience. I think that my practice of law, which involved itself quite broadly in the oil industry, the ranching industry, real estate ventures, and all sorts of things, has been of great help to me as a generalist. I think the same thing could be done if we could provide programs which would intentionally move people from one of the activities to another in a trainee-type program. I don't know how you could do it yourself unless you are just going to jump from job to job. I think that a program that was structured and funded so you could move some of the young people into various areas would be most helpful in the general field.

Discussant: Sir, in talking about your belief very strongly in the system of state government as opposed to a completely centralized federal government, it occurred to me that one of the basic questions we ask is how large or how small a unit should be given individual control? For example, in our state system, we see here everything from a few square miles to states like Texas and California. Do you feel, perhaps, that we would be better off if we were to reorganize the states to make them more efficient from this standpoint? And if so, what, from your experience, would be a practical range of the population? Is it size? Is it industry?

Governor Love: Efforts have been made recently to improve the internal organization of states and of legislatures. As far as the geographical limits are concerned, they are drawn irrationally. I don't have much hope that they will be redrafted. All you need to do is attempt to bring reorganization or consolidation of counties in the State of Colorado, and you will see the kind of resistance that occurs. We've got in our county of Hinsdale the least populous county in the United States. It sits on both sides of Slumgullion Pass, and in the winter you can't get from one portion of the county to the other. That county line is as irrationally drawn as you possibly can draw one. But talk to anybody about splitting that county in two and joining it to Gunnison and Mineral counties, and you will find there will be marching on the State Capitol.

Discussant: Governor, can you see the place for regional government in the United States?

Governor Love: There have been some efforts made in this area along the line of establishing regional commissions. The one that affects a portion of our state is the Four Corners Regional Commission. I have to report that I don't think it has been very effective so far. Maybe it is lack of funding, but our exercises consisted primarily of expenditure of a good deal of money on a fairly large staff that has been busy planning for what we might do. In the meantime, the funds that are available we split up four ways between the four states and use them to help some of the communities with some of their problems. An older example in this area is the Appalachian one, which ended up spending a good share of its money on highways. You don't need a regional government to build highways. We have been experimenting on a voluntary basis with a so-called Federation of Rocky Mountain States. Again, it has some hope; but it hasn't moved. But I'm sure we will continue to look at it. There are regional problems that perhaps could be better advanced that way.

I would like to tell a classic Colorado story--if you haven't heard it, you should hear it. Back in early Colorado history, a man named Packer was caught up in the snows with a group of people in the high San Juans. When they ran out of food, he is alleged to have eaten his companions or portions thereof. He was brought to trial in Hinsdale County and charged with murder because there was no statute against cannibalism. And the story--somewhat apocryphal--the judge is supposed to have leaned across the podium, pointed at Alfred Packer and said, "You, you SOB, there were only seven Democrats in all of Hinsdale County; and you et three of them."

Discussant: Sir, I was gratified by the quick action that the legislatures took in Colorado and New Mexico for the preservation of that narrow gauge line. I'm just curious to know what administrative processes were involved, between yourself and Governor Cargo, for the acquisition and the funding that you both provided for the preservation of that line.

Governor Love: I'm a little bit surprised about that myself. I don't claim great leadership in that regard. It is a great stretch of country, and it would be fine if it can be made to work. I was having very serious doubts in the problems of once you acquire it, how in the world are you going to operate it on any kind of economically sound basis? But on the basis that we can at least keep our options open, I was not opposed to it. Clarence Quinlan, a legislator from that district, brought it to the legislature; and I didn't think he would get very far with it. It turned out to be one of the more popular bills that hit the legislature. Everybody was concerned and interested in it. As far as New Mexico was concerned, I think there was a little more difficulty down there; but it came through. We are now in the process of negotiating a purchase of the stretch of line from Antonito to Chama with an option on the rest. There is a report due in the next month from the park service. We'll see if it can be put together.

Discussant: Returning to the symbolic, we have heard criticism in recent years that this function is neglected by military leaders; and that we no longer have heroes--we no longer have figureheads. From your perspective in civilian life, would you comment on how you see this?

Governor Love: First let me comment that I've been interested from the viewpoint of my office, particularly in the schools when the younger children gasp, "There is the Governor. That's the Governor." They are very impressed, and I think this feeling they have is a very valuable thing. It's something that if we lost it, there is an indication that we are losing even more of the kind of symbolic cement that holds this country together. I think it is very important as far as the military is concerned, too, that you do have symbols and the ceremony which does reinforce our system.

Discussant: The problem is that school children might be impressed with a General Patton or a General Marshall, but in today's society a general is kind of a vague thing to them.

Governor Love: I don't know how they feel at the present time. I know that I was practically impressed beyond belief the first time I saw somebody with a star on his shoulder, but we've had enough of them by here. I'm still impressed, but not to the same extent.

General Moorman: I'm impressed with governors all the time. Thank you very much, Governor Love. We appreciate your coming down here and spending all this time. I'm sure all of us have gotten a lot out of your discussion, not only in your ideas of leadership and how they are exercised in public life, but also how you run the State of Colorado. Thank you again.